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This article explores some of the challenges generated by recent attempts to relate the concept of political corruption to real politics. It shows that the three distinct arguments upon which scholars who conceptualize political corruption through the lens of real politics often rely are ambiguous, and posit standards for the use of power on the basis of naive or conservative assumptions about politics. The article then contends that we do need to consider real politics in the study of political corruption, but not in the manner or for the reasons suggested in much current scholarship. Specifically, examining real politics can help us determine the form of any given case of political corruption. In making this argument, the article attempts to avoid the problems that accompany most real-politics-based understandings of corruption while retaining concern for how the discourse around political corruption might influence political study and democratic politics.

This study empirically examines relationships between conceptions of political corruption, perceived levels of corruption, and political participation among members of the public. Based on a field study of 298 Israelis, we show that the effects of perceived levels of corruption on participation are significantly influenced by how citizens conceptualize corruption. The public's conceptions of corruption influence whether and how they will participate. The findings provide strong evidence that while the perceived extent of political corruption is a powerful determinant of participation, the public's conception of corruption must not be overlooked. Rather, both factors should be considered as important indicators of participation.

This article suggests a new perspective for analyzing anticorruption policies by emphasizing the important role of policy entrepreneurs. We maintain that these entrepreneurs combat corruption in three ways: (1) by initiating attempts to reduce corrupt practices, whether through legislation or judicial decisions; (2) by being recognized as honest brokers for informants and insiders; and (3) by providing reliable information from these sources to promote scandals. Even when they are unsuccessful in getting legislation passed, anticorruption entrepreneurs reduce corruption because they raise the level of scrutiny into corrupt practices. In addition, they foment uncertainty, deterring those considering abusing their power. We test our theoretical framework on several anticorruption entrepreneurs in Israel, demonstrating that their existence increases the potential cost of corruption. By creating networks, sharing information with others, and building reputations of honesty and courage, they encourage those involved in or considering illegal activities to refrain from such actions. Adapted from the source document.

This article suggests a new perspective for analyzing anticorruption policies by emphasizing the important role of policy entrepreneurs. We maintain that these entrepreneurs combat corruption in three ways: (1) by initiating attempts to reduce corrupt practices, whether through legislation or judicial decisions; (2) by being recognized as honest brokers for informants and insiders; and (3) by providing reliable information from these sources to promote scandals. Even when they are unsuccessful in getting legislation passed, anticorruption entrepreneurs reduce corruption because they raise the level of scrutiny into corrupt practices. In addition, they foment uncertainty, deterring those considering abusing their power. We test our theoretical framework on several anticorruption entrepreneurs in Israel, demonstrating that their existence increases the potential cost of corruption. By creating networks, sharing information with others, and building reputations of honesty and courage, they encourage those involved in or considering illegal activities to refrain from such actions.