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This paper reformulates the question of 'sociology, who needs it' in two ways, The first question we address is that of the reason why the educational system itself did not come to sociology for help in their long quest for a clear-cut content of the subject. The second question is why sociology did not adopt the orphaned subject of social studies back in 1960. The answer to the first question lies in the vulnerability of a subject that is dependent for its continued existence on the political leanings of the day. This led to a new goal for the subject almost every decade: from social education in the sixties and social and political education in the seventies, to a focus on citizenship education in the nineties. Although the objective was renamed on several occasions, the prescriptive viewpoint is recognizable in each. This perspective is difficult to reconcile with a social science content. The answer to the second questions points towards Dutch social scientists with a strong focus on academic sociology and not for critical, policy or public sociology. This choice was also made in order to win the competition with psychologists and for the discipline to get rid of the poor image it had acquired in the 1960s. The new subject social sciences, with a strong focus on science made it possible for sociology to become the pillar of this new subject.

Using insights from theories on marital homogamy and political behaviour, this research examines the tendency of husbands and wives to vote for the same party family. It disentangles the extent to which similarity in party family preference can be explained by (1) partners choosing one another because of their shared socio-economic position and (2) partners influencing one another. For this purpose, we conducted probit regression models with instrumental variables using data from the 2000 and 2003 Dutch Family Survey. Using instrumental variables to analyze endogenous relationships, we found that Dutch partners tend to support parties belonging to the same party family (left, confessional or right). There is some support for the idea that similarity in preference for a leftist and confessional party is - at least partly - a by-product of 'self-selection', i.e. the preference for a partner who is similar in socio-economic characteristics to oneself. As regards rightist voting, there does not seem to be an effect of similarity in socio-economic characteristics. Similarity in preference for a rightist party rather seems to be uniquely the result of mutual influence. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

Using insights from theories on marital homogamy and political behaviour, this research examines the tendency of husbands and wives to vote for the same party family. It disentangles the extent to which similarity in party family preference can be explained by (1) partners choosing one another because of their shared socio-economic position and (2) partners influencing one another. For this purpose, we conducted probit regression models with instrumental variables using data from the 2000 and 2003 Dutch Family Survey. Using instrumental variables to analyze endogenous relationships, we found that Dutch partners tend to support parties belonging to the same party family (left, confessional or right). There is some support for the idea that similarity in preference for a leftist and confessional party is - at least partly - a by-product of 'self-selection', i.e. the preference for a partner who is similar in socio-economic characteristics to oneself. As regards rightist voting, there does not seem to be an effect of similarity in socio-economic characteristics. Similarity in preference for a rightist party rather seems to be uniquely the result of mutual influence. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

This paper reformulates the question of 'sociology, who needs it' in two ways, The first question we address is that of the reason why the educational system itself did not come to sociology for help in their long quest for a clear-cut content of the subject. The second question is why sociology did not adopt the orphaned subject of social studies back in 1960. The answer to the first question lies in the vulnerability of a subject that is dependent for its continued existence on the political leanings of the day. This led to a new goal for the subject almost every decade: from social education in the sixties and social and political education in the seventies, to a focus on citizenship education in the nineties. Although the objective was renamed on several occasions, the prescriptive viewpoint is recognizable in each. This perspective is difficult to reconcile with a social science content. The answer to the second questions points towards Dutch social scientists with a strong focus on academic sociology and not for critical, policy or public sociology. This choice was also made in order to win the competition with psychologists and for the discipline to get rid of the poor image it had acquired in the 1960s. The new subject social sciences, with a strong focus on science made it possible for sociology to become the pillar of this new subject.

This paper examines divisions between majority and minority ethnic groups over attitudes towards minority rights in 13 East European societies. Using national sample surveys and multilevel models, we test the effectiveness of competing explanations of ethnic polarization in attitudes towards minority rights, as well as regional and cross-national differences in levels of polarization. We find that, at the individual level, indicators of 'social distance' (inter-marriage and social interaction) account most effectively for the extent of ethnic polarization. However, regional and cross-national variations in polarization between majority and minority groups are explained most effectively by cultural (linguistic and religious) differences. These findings accord with research in the West, indicating the importance of cultural differences as a source of ethnic polarization, while offering little support for theories focusing on economic and structural factors or the size of minority groups. They also suggest the likely sources of difficulties for democratic consolidation in ethnically divided post-communist societies.

AbstractAs climate change increases the probability and severity of natural hazards, the need for coordinated adaptation at all levels of society intensifies. Governmental‐level adaptation measures are essential, but insufficient in the face of growing risks, necessitating complementary action from households. Apprehending the drivers of household adaptation is critical if governments are to stimulate protective behavior effectively. While past work has focused on the behavioral drivers of household adaptation, little attention has been paid to understanding the relationships between adaptation measures themselves—both previously undergone and additionally (planned) intended adaptation(s). Using survey data (N = 4,688) from four countries—the United States, China, Indonesia, and the Netherlands—we utilize protection motivation theory to account for the behavioral drivers of household adaptation to the most devastating climate‐driven hazard: flooding. We analyze how past and additionally intended adaptations involving structural modification to one's home affect household behavior. We find that both prior adaptations and additionally intended adaptation have a positive effect on intending a specific adaptation. Further, we note that once links between adaptations are accounted for, the effect that worry has on motivating specific actions, substantially lessens. This suggests that while threat appraisal is important in initially determining if households intend to adapt, it is households' adaptive capacity that determines how. Our analysis reveals that household structural modifications may be nonmarginal. This could indicate that past action and intention to pursue one action trigger intentions for other adaptations, a finding with implications for estimating the speed and scope of household adaptation diffusion.

Electoral participation of immigrants is an important issue in Europe, particularly because immigrants vote less often than natives. This may suggest a lack of political integration and might result in proportionally lower representation in parliament, in turn affecting democratic legitimacy. This research analyses 8,132 immigrants in 24 European countries. We find that although the largest differences are at the level of the country of destination, the measured characteristics of the country of origin offer more powerful explanations. We conclude that immigrants from countries with more political and socio-economic opportunities have a higher propensity to vote. Immigrants who live in countries with a higher economic development level also vote more often.

Electoral participation of immigrants is an important issue in Europe, particularly because immigrants vote less often than natives. This may suggest a lack of political integration and might result in proportionally lower representation in parliament, in turn affecting democratic legitimacy. This research analyses 8,132 immigrants in 24 European countries. We find that although the largest differences are at the level of the country of destination, the measured characteristics of the country of origin offer more powerful explanations. We conclude that immigrants from countries with more political and socio-economic opportunities have a higher propensity to vote. Immigrants who live in countries with a higher economic development level also vote more often.