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Research objectives: To study sixteenth-century Russian society's adoption of the traditions of the Golden Horde and Ottoman Empire in the field of autocratic govern-ance, finance, military affairs, etc. Research materials were selected on the basis of their comparative nature. These are Russian chronicles along with Arabic, Turkish, Persian, and Chinese texts. Archaeological evidence has been used as well in the study. Results and novelty of the research: The question regarding the "principle of delayed action", raised by Vernadsky, was the first objective of study. According to this principle, the Mongol influence had a major effect not during the period of Russian dependence on the Golden Horde, but even after the establishment of an independent state. Many histori-ans have referred to this principle when explaining the origin of the Russian autocracy and other state institutions, such as the po est'e. The main historiographical problem regarding this interpretation has been the lack of sources from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Sources, such as notes by foreigners, appear at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and these sources speak about the unlimited power of the great princes. Thus, the autocracy of the sixteenth century was generally considered to have been the result of Mongol influence. To begin with, the author investigated the question of the origin of po est'e. He dis-covered the detailed similarities between Russian pomest'e and Turkish timar. He then established that Russian po est'e and Russian censuses were copies of the Turkish timar and defter. Thus, borrowings from Turkish practices and a palpable Turkish influence were discovered. This Turkish influence supplanted the remnants of the Mongol influence, and the "principle of delayed action" has been demonstrated to be unfeasible. The author showed that the origin of the Russian autocracy was associated with the Turkish influence, and not with the Mongol one. However, the Russian military system was certainly bor-rowed from the Tatars and Mongols. © 2020 Shigabutdin Marjani Institute of History of Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

In the second half of the XX century the neo-Malthusian theory became the basis for the practical politics of many developing countries. Thus, governments have recognized that Malthusian laws are a reality of the traditional society, that they are the laws of history. The neo-Malthusian school exists in modern historiography, which studies the effect of Malthusian laws in the past. Historians-Malthusians argue that the historical process consists of demographic cycles — repeated periods of growth, stagnation and crisis. The article reviews the works of historians of the neo-Malthusian school.

Many historical processes exhibit recurrent patterns of change. Century-long periods of population expansion come before long periods of stagnation and decline; the dynamics of prices mirror population oscillations; and states go through strong expansionist phases followed by periods of state failure, endemic sociopolitical instability, and territorial loss. Peter Turchin and Sergey Nefedov explore the dynamics and causal connections between such demographic, economic, and political variables in agrarian societies and offer detailed explanations for these long-term oscillations.

The theory of military revolution is known to describe the process of transformation of states in Early modern period with the appearance of armed with firearms regular armies. According to the Brian Downing model, this process consists of several successive steps. 1. The starting point in development is the medieval monarchy, where the power of the suzerain is limited to meetings (conditionally, "parliaments"), where aristocrats predominate, managing the resources of their land holdings. 2. The military revolution downgrades the value of chivalry and requires the creation of a large army of firearms-wielding mercenary infantrymen. 3. Funding a new army requires the reallocation of resources to the detriment of the nobility. 4. "Parliaments" resist these demands, with the conflict between the monarchs and the nobility starting. 5. The new army ensures the victory of monarchs. 6. The monarchs abolish "parliaments" or deprive them of real powers that means the victory of absolutism. 7. Further, the victorious monarchs subjugate the nobility, taking away part of their resources. 8. Reforms start, with a new financial system created. 9. New bureaucracy is created, with commoners recruited for positions. 10. The nobility tries to fit into these new structures by taking office positions. The article focuses on testing the Downing model on the material of Peter I transformations and shows that Russian historical process of the second half of the 17th - early 18th centuries actually went through the ten steps mentioned above.

In late imperial Russia, peasants were placed in an extremely difficult situation. The terms of the 1861 Emancipation had left them short of land and highly indebted to the government. Their rate of population growth was extremely high, and as Russia entered the demographic transition, it increased even more. The government was intent on a policy of rapid industrialization, which was ultimately to be paid for by large grain exports. This already strained situation was further complicated by three additional factors. Both the changing level of international grain prices and the weather-induced fluctuations in grain yields were external factors capable of applying severe shocks to the peasantry, and little could be done to affect their impact. The third factor was the effectiveness of the tsarist administrative machin-ery for levying taxes on the peasants and providing them with relief (Wheatcroft 1991: 128). © 2021 'Uchitel' Publishing House.

The second part of the paper is devoted to the preparation of the mass demonstration on February 14, 1917. The mass demonstration was prepared by the "Working Group" of the Central Military-Industrial Committee with the support of A. I. Guchkov and A. I. Konovalov, the leaders of this committee. It was assumed that the 100,000 workers gathered outside the walls of the Duma would demand that the deputies create the "Provisional Government" responsible to the Duma and the "people". It was planned to provide armed resistance in the case the police and troops tried to break up the demonstrators, and therefore weapons were distributed at some local factories. It was supposed that the protest would become the beginning of an armed uprising and revolution. The activity of the workers was stimulated by the food crisis, which hightened its acuteness. In the absence of a ration card system, the lack of bread gave rise to huge queues, which acted on the population more than any agitation According to the police reports, even those workers who were not interested in politics were ready to take part in the mass demonstration. Some reports spoke of the preparation of an armed uprising. The authorities were preparing for battles in the streets of Petrograd, a "protection plan" was developed, and police received machine guns. At the same time, there was a sensation of insecurity and fear at the court. M. V. Rodzianko, Chairman of the State Duma, tried to use these sentiments to get Nicholas II consent to create a responsible ministry, but this attempt failed. The opposition leaders however feared a possible revolution as much as the authorities. Ultimately, Miliukov and Rodzianko issued a call to the workers to refrain from mass demonstration - and it did not take place. The authorities appreciated this demonstration of loyalty on the part of the opposition and, according to some information, Nicholas II decided to agree to the creation of the responsible ministry. © 2018 Saint-Petersburg State University. All rights reserved.

The article, based on archival materials, describes events connected with the preparation of the demonstration on February 14, 1917. It is shown that, in the atmosphere of the "Government Assault" undertaken by the liberal opposition, the group of the most radical opposition, supported by the Central Military Industrial Committee and led by A. I. Guchkov decided to join the workers' organizations in order to organize a grand antigovernment demonstration. The Central Military Industrial Committee kept contact with the working people through the "Working Group", which was a part of the Committee and was headed by the Menshevik K. A. Gvozdev. It was expected that on the day of the convocation of the State Duma, on February 14, a hundred thousand people would gather at the walls of the State Duma and would require the deputies to create a "Provisional Government" responsible to the Duma and the "people". In case the police and government forces tried to scatter the protesters, then, according to the police, it was planned to provide armed resistance; weapons were given to people at some factories. It was supposed that the manifestation could become the beginning of an armed uprising and revolution. The authorities were worried by the news received, and they arrested the "Working Group", nevertheless, preparations continued. However, the possibility of an uncontrolled development of events worried the moderate leaders of the Progressive Bloc and, at a meeting on January 29, P. S. Miliukov spoke out against the planned demonstration. At the same time, another leader of the Bloc, M. V. Rodzianko, tried to use the fears of the authorities to get their consent to the creation of a responsible ministry. Finally, Miliukov and Rodzianko made an appeal before the workers to refrain from demonstration, and it did not take place. However the authorities appreciated the loyalty of the opposition and, according to some information, Nicholas II decided to agree to the creation of a responsible ministry.

The paper analyzes the socio-economic consequences of the first network of Russian railways constructed be-tween 1866 and 1875. The purpose of this project, according to the plan of the Minister of Finance M. Kh. Reitern, was to increase exports and improve trade and the balance of payments. In accordance with this plan, "export" rail-ways were prioritized, linking inland agricultural regions with the seaports Grain exports increased sixfold between 1862 and 1878, comprising 3/5 of total exports by value. Correcting official grain collection data reveals a 17% de-crease in per capita net grain balance in European Russia from 1862 to 1881 due to massive exports. The decrease in consumption is also evident from the declining average height of recruits, which dropped by 0.4 cm in 1882–1884 compared to 1875–1884. The most significant decline of 0.7 cm or more occurred in regions from where grain was exported. While the consumption of the peasants was decreasing, the standard of living of the "sufficient classes" was rising. Exporting grain to industrial countries of Europe, where grain prices were higher than in Russia, sharply increased income for landowners and doubled the value of their land. Correspondingly, the size of deposits in banks and the imports of high-quality consumer goods increased. The number of "travelers" going abroad and the amount of currency they took with them rose sharply.

What have been the causes and consequences of technological evolution in world history? In particular, what propels innovation and diffusion of military technologies, details of which are comparatively well preserved and which are often seen as drivers of broad socio-cultural processes? Here we analyze the evolution of key military technologies in a sample of pre-industrial societies world-wide covering almost 10,000 years of history using Seshat: Global History Databank. We empirically test previously speculative theories that proposed world population size, connectivity between geographical areas of innovation and adoption, and critical enabling technological advances, such as iron metallurgy and horse riding, as central drivers of military technological evolution. We find that all of these factors are strong predictors of change in military technology, whereas state-level factors such as polity population, territorial size, or governance sophistication play no major role. We discuss how our approach can be extended to explore technological change more generally, and how our results carry important ramifications for understanding major drivers of evolution of social complexity.

What have been the causes and consequences of technological evolution in world history? In particular, what propels innovation and diffusion of military technologies, details of which are comparatively well preserved and which are often seen as drivers of broad socio-cultural processes? Here we analyze the evolution of key military technologies in a sample of pre-industrial societies world-wide covering almost 10,000 years of history using Seshat: Global History Databank. We empirically test previously speculative theories that proposed world population size, connectivity between geographical areas of innovation and adoption, and critical enabling technological advances, such as iron metallurgy and horse riding, as central drivers of military technological evolution. We find that all of these factors are strong predictors of change in military technology, whereas state-level factors such as polity population, territorial size, or governance sophistication play no major role. We discuss how our approach can be extended to explore technological change more generally, and how our results carry important ramifications for understanding major drivers of evolution of social complexity. © 2021 Turchin et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. ; This work was supported by: a John Templeton Foundation grant to the Evolution Institute, entitled "Axial-Age Religions and the Z-Curve of Human Egalitarianism" (HW, PF, PT); a Tricoastal Foundation grant to the Evolution Institute, entitled "The Deep Roots of the Modern World: The Cultural Evolution of Economic Growth and Political Stability" (PT); an Economic and Social Research Council Large Grant to the University of Oxford, entitled "Ritual, Community, and Conflict" (REF RES-060-25-0085) (HW); a grant from the European Union Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme ...