Suchergebnisse

What is the effect of constitutional decree authority (CDA) on the policy-making process of a presidential regime? Despite recent efforts to answer this question, there is still much uncertainty in the literature about the extent to which decree powers may allow presidents to control the legislative process. This article argues that in a separation-of-powers system, the existence of CDA effectively enhances executives' ability to act as agenda setters. This capacity, however, is not uniform across all cases. Developing a simple spatial model of decree games, the author argues that the bargaining power of an executive to promote legal changes through decrees varies according to three interrelated factors: decree approval rules, the extent of the executive's partisan support in the legislature, and the strength of the presidential veto. These propositions are supported by a comparative analysis of the process of constitutional design and the implementation of decrees in Brazil and Argentina, two cases presenting significant variation in each of the independent variables.

Discusses constituent processes and distribution of power, focusing on the reform of presidentialism in Argentina; examines constraints that the 1994 constitutional reform placed on the existing structure of presidential powers. Summary in English p. 7.

The predominant interpretation of nineteenth century Latin America is
to see the failure of constitutional democracy in the region in terms of the
inability of liberal elites to break with an authoritarian past. Against these views,
we argue that the divorce between liberalism and democracy in Latin America
was the unintended outcome of the institutions created by the liberal elite in
response to the problems of territorial fragmentation and factional conflict that
emerged after the fall of the Spanish empire. Using the cases of Argentina and
Mexico, we support this proposition by focusing on the creation of a centralised
form of government and a system of electoral control by the ruling elites as the
main factors that through time prevented the evolution of the liberal regime into
a competitive democracy.There is no good faith in America, nor among the nations of America. Treaties
are scraps of paper; constitutions, printed matter; elections, battles; freedom,
anarchy; and life, a torment.Simón Bolívar