Suchergebnisse

The study of Russia's foreign policy poses something of a paradox. On the one hand, Russia's actions are viewed as aimed at revising the existing rules-based order built by the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, on numerous occasions, one pinpoints that Russia has devised a language similar to the Western nations to justify its foreign policy. I call the phenomenon that explains this paradox the game of interpretation. The article illustrates how Russia is engaged in the game of interpretation with the West in the post-Cold War order by Russia's appliance to the norm of humanitarian interventions. By analyzing the Russian discourse during the Russo-Georgian War (2008), I demonstrate how the Russian foreign policy leadership reproduces similar narrative patterns used by the West during the Kosovo War (1999). Exemplifying the game of interpretation by humanitarian interventionism is not accidental. Humanitarian interventionism is studied in the literature as being characteristic of the Western 'ethical foreign policy' originated by the end of the Cold War, with Russia being depicted as either skeptical or as an unequivocal opponent of such an approach in world politics. Methodologically, the work builds on quantitative and qualitative analysis of selected texts compiled from the archives of NATO and the US State Department, as well as the website "Kremlin.ru" and the website of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

.

The article studies "ontological" security concept. In a general sense the term depicts expectations of a state about its stable and predictable relations with counterparts. With the term gaining theoretical sway in constructivism since the 21st century, we argue, that it still lacks instrumental definition with fixed assumptions and variables. The analysis of ontological security is conducted in twofold manner. First, we overview the broad range of interpretations, demonstrate the absence of an instrumental definition of the concept and suggest some parameters of such a definition. Secondly, we study the ways how a state can gain ontological security. Three options of achieving ontological security are being presented: adaptation (assuming the role of 'another' from the external environment); change of rules (imposing its own role on the subject with whom the interaction occurs); and the breach of relations. At all these stages, the state tries either to adopt the norms and practices by which it interacts with the environment, or to redefine its position in ongoing relations with counterparties. We conclude by presenting a sought definition of the term and by arguing that the concept enhances the constructivist contribution to the IR theory since it allows to define the logic of states' behavior in international arena. Thus, states seek to be socialized into an intersubjective reality and to define norms, practices and status through forging common and communicative knowledge with 'other'. Otherwise, the state's behavior could be irrational. Theory emphasizes the need to avoid situations of the ontological security dilemma: the state projects its own, mostly protective reality, which, however, does not provide it with ontological security from the counterparty and could potentially push for further escalation of crisis interactions.Authors declare the absence of conflict of interests.

After the 'rose revolution' Georgia significantly improved its governance and state institutions. Scholars explain it with the professional and personal qualities of the reformist team led by Mikhael Saakashvili, with the concentration of power in the hands of the reformers, and with the international settings. However, most of those explanations hardly work in case of the reforms that were implemented after Saakashvili's team lost the power in 2012. From 2012 to 2020 Georgia have retained and even slightly improved the quality of state institutions. Also, the governments of the ruling 'Georgian Dream' party implemented three major reforms: of judiciary, of local self-government, and of public service. Why did Georgia continue reforms despite its domestic political settings changed dramatically after 2012? The paper aims to reveal structural factors which support the long-term reformist course. We point out three factors. The first is that the structure of Georgia's economy and the constellation of the elite's interests preclude the making of influential oligarchy able to significantly distort the state institutions. Unlike Ukraine, Georgia did not inherit from the USSR large export-oriented and lucrative heavy industrial sector that could have become an economic base for making sustainable financial-industrial groups with strong political influence. Unlike Moldova, Georgian home-grown "oligarchs" were locked within the small consumer market of their country and served as clients of the political leaders. The richest politicians in Georgia like Bidzina Ivanishvili, late Badri Patarkatsishvili, late Kakha Bendukidze played their own political game but the main sources of their wealth were abroad, their economic interest lay far beyond the national scale and they have (had) no strong incentives to distort the state institutions in the country. Therefore "oligarchs" in Georgia did not make obstacles for reforms. The second factor is that the opposition in 2012–2020 had no reasons to obstruct reforms implemented by "Georgian Dream" governments, because most of those reforms opened new ways (municipal reform) or gave new guaranties (judicial and public service reforms) for political participation. The third is the geopolitical one. The confrontation with Russia since 2004 provides Georgian political elite strong motivation to continue reforms in order to secure the Western patronage.