Cross-border mergers as instruments of comparative advantage
In: CeGE-discussion paper 34
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In: CeGE-discussion paper 34
In: Discussion paper series / International trade, 1740
World Affairs Online
In: Review of International Economics, Band 24, Heft 4, S. 669-698
SSRN
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5671
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 33, Heft 1, S. 95-118
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: American economic review, Band 94, Heft 5, S. 1411-1428
ISSN: 1944-7981
Real incomes are routinely compared internationally using methods that "correct" for deviations from purchasing power parity. The most widely used of these is the Geary method which, though theoretically suspect, underlies the Penn World Table. This paper provides a theoretical foundation for the Geary method which I call the GAIA ("Geary-Allen International Accounts") system. I show that the Geary method is exact when preferences are non-homothetic Leontief and, more generally, gives a (possibly poor) approximation to the GAIA benchmark. An empirical application suggests that both it and other widely used methods underestimate the degree of international inequality.
This paper reviews progress to date towards a new trade agreement under the Doha Development Agenda. Some of the key issues in contention are examined, including barriers to trade in agriculture and manufacturing, intellectual property rights, and competition policy. A potential sticking point is whether the US will accept a quasi-judicial role for the WTO and constraints on the use of anti-dumping policy. European governments need to decide how badly they want to complete a new trade agreement, and should start preparing their constituents for compromise if an agreement is to be reached.
BASE
In: The Manchester School, Band 70, Heft 3, S. 291-314
ISSN: 1467-9957
This paper extends the theory of multinational corporations, identifying three distinct influences of internal trade liberalization by a group of countries on the level and pattern of inward foreign direct investment (FDI). First, the tariff jumping motive encourages plant consolidation. Second, the export platform motive favours FDI with only a single union plant relative to exporting, and may induce a firm which has never exported to invest. Finally, reduced internal tariffs increase competition from domestic firms, which dilutes the other motives and may induce a 'Fortress Europe' outcome of multinationals leaving union markets even though external tariffs are unchanged.
I review previous approaches to modelling oligopoly in general equilibrium, and propose a new view which in principle overcomes their deficiencies: modelling firms as large in their own market but small in the economy as a whole. Implementing this approach requires a tractable specification of preferences. Dixit-Stiglitz preferences (which imply iso-elastic perceived demand functions) could be used, but continuum-quadratic preferences (which imply linear perceived demand functions) are more convenient. To illustrate their usefulness, I construct a simple closed-economy model of oligopoly in general equilibrium and derive some surprising implications for competition policy.
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Following a brief historical introduction and a discussion of different types of commercial policy, this paper reviews the arguments for and against trade protection. In the bench-mark case of a competitive, small, open economy, free trade maximizes aggregate national welfare, although some individual groups will lose unless compensation is actually paid. Guidelines for policy include the uniform reduction and concertina rules for tariff cuts, and the principle of targeting: corrective measures should be applied as close to the source of the distortion as possible. Relaxing the bench-mark assumptions allows exceptions to the case for free trade: optimal tariffs to manipulate world prices; strategic tariffs or export subsidies when home firms engage in oligopolistic competition with foreign rivals; and infant industry protection to allow home firms benefit from learning by doing. Protection can also raise the growth rate, though it is less likely to raise welfare in a growing economy. Overall, with due allowance for some ambiguity, both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggest a pragmatic case for free trade. Finally, the paper notes the political pressures for and against protection, and the role of international institutions such as the GATT in underpinning moves towards freer trade.
BASE
In: The Canadian Journal of Economics, Band 28, S. S4
In: Economica, Band 48, Heft 191, S. 219
In: The Manchester School, Band 47, Heft 2, S. 160-167
ISSN: 1467-9957
In: The Economic Journal, Band 88, Heft 351, S. 488