Replacing and Amending Constitutions: The Logic of Constitutional Change in Latin America
In: APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper
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In: APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper
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Working paper
In: British journal of political science, Band 39, Heft 1, S. 117-139
ISSN: 0007-1234
The formulas for electing presidents and the rules determining the legislative powers of presidents are important variables for explaining the performance of presidential democracies. This article develops a strategic choice model to explain variations in these institutional features. Based on this model, it is proposed here that constitution makers are likely to opt for more-than-plurality rules of presidential elections when the number of parties necessary to pass constitutional changes increases. It is also proposed that the makers of constitutions are likely to strengthen the legislative powers of the president when the number of parties necessary to pass constitutional changes increases and when parties are decentralized. The argument is supported by a statistical analysis of the determinants of constitutional choice in Latin America. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)
World Affairs Online
In: Latin American politics and society, Band 49, Heft 2, S. 209-212
ISSN: 1548-2456
In: Latin American politics and society, Band 49, Heft 2, S. 209-212
ISSN: 1548-2456
In: Latin American politics and society, Band 49, Heft 2, S. 209-212
ISSN: 1531-426X
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 68, Heft 2, S. 421-433
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: Política y gobierno, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 361-392
ISSN: 1665-2037
World Affairs Online
In: Latin American politics and society, Band 48, Heft 3, S. 63-92
ISSN: 1531-426X
World Affairs Online
In: Latin American politics and society, Band 48, Heft 3, S. 63-92
ISSN: 1548-2456
Abstract
A widely accepted argument among scholars of Latin American presidential regimes is that interbranch cooperation is impaired when the president's party falls short of a majority of seats in the legislature. This argument fails to consider three factors that affect the performance of minority presidents: the policy position of the president's party, the president's capacity to sustain a veto, and the legislative status of the parties included in the cabinet. This article argues that the greatest potential for conflict in a presidential regime occurs when the president's party lacks the support of both the median and the veto legislator and no cabinet coalition holding a majority of legislative seats is formed. This hypothesis is supported using data on executive-legislative conflicts and on interrupted presidencies in Latin America during the period 1978–2003.
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 68, Heft 2, S. 421-433
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: Les cahiers ALHIM, Heft 11
ISSN: 1777-5175
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 37, Heft 5, S. 531-562
ISSN: 1552-3829
What is the effect of constitutional decree authority (CDA) on the policy-making process of a presidential regime? Despite recent efforts to answer this question, there is still much uncertainty in the literature about the extent to which decree powers may allow presidents to control the legislative process. This article argues that in a separation-of-powers system, the existence of CDA effectively enhances executives' ability to act as agenda setters. This capacity, however, is not uniform across all cases. Developing a simple spatial model of decree games, the author argues that the bargaining power of an executive to promote legal changes through decrees varies according to three interrelated factors: decree approval rules, the extent of the executive's partisan support in the legislature, and the strength of the presidential veto. These propositions are supported by a comparative analysis of the process of constitutional design and the implementation of decrees in Brazil and Argentina, two cases presenting significant variation in each of the independent variables.
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 37, Heft 5, S. 531-562
ISSN: 0010-4140
In: Revista mexicana de sociología, Band 65, Heft 1, S. 41
ISSN: 2594-0651
In: Desarrollo económico: revista de ciencias sociales, Band 42, Heft 167, S. 377
ISSN: 1853-8185