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The article is devoted to the consideration of the circumstances of the transition to protectionism in the reign of Alexander III. In the 1860s and 1870s, the "free trade"policy of finance minister M.Kh. Reitern led to the stagnation of heavy industry and lagging behind western countries. The protest of Slavophile business circles against "free trade" was conveyed to the heir to the throne, Alexander Alexandrovich, through professor I.K. Babst. In 1881, the heir became the Emperor Alexander III, Pobedonostsev - his closest adviser, and Katkov -"the mouthpiece" of the new political course. The industrialists gained the right to vote, in 1882, a large Trade and Industrial Congress was convened, which demanded the introduction of protective duties. After a long period of pressure on the liberal minister of finance N.Kh. Bunge (and his resignation), duties were introduced that ensured the accelerated development of Russian heavy industry and partially overcome the backlog.

The article is devoted to a new round of discussion between «optimists» and «pessimists» associated with the publication of an interview with the famous Russian historian B.N. Mironov in the journal "Historical Expertise". The author analyzes Mironov's responses to criticism of opponents on the accuracy of official harvest data, on the compilation of grain feed balances, and the amount of feed costs. Particular attention is paid to the discussion of Mironov's anthropometric calculations, indicating an increase in the growth of recruits in 1874-1913.

According to official documents from the tsarist government and the works of many historians, the beginning of the February Revolution was a food riot caused by "food panic". It is believed that the panic was triggered by rumours about the establishment of a rationing system and whether there was enough bread in Petrograd. This article studies bread availability in Petrograd and the dynamics of its sale to the public. It is demonstrated that the food crisis in Russia began in October 1916, when, in conditions of galloping inflation, the government imposed fixed prices on grain, leading manufacturers (both landowners and peas- ants) to refuse to sell grain for devaluing paper money. Due to short supply, bread stocks in Petrograd were running low; at the end of January 1917, the Minister of Agriculture Rittich ordered that the flour norm handed out to bakeries be limited to 35,000 poods, which meant the daily norm per capita was 1 pound (409 g) of baked bread. In the absence of a rationing system, food was given out very unevenly, and there was not enough bread for a large proportion of those standing in line. This forced them to start queuing as early as possible (during the night or even as soon as evening came) to be able to get their bread in the morning at the opening of the bakeries. The shortage of bread resulted in food panic. The first period of the food panic in the beginning of February coincided with when the opposition circles were preparing a mass demonstration for the opening day of the State Duma on 14 February. Alarmed by the preparations, on 10 February the municipal government ordered residents to be given five days' worth of flour in advance. This stopped the panic, but led to a sharp decline in the city's grain stocks. Consequently, on 18 February the government reduced the flour distribution to bakeries again, which caused another wave of panic. On 23 February, women standing in bread queues began revolting: on 24 February, a general strike broke out, and the February Revolution began. It was caused by the incompetence of the government and its inadequate measures in a crisis situation. Despite all the efforts later made by the Provisional Government, the supply of Petrograd was never restored, so the bread shortage led to new political crises during 1917. ; В официальных документах царского правительства и в работах многих историков начало Февральской революции описывается как голодный бунт, вызванный «продовольственной паникой». Традиционно считается, что паника была спровоцирована слухами о введении карточной системы, что хлеба в Петрограде было достаточно. Рассмотрение вопросов о наличии хлеба в Петрограде и о динамике его реальных продаж населению показывает, что продовольственный кризис в России начался в октябре 1916 г.: когда в условиях галопирующей инфляции были введены твердые цены на зерно, производители (как помещики, так и крестьяне) отказались продавать его за обесценивавшиеся бумажные деньги. Недостаточный подвоз хлебных продуктов сокращал их запасы в Петрограде, и в конце января 1917 г. министр земледелия Риттих приказал ограничить выдачу муки в пекарни нормой в 35 тыс. пудов. При такой норме на одного человека приходился один фунт (409 г.) хлеба в день. При отсутствии карточной системы продовольствие распределялось крайне неравномерно, и значительной части стоявших в очередях людей хлеба не хватало. Это заставляло занимать очередь возможно раньше, ночью или вечером, чтобы иметь возможность получить хлеб утром при открытии булочной. Нехватка хлеба породила продовольственную панику. Первый ее период в начале февраля совпал с моментом, когда оппозиционные круги готовили массовую манифестацию в день открытия Государственной думы 14 февраля. Напуганное этими приготовлениями городское начальство 10 февраля распорядилось выдать жителям муку на пять дней вперед, что привело к резкому сокращению хлебных запасов, поэтому 18 февраля власти снова уменьшили выдачу муки в пекарни. 23 февраля начался бунт стоявших в хлебных очередях женщин, 24-го вспыхнула всеобщая забастовка – началась Февральская революция. Причиной были некомпетентность и неумелые действия правительства в кризисной ситуации. Несмотря на все усилия Временного правительства, снабжение Петрограда так и не было восстановлено, и в течение 1917 г. Нехватка хлеба приводила к новым острым политическим кризисам.

The role played by the student movement in the political events of the late 20thearly 21st centuries should encourage researchers to carry out a more detailed analysis of similar events in the preceding century. The student community was one of the actors involved in the modernisation process which ultimately led to the three Russian revolutions. It is important to consider the events that occurred prior to the start of the Russian Revolution in 1905 and to clarify the extent to which the students were instigators of the revolution. Particular attention should be paid to the events that took place on 5–6 December 1904: the mass student demonstrations in Moscow, accompanied by violent clashes with the police. The analysis of police surveillance reports and documents from the Ministry of Education shows that one of the factors motivating the student movement was the propaganda campaign launched by liberal newspapers in connection with the convention of the Provincial Congress and the subsequent 'banquet campaign'. The students were influenced by the mood which then captivated society; they listened to criticisms of the autocratic regime being spread by liberal professors and liberal newspapers. The students were moved by the enthusiasm inherent in youth: they eagerly took up the slogans advanced by the older generation and brought them onto the streets. The underground political parties, the Social Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries, had no significant impact on the students. The student movement was mainly spontaneous: the students independently joined the demonstration on 16 October and then made the Socialist Revolutionaries join the demonstration on 5 December. The participation of the SRs made this demonstration aggressive and provocative. The protesters themselves provoked the police to use force; thus, the police responded appropriately. The battles that erupted on the streets of Russia's capitals did not bring any benefits to the struggle for liberal reforms. These clashes were interpreted by Nicholas II as a consequence of the 'policy of trust' and opened the frightening prospect of growing instability. As a result, the unbridled desire of students for reform forced the government to give up the idea of making any changes. ; Роль, которую играет студенческое движение в политических событиях конца XX – начала XXI в., побуждает исследователей к более детальному анализу аналогичных событий предшествующего столетия. Студенчество было одним из акторов процесса модернизации, которая в конечном итоге привела к трем русским революциям. Автор рассматривает события, происходившие перед началом Первой русской революции 1905 г., и пытается прояснить вопрос о том, в какой степени студенчество исполняло роль ее застрельщика. Особого внимания, по его мнению, заслуживают события 5–6 декабря 1904 г. – массовые демонстрации студентов Москвы, сопровождавшиеся ожесточенными столкновениями с полицией. Анализ сводок полицейского надзора, а также документов Министерства народного просвещения показывает, что одним из стимулов студенческого движения была пропагандистская кампания, развернутая либеральными газетами в связи с созывом Земского съезда и последующей «банкетной кампанией». Студенты подчинялись охватившему общество настроению, прислушивались к той критике самодержавного режима, которая раздавалась на лекциях либеральных профессоров и в либеральных газетах. Ими двигал свойственный молодости энтузиазм, они с горячностью подхватывали лозунги, выдвигавшиеся старшим поколением, и шли с ними на улицу. Подпольные политические партии – социал-демократы и эсеры – не оказывали существенного влияния на студентов. Студенческое движение было в основном стихийным, студенты самостоятельно вышли на демонстрацию 16 октября, а потом фактически заставили эсеров присоединиться к демонстрации 5 декабря. Участие эсеров придало этой демонстрации агрессивный и провокационный характер; демонстранты сами спровоцировали полицию на применение силы, и полиция ответила соответствующим образом. Настоящие сражения, разразившиеся на улицах столиц как в Москве, так и в Петербурге, не принесли пользы делу либеральных реформ. Эти столкновения были истолкованы Николаем II и его окружением как следствие «политики доверия» и открыли пугающую перспективу нарастающей дестабилизации. В итоге необузданное стремление студенчества к переменам привелок отказу правительства от каких-либо перемен.

The present paper considers evaluative aspect of a German linguistic review as a certain type of expert text. Expert evaluation is regarded in the context of its role in collective intersubjective process of verification and critical review of knowledge aimed at implementing it in the scientific scope of the subject. Special focus is put on regulatory character of expert evaluation. When exercising evaluation, reviewers as representatives of the scientific expert community united by its aims and tasks, rely on collectively elaborated and shared criteria of scientific rationality. The article also identifies the key role of institutional, sociocultural and internal verbal context when revealing means of expression of evaluative meanings and axiological contrast of evaluation in the text structure. Major ways of implicit display of evaluation are categorized in the concept of cognitive strategy; typical strategies are illustrated by examples of their context realization. Methods involved in the study (structural and propositional text segmentation, component analysis of lexical units, contextual and linguo-epistemic analysis) being the elements of complex methodology allowed to produce general evaluative profile of scientific reviews in German linguistics

The article is devoted to the analysis of the reasons for Russia's economic lagging behind during the Great Divergence. The author tests the well-known hypotheses that industrial development was hampered by the opposition of the nobility and the cheap labor of serfs. Upon closer examination, these assumptions are not confirmed. The economic lag was primarily due to the lag in railway construction, which in the 19th century was the main driver of the development of heavy industry. The article analyzes the policy in the field of railway construction during the reign of Emperor Nicholas I (1825–1855). It is shown that the formation of this policy took place in a conflict between the emperor and the ministerial bureaucracy, headed by the Minister of Finance, Count Kankrin. While Nicholas I was guided by military-strategic considerations, the ministers proceeded from economic interests. Economic calculations pointed to the unprofitability of railways compared to transportation by waterways. The technical conservatism of the bureaucracy did not allow adequately assessing the prospects for new technology and the possibility of reducing the cost of transportation in the future. The article analyzes the difference between economic policy in Russia and in England, the United States, France and Germany, which led to the lag of Russia. In the West (with the exception of France), economic policy developed spontaneously on the basis of private initiative. The Russian bureaucracy blocked private initiative, it sought to preserve the capital stored in state banks to finance the great power politic. On the other hand, the railroad "mania" in England was accompanied by a speculative boom and the ruin of many railroad companies. For the Russian bureaucracy, this was another argument in favor of refusing to attract private capital. Meanwhile, "mania" promoted the mobilization of capital from small shareholders for railway construction and spurred the development of industry. Another way of using controlled private initiative was possible, which was implemented in France in the "Legrand project". But the Russian bureaucracy refused to use private initiative, which doomed the country to an economic lag.

The article is devoted to the study of the influence of customs policy on the economic development of Russia in the first half of the 19th century. If we do not take into account the demands of the coalition allies, then this policy was mainly determined by the struggle of two forces with opposing economic interests. One of the forces was "agrarians", landowners-nobles, interested in free trade, that is, in the free export of agricultural products and the duty-free receipt of manufactured goods from industrial countries. Another force, whose role is still downplayed by historians, was the absolutist state, personified by the monarch and the central bureaucracy. The state was interested in maintaining military and financial power, and in economic independence. This implied an industry that had to be protected from foreign competition by high customs duties. The interests of these forces were reflected in the ideological confrontation. On the one hand, the ideas of Adam Smith's "political economy" proclaiming freedom of trade were popular among the nobility. On the other hand, the bureaucracy used in its practice the ideas of traditional mercantilism. After the end of the Napoleonic wars, duties were significantly reduced (tariff of 1819), but the relative freedom of trade led to the massive ruin of Russian manufactories. As a result, the tariff of 1822 marked a decisive turn towards mercantilist politics. Although Treasury Secretary Kankrin was lip service to protectionism, he retained the most important mercantilist ban on metal imports by sea. In the absence of competition, the Ural industrialists were not interested in introducing new technology, and the industrial revolution passed by the Russian metallurgy. Thus, while the thoughtless transition to free trade in 1819 caused the ruin of a large part of the manufactures, the mercantelist policy carried to the extreme caused technical stagnation in the most important branches of the economy. This predetermined the further economic lag in the process of "great divergence".