Suchergebnisse

A number of recent studies have argued that municipal governments have so significantly modified elements of their form of government that it is now difficult to distinguish form. However, none of these studies considers the influence of state government on these choices. This study uses a comprehensive data set of U.S. municipal governments with populations of at least 10,000 and a data set of state legislative provisions related to form of government to investigate the influence of state law on municipal form of government choices. The findings demonstrate that state law is associated with some choices of government form and that structures that hybridize the council-manager and mayor-council forms of government are still relatively uncommon.

This study reports the findings of a comparative case study analysis of sixteen U.S. municipalities to provide an in-depth examination of the choices municipal leaders are making to address revenue shortfalls. The findings suggest that municipal fiscal choices during a recession fit the bounded rationality model. While local government leaders will attempt to follow a rational sequence of fiscal management decisions, as the economic situation worsens, the external pressures from electoral considerations, state government restrictions, and interest group involvement increase, leading a divergence in strategies. The greater the pressures (the bounds), the more unpredictable the choices among municipalities become. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis research explores the relationship between form of government and corruption using national municipal level data (1990–2020) using competing theoretical models; the principal–agent model and the professionalism–performance model. The principal–agent model suggests that the additional scrutiny provided by the electoral process will lead to a lower risk of corruption under the mayor–council form of government. The professionalism–performance model suggests that the professional training and incentives in place in the council–manager form will lead to a lower risk of corruption. However, it is difficult to examine the impact of the form of government on the incidence of corruption because there may be underlying community characteristics, such as population and poverty levels, that drive both the selection of form and corruption. Using propensity score matching and other propensity score methods to reduce the impact of confounding factors, this analysis finds robust evidence that the council–manager form reduces the risk of corruption, supporting the professionalism–performance model.

One measure of governance quality is the level of reported conflict and cooperation that is present between and among elected officials and administrators. High levels of conflict or low levels of cooperation can hinder the decision-making process. However, there are few attempts to assess the causes of conflict and cooperation in the existing literature. This study uses an expanded typology of local government form and additional independent variables to determine what factors are likely to lead to conditions conducive to cooperation and lower perceived conflict in the local governance process. Data on government performance and indicators of perceived conflict and cooperation were collected from a national survey of municipal mayors, council members, and chief administrators in cities with populations of 50,000 to 250,000. Our results suggest that form of government and proportion of council members elected by district are two factors that significantly influence governance at the local level.