Eductive expectations coordination on deterministic cycles in an economy with heterogeneous agents
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 29, Heft 5, S. 931-952
ISSN: 0165-1889
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In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 29, Heft 5, S. 931-952
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: Economica, Band 71, Heft 284, S. 693-694
ISSN: 1468-0335
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 117-140
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: Metroeconomica, Band 70, Heft 1, S. 24-44
SSRN
In: Research in economics: Ricerche economiche, Band 67, Heft 3, S. 259-277
ISSN: 1090-9451
Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. Investment costs are heterogeneous. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are studied which differ for the considered sociopolitical structure: communal property in one case and private property in the other. We hereby show that in both games when a unique stochastically stable outcome exists a norm of investment and a norm of surplus division must coevolve. While the investment norm always supports the efficient investment profile, the surplus division norm may differ among these games depending on the size of investment cost gap. Under private property only the egalitarian surplus division evolves. Under communal property instead two different surplus division norms may evolve: the egalitarian one and an inegalitarian norm. We show that no cap to payoffs inequality emerges under private property while an inequality payoff cap endogenously evolves under communal property. The games have been proposed to explain the social norms used in modern hunter-gatherer societies.
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Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are considered. In both, bargaining proceeds according to the Nash Demand Game when a symmetric investments profile is observed. When, on the other hand, an asymmetric investments profile is observed, we assume that bargaining proceeds according to the Ultimatum Game in one case and according to a Dictator Game in the other. We hereby show that in both games when a unique stochastically stable outcome exists it supports an homogeneous behavior in the whole population both at the investment stage and at the distribution stage. A norm of investment and a norm of division must therefore coevolve in the two games, supporting both the efficient investment profile and the egalitarian distribution of the surplus, respectively. The two games differ depending on the conditions needed for the two norms to coevolve. The games are proposed to explain the social norms used in modern hunter-gatherer societies.
BASE
Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are considered. In both, bargaining proceeds according to the Nash Demand Game when a symmetric investments profile is observed. When, on the other hand, an asymmetric investments profile is observed, we assume that bargaining proceeds according to the Ultimatum Game in one case and according to a Dictator Game in the other. We hereby show that in both games when a unique stochastically stable outcome exists it supports an homogeneous behavior in the whole population both at the investment stage and at the distribution stage. A norm of investment and a norm of division must therefore coevolve in the two games, supporting both the efficient investment profile and the egalitarian distribution of the surplus, respectively. The two games differ depending on the conditions needed for the two norms to coevolve. The games are proposed to explain the social norms used in modern hunter-gatherer societies.
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This paper proposes an interpretation of the experimental evidence on tacit coordination games involving randomly matched players provided by Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990), based on the notion of stochastic stability. When the model is calibrated with the parameters chosen in the experiment, it predicts that every strict Nash equilibrium is stochastically stable; therefore, in the long run we should not observe the emergence of any particular pattern of behavior, as suggested by the experimental evidence. The model is also compatible with the experimental evidence provided by Goeree and Holt (2005).
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In this paper we study a two agents asymmetric stag hunt game. The model has an infinity of strict, Pareto rankable Nash equilibria. The equilibrium selection problem is solved by appealing to the stochastic stability concept put forward by Young (1993). We prove two main results. When the action sets are numerable in.nite sets, then for any value of the distributive parameter we can expect the emergence of a norm involving less than maximal cooperation. When instead the action sets are finite sets of a particular type (in the sense that each agent can choose his maximum optimal effort and fractions of this), then for some value of the distributive parameter we can expect the emergence of a norm involving maximal cooperation.
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In: Revue économique, Band 52, Heft 3, S. 583
ISSN: 1950-6694