Suchergebnisse

Petroleum policy in Britain and Norway provides comparativists with an opportunity to study policy formation, stability, and transformation on a cross‐national basis. This study explains why British and Norwegian officials decided to intervene in the North Sea, why offshore policy in the two countries went through periods of stability and change, and why they adopted similar offshore systems in the 1960s and 1970s but diverged markedly in the 1980s. We develop an explanatory framework using insights from state‐centric, group politics, rational choice, and institutional models of policy‐making. The framework identifies three decision‐making contexts in which petroleum policy‐makers operate simultaneously: an oil context, a domestic political context, and an international context, Each context establishes objectives for policy‐makers, indicates an acceptable degree of government intervention, and narrows policy options. Rational decision‐making within each context, however, may yield conflicting results. These must be worked out through intrastate and/or state‐society bargaining. The decision‐making contexts in Britain and Norway produced similar policies in the 1960s and 1970s, but the similarities hid deeper differences. Norwegian officials consistently favored state intervention offshore, and Norwegian interest groups successfully lobbied the state for offshore favors, while British officials intervened more reluctantly and paid less attention to societal interests. Differences in decision‐making contexts finally produced a major divergence in offshore policies in the 1980s when the Thatcher government dismantled the state's offshore participation policy.

Framework -- Culture and integration -- Confessional cultures -- Common roots -- Reformation and reaction -- Political movements -- Constructing a new Europe -- Postwar preparation -- Catholic construction -- Protestant resistance -- Divided Europe -- Member states and elites -- Political groups -- European identity.

Does the rise of populist parties of the right and left indicate the fading of the traditional left–right cleavage and the rise of a new transnational cleavage? Our analysis finds evidence of a continued left–right cleavage that divides European parties by religion and class. Our analysis also finds strong evidence for an additional transnational cleavage that pits the populists of right and left against the traditional parties of the "frozen" center. Right-Wing Populist parties attract young, working-class, and less educated voters, more often male, who are disconnected from religious institutions, perceive the national economy and their own economic status in a negative vein, and do not like immigrants. They distrust their own national government and the European Union. The Populist Left trends even younger, lower in status and education, more pessimistic about economic concerns, and just as hostile to political elites. The populists—left and right—may be divided over some aspects of modern culture, but they are united in their opposition to European elites.

We attempt to further the `normal' study of public opinion in the European Union (EU) by examining the relationship of gender to attitudes toward integration. Using Eurobarometer 42 we demonstrate that a modest gender gap exists, with women being less enthusiastic about the EU than men. We then construct a model to explain male and female attitudes using measures of political distance, women's values, ideology, economic vulnerability and national tradition. Women's attitudes are more sensitive to knowledge about the EU and to economic pessimism than men's, while men's attitudes are determined more by interest in politics, traditionalist values, ideology, and working-class status. We conclude by analyzing interesting differences that emerge when respondents are grouped by `type of welfare state'.

We attempt to further the 'normal' study of public opinion in the European Union (EU) by examining the relationship of gender to attitudes toward integration. Using Eurobarometer 42 we demonstrate that a modest gender gap exists, with women being less enthusiastic about the EU than men. We then construct a model to explain male & female attitudes using measures of political distance, women's values, ideology, economic vulnerability & national tradition. Women's attitudes are more sensitive to knowledge about the EU & to economic pessimism than men's, while men's attitudes are determined more by interest in politics, traditionalist values, ideology, & working-class status. We conclude by analyzing interesting differences that emerge when respondents are grouped by 'type of welfare state'. 3 Tables, 59 Figures. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd.]