Public enterprise reform in adjustment lending
In: Policy, planning, and research working papers 233
In: Public sector management and private sector development
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In: Policy, planning, and research working papers 233
In: Public sector management and private sector development
By the fall of 1990 the economic position of the USSR had deteriorated to the point where the Gorbachev government sought the advice and assistance of the major Western international financial institutions: the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the World Bank. These IFIs were asked to diagnose the situation and recommend measures to assist in the transition from plan to market. The reform of industrial and manufacturing enterprises was a key issue among the many analyzed. This article's author, from the World Bank, worked on the enterprise reform team. Drawing on extensive notes from 1990 and 1991 interviews with Soviet and Russian officials, reformers and enterprise managers, this article portrays in detail the extent of the economic — and political — dislocation of the Soviet Union in 1990, the acutely uncertain policy and legal environments in which enterprise managers and government overseers tried to function, and the various and sometimes desperate means by which those in the enterprise sector struggled to position themselves for survival in the newly emerging economy. A major theme is the widespread but ultimately fruitless effort on the part of the Soviet and then Russian reformers to find a gradualist, minimally painful way to carry out the transition of enterprises to market operations. One result of that failure was the much-criticized Russian privatization program. The conclusion is that for political as much as economic reasons, the pace of enterprise reform adopted was unavoidable.
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By the fall of 1990 the economic position of the USSR had deteriorated to the point where the Gorbachev government sought the advice and assistance of the major Western international financial institutions: the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the World Bank. These IFIs were asked to diagnose the situation and recommend measures to assist in the transition from plan to market. The reform of industrial and manufacturing enterprises was a key issue among the many analyzed. This article's author, from the World Bank, worked on the enterprise reform team. Drawing on extensive notes from 1990 and 1991 interviews with Soviet and Russian officials, reformers and enterprise managers, this article portrays in detail the extent of the economic — and political — dislocation of the Soviet Union in 1990, the acutely uncertain policy and legal environments in which enterprise managers and government overseers tried to function, and the various and sometimes desperate means by which those in the enterprise sector struggled to position themselves for survival in the newly emerging economy. A major theme is the widespread but ultimately fruitless effort on the part of the Soviet and then Russian reformers to find a gradualist, minimally painful way to carry out the transition of enterprises to market operations. One result of that failure was the much-criticized Russian privatization program. The conclusion is that for political as much as economic reasons, the pace of enterprise reform adopted was unavoidable.
BASE
From a triumphant high in the late 20th century, esteem for privatization has significantly declined, post-2000. Politicians and businesspeople alike now take a more balanced view of its effectiveness, recognizing that privatization must happen in a supportive institutional and policy framework if it is to live up to its potential. They have also come to share a better understanding of the sociopolitical consequences – especially with regard to public opinion – that privatization inevitably brings with it. This paper provides a comprehensive examination of this 21st century global shift in perception, with an emphasis on developing and emerging markets. Through a rich trove of case studies, it accounts for why privatization has slowed, analyzing current and past trends from a variety of sectors worldwide. It also offers a thorough analysis of privatization's effects on economies, societies and the political process, while giving ample space to critics' views. Although powerbrokers now tend to view privatization warily, there is good reason to believe that, due to the impact of the ongoing global economic crisis on government budgets, its day will come again. This paper, with its impressively detailed and wide-ranging grasp of the phenomenon, is essential reading for academics, policymakers and economists –the individuals who must grapple with privatization's implications when that day arrives.
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In: SPP Research Paper No. 12-3
SSRN
Working paper
In: The SAIS review of international affairs / the Johns Hopkins University, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Band 27, Heft 2, S. 3-29
ISSN: 1945-4716
World Affairs Online
In: SAIS Review, Band 27, Heft 2, S. 3-29
In the last 25 years many thousands of formerly state-owned firms have been privatized in transition economies, generating over US. $400 billion in sales proceeds. In addition, thousands of firms have been privatized by methods in which no money was raised. The vast majority of economic studies praise privatization's positive impact at the level of the firm, as well as its positive macroeconomic and welfare contributions. Even so, public opinion in the developing world is quite hostile to privatization. The process has proven harder to launch, and more likely to produce errant results in institutionally weak states. A successful privatization process requires mechanisms that give private investors incentives and comfort, that create and sustain the policies and regulatory institutions that make governments competent and honest partners with private partners, and that protect consumers, particularly the most disadvantaged, from abuse. Adapted from the source document.
Many African state-owned enterprises (SOEs), particularly those in infrastructure, have a long history of poor performance. From the outset, SOE financial and economic performance generally failed to meet the expectations of their creators and funders. By the late 1970s, the situation was alarming, and by early 1980s, critical. The poor financial performance of SOEs became so burdensome to government budgets that it attracted the attention of the international financial institutions, or IFIs. In response, in the 1980s, the World Bank approved SOE reforms that could be summed up in the term "commercialization". By the mid-1990s, however, the idea of making SOEs function efficiently and effectively under government management was largely abandoned by the IFIs and privatization and private participation in infrastructure, or PPI became the order of the day. Once more, however, the results were disappointing. PPI has not been as widely adopted as anticipated, nor has it generated the massive resources and changes hoped for, nor has it been widely accepted as beneficial by the African public. The findings of recent studies in Africa suggest that PPI should not be jettisoned, and that the more productive path is to recognize the limitations of the approach, and to work harder at creating the conditions needed to make it function effectively. This will entail, as many have recognized, an end to the view that public and private infrastructure provision is a dichotomy – a case of either-or, one or the other – and a better appreciation of the extent to which the performance of each is dependent on the competence of the other. In other words, for the private sector to perform well, public sector capacity must be enhanced. Moreover, proposed tactics of reform should fit more closely with the expectations and sentiments of the affected government, consumer base, and general population. This broader approach implies, probably, a reduction in the scope and, certainly, a reduction in the planned speed of operations. Improving infrastructure performance is a long-term matter.
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Sub-Saharan African states urgently need expanded and more dynamic private sectors, more efficient and effective infrastructure/utility provision, and increased investment from both domestic and foreign sources. Privatization is one way to address these problems. But African states have generally been slow and reluctant privatizers; a good percentage of industrial/manufacturing and most infrastructure still remains in state hands. Given prevailing public hostility towards privatization, and widespread institutional weaknesses, such caution is defensible, but nonetheless very costly. The long-run and difficult solution is the creation and reinforcement of the institutions that underpin and guide proper market operations. In the interim, African governments and donors have little choice but to continue to experiment with the use of externally supplied substitutes for gaps in local regulatory and legal systems.
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In: Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 31
SSRN
Working paper
In: Canadian journal of political science: CJPS = Revue canadienne de science politique, Band 12, Heft 4, S. 842-845
ISSN: 1744-9324
In: The journal of modern African studies: a quarterly survey of politics, economics & related topics in contemporary Africa, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 153-156
ISSN: 1469-7777
In: Canadian journal of political science: CJPS = Revue canadienne de science politique : RCSP, Band 12, Heft 4, S. 842-845
ISSN: 0008-4239
In: Canadian journal of political science: CJPS = Revue canadienne de science politique, Band 10, Heft 3, S. 660-661
ISSN: 1744-9324
In: American political science review, Band 68, Heft 2, S. 831-832
ISSN: 1537-5943