Suchergebnisse

1. Michael Oakeshott's Life -- 2. Michael Oakeshott as Defender of Pluralism and Moderni -- 3. The Reception of Michael Oakeshott's Thought -- 4. Oakeshott's Continuing Relevance: Some Meditations on Conservatism and Liberalism -- Bibliography -- Index.

This article compares Michael Oakeshott and Hans-Georg Gadamer, in particular examining the different ways they conceptualise human practices and the relationship between theory and practice. First, I highlight where the two agree. Both are sceptical of causal explanations of human behaviour, and instead advocate understanding human conduct intersubjectively, using Aristotle's concept of 'practical wisdom'. Second, however, I also highlight important areas of disagreement. Oakeshott maintains that non-philosophical but non-practical theoretical disciplines are possible; by contrast, Gadamer stresses the intrinsically practical nature of all understanding. More practically, they also differ over how useful Aristotelian insights are politically. Gadamer claims (like Aristotle) that we can seek an objective common good; Oakeshott rejects this, due to his commitment to pluralism. Finally, I suggest that these divergences are due to different conceptualisations of 'experience' and the Western tradition. First, Oakeshott and Gadamer differ over how authentically we can know human experience, and therefore over how important the right discipline for investigation is. Second, they differ over the degree to which we can interrogate the Western tradition. For Oakeshott, we must accept its pluralist inheritance; for Gadamer a healthy dialogue with it is essential-only thus can we unearth the (Aristotelian) insights vital for us to live well. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

This article introduces a set of essays examining the state of political thought in the Western European democracies of Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and Sweden in the post-war period between 1945 and 1970. In particular, as well as simply filling a gap, they seek to demonstrate that political theory in this period was more vibrant than has traditionally been maintained. A key part of this argument is that the discipline was less adversely affected by the ascendancy of positivism than historians and political theorists have normally argued, not least because 'positivism' was in fact a more diverse and varied phenomenon than is usually recognised. For while some positivists drew on either behaviourist social science of linguistic philosophy to justify their denial that moral and political values could be discussed rationally with reference to theoretical arguments, others argued that it was the perceived success of post-war welfare states or the alleged failure of political ideologies that had made traditional political theory irrelevant. This meant that although few political theorists in this period were able to refute all types of positivism entirely, they were able to take issue with different aspects of it, and hence, at least to some extent, to pursue their discipline normatively. However, experiences in different Western European countries nevertheless varied widely. In Britain, normative political theorists faced both versions of the positivist challenge, but their ripostes were largely couched in academic terms, whether addressing the 'end of ideology' thesis, behaviourism or linguistic positivism. In West Germany, by contrast, the debate over positivism was much more overtly political, since the legacy of the Weimar republic caused the issue of whether political values in general, and laws in particular, were rationally justifiable to be a peculiarly sensitive one. But even in Sweden, which had a much quieter history, and has often been seen as the epitome of a technocratic political system, it is revealed that the degree to which 'the end of ideology' had been reached was much more keenly contested in practical politics than has previously been thought. And in France, it is revealed that there was more interesting academic political theorising being prosecuted than has traditionally been acknowledged, by such thinkers as Jacques Maritain and Raymond Aron, even if there was admittedly less than in, for example, Britain. And lastly, in Italy, despite a badly functioning political system, which tended to encourage cynicism about politics in general, there were in fact important and sophisticated attempts at formulating coherent normative positions, at least on an ideological level. Whatever the differences, however, the conclusion is clear: normative political theory was in general in much better health during this period than has traditionally been admitted, and, as such, is worthy of considerable further exploration. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

This article examines the nature of academic political theory in Britain in the post-war period, examining in particular the degree to which theorists were able to mount normative theoretical arguments. Traditionally, commentators such as Brian Barry and Perry Anderson have argued that political theory in this period was largely dead between 1945 and 1970 due to the impact of positivism, but I argue this is mistaken for two main reasons. First, it fails to distinguish between the different forms that positivism took in the post-war era. Thus although it is true many theorists tended to claim that moral and political values could (or should) not be discussed rationally, their reasons for doing so varied considerably. For while theorists such as A. J. Ayer and T. D. Weldon justified their positions theoretically, with arguments drawn from behaviourist social science or innovations made in linguistic philosophy, others, such as Ralf Dahrendorf and Anthony Crosland, argued that it was the perceived success of post-war welfare states or the alleged failure of political ideologies that made traditional political theory irrelevant. Second, following on from this, I argue that delineating more accurately how positivism actually operated helps to explain how political theorists were able to pursue their discipline normatively-albeit that few reacted to all aspects of positivism. Thus if some (such as Karl Popper) were more concerned to insist that political philosophy had something to say in practice, others (such as Michael Oakeshott), reacted more strongly against the proposition that human behaviour can be understood purely causally. Finally, I examine the impact of ordinary language philosophy on post-war political theory, and argue that rather than simply damaging the cause of normative political theory by encouraging a myopic concentration on the linguistic analysis of particular moral and political concepts, over the longer term its effects were much more positive, since it helped to focus attention on the irreducibly normative dimension of political concepts. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]