Tinkering with executive term limits: partisan imbalances and institutional legacies in Latin America
In: Democratization, Band 29, Heft 1, S. 38-56
ISSN: 1743-890X
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In: Democratization, Band 29, Heft 1, S. 38-56
ISSN: 1743-890X
World Affairs Online
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 19, Heft 4, S. 1292-1294
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 19, Heft 4, S. 1292-1292
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: Democratization, Band 29, Heft 1, S. 38-56
ISSN: 1743-890X
In: Latin American politics and society, Band 61, Heft 3, S. 154-160
ISSN: 1548-2456
In: Revista de ciencia política, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 201-215
ISSN: 0716-1417
Both political theory and constitutional, the overwhelming majority of analyzes on the creation of constitutions taken as perspective the idea of a new political beginning, is to refer to the revolution that founded the first Republican government in a country, or the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. However, you may break out in a constitutional process of a democratic order and constituted. This may occur because basic aspects of the current constitution have become dysfunctional in a given historical situation or because society has undergone changes that make questionable origin and political orientation of the Constitution. Adapted from the source document.
In: Revista de ciencia política, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 201-215
ISSN: 0718-090X
In: Revista SAAP: publicación de ciencia política de la Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Político, Band 7, Heft 2, S. 297-305
ISSN: 1666-7883
In: Revista latinoamericana de política comparada, Band 7, S. 127-168
ISSN: 1390-4248
In: APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: British journal of political science, Band 39, Heft 1, S. 117-139
ISSN: 0007-1234
The formulas for electing presidents and the rules determining the legislative powers of presidents are important variables for explaining the performance of presidential democracies. This article develops a strategic choice model to explain variations in these institutional features. Based on this model, it is proposed here that constitution makers are likely to opt for more-than-plurality rules of presidential elections when the number of parties necessary to pass constitutional changes increases. It is also proposed that the makers of constitutions are likely to strengthen the legislative powers of the president when the number of parties necessary to pass constitutional changes increases and when parties are decentralized. The argument is supported by a statistical analysis of the determinants of constitutional choice in Latin America. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)
World Affairs Online
In: Latin American politics and society, Band 49, Heft 2, S. 209-212
ISSN: 1548-2456
In: Latin American politics and society, Band 49, Heft 2, S. 209-212
ISSN: 1548-2456
In: Latin American politics and society, Band 49, Heft 2, S. 209-212
ISSN: 1531-426X
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 68, Heft 2, S. 421-433
ISSN: 1468-2508