Suchergebnisse

1 Introduction.- 2 Transmission Channels for Quantitative Easing and Effects on Interest Rates -- 3 The Central Bank Loss Function and Quantitative Easing as a Stackelberg Game -- 4 The Effect of Quantitative Easing on Interest Rates -- 5 Broader Economic Effects on Quantitative Easing -- 6 Conclusion

"Monetary Policy and the Economy in South Africa covers both modern theories and empirical analysis, linking monetary policy with relating house wealth, drivers of current account based on asset approach, expenditure switching and income absorption effects of monetary policy on trade balance, effects of inflation uncertainty on output growth and international spill overs. Each chapter uses data and relevant methodology to answer empirical and pertinent policy questions in South Africa. The book gives new insights into understanding these areas of economic policy and the wider emerging-markets"--

A game is developed where an incumbent chooses between benefits provision to the population, which decreases the probability of revolution endogenously, and fighting with a challenger. Thereafter the challenger chooses a degree of fighting, which determines rent sharing. A successful revolution enables the challenger to replace the incumbent. An unsuccessful revolution preserves the status quo, or causes standoff or coalition. The four possibilities of incumbent replacement, status quo, standoff, or coalition combine with the incumbent either repressing (providing benefits below a threshold) or accommodating (providing benefits above a threshold) the population, for a total of eight outcomes. Such a rich conceptualization of eight outcomes of civil war is missing in the literature. We show how an advantaged versus disadvantaged incumbent deters or fights with a challenger, and provides versus does not provide benefits to the population. The eight outcomes are mapped to 87 revolutions 1961-2011.

A government failing to protect against insurgents may or may not be rescued by the international community. Classifying events during 1961-2012, we find that among the successful interventions, war occurs more often than tension which occurs more often than that the government remains in power. Unsuccessful interventions are less common than successful interventions. When the government protects successfully, tension occurs more often than that the government remains in power, which occurs more often than war. Empirical tests show that the type of intervener matters. U.S. interventions tend to cause more successful outcomes. ; publishedVersion

We consider revolutions and civil war involving an incumbent, a challenger, and the population. Revolutions are classified into eight outcomes. In four outcomes incumbent repression occurs (viewed as providing sub-threshold benefits such as public goods to the population). Accommodation occurs in the other four outcomes (benefits provision above a threshold). The incumbent and challenger fight each other. The incumbent may win and retain power or else lose, thereby causing standoff or coalition. In a standoff, which is costly, no one backs down and uncertainty exists about who is in power. In a coalition, which is less costly, the incumbent and challenger cooperate, compromise, and negotiate their differences. If the population successfully revolts against the incumbent, the challenger replaces the incumbent. Eighty-seven revolutions during 1961–2011, including the recent Arab spring revolutions, are classified into the eight outcomes. When repressive, the incumbent loses 46 revolutions, remains in power through 21 revolutions, and builds a coalition after 12 revolutions. When accommodative, the incumbent loses seven revolutions and builds a coalition after one revolution. The 87 revolutions are classified across geographic regions and by time-period.

This article analyzes revolutionary uprisings, such as the Arab spring of 2011. Revolutions occur with an inherent probability dependent on a country's characteristics. A country's incumbent leader can decrease this probability by providing benefits to a population, e.g., public goods such as necessities of life, health care, safety, and education. We equate the probability of revolution with Granovetter's equilibrium proportion of a population that joins a revolution. Decreased benefits provision increases the share of revolutionaries which, in turn, decreases the cost of revolt which helps resolve the free-rider problem implicit in revolting. The article quantifies how the incumbent chooses whether or not to provide benefits, and how many benefits to provide. We account for the unit cost of providing benefits and for the effects of the benefits provided, adjusted for whether the inherent revolution probability is low or high. Combining the modeling approaches, i.e., how revolutions spread and how the incumbent provides benefits, enriches our understanding of which factors affect revolutions and of how populations and their incumbent leaders interact. The model helps to understand the logic of revolutionary uprisings and how they can be curtailed.

A four-period game is developed between a policy maker, the international community, and the population. This research supplements, through implementing strategic interaction, earlier research analyzing "one player at a time". The first two players distribute funds between preventing and treating diseases. The population reacts by degree of risky behavior which may cause no disease, disease contraction, recovery, sickness/death. More funds to prevention implies less disease contraction but higher death rate given disease contraction. The cost effectiveness of treatment relative to prevention, country specific conditions, and how the international community converts funds compared with the policy maker in a country, are illustrated. We determine which factors impact funding, e.g. large probabilities of disease contraction, and death given contraction, and if the recovery utility and utility of remaining sick or dying are far below the no disease utility. We also delineate how the policy maker and international community may free ride on each other's contributions. The model is tested against empirical data for 43 African countries. The results show consistency between the theoretical model and empirical estimates. The paper argues for the need to create commitment mechanisms to ensure that free riding by both countries and the international community is avoided. ; publishedVersion