Inter-Institutional Dynamics: Assessments of the Supreme Court in a Separation of Powers Context
In: Political behavior, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 357-382
ISSN: 0190-9320
10 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Political behavior, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 357-382
ISSN: 0190-9320
In: Political behavior, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 357-382
ISSN: 1573-6687
Using data collected from a survey experiment, we examine whether information about the nature of the interactions between the Supreme Court and Congress influences respondents' assessments of the Court. We find that political sophistication is key to understanding how individuals incorporate the separation of powers context into their evaluations of the Court. Political sophisticates give the Court its highest assessments when told that the Court and Congress are often in disagreement, and that Congress is most responsible for this disagreement. Assessments of the Court are significantly lower, however, when sophisticates believe that high levels of disagreement between the Court and Congress are due to the Court's actions and when these respondents believe that the Court and Congress agree a high proportion of the time. These results suggest that for political sophisticates, the Court's institutional standing is related to the balance it strikes between deference to Congress and judicial independence. Adapted from the source document.
In: Political behavior, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 357-382
ISSN: 1573-6687
In: American politics research, Band 37, Heft 3, S. 486-507
ISSN: 1552-3373
Previous findings on whether U.S. Supreme Court justices include strategic factors in their decisions to leave the Court have been mixed. We use ideological distance measures to capture the political landscape and retest the hypothesis that justices use strategic political considerations when making the decision to leave the Court. Using a Cox model of proportional hazards, we find that justices do take ideological distance from the Senate into account when making retirement decisions. Thus, the evidence indicates that justices engage in strategic behavior when contemplating retirement.
In: American journal of political science, Band 47, Heft 4, S. 729-745
ISSN: 1540-5907
Public opinion research demonstrates that citizens' opinions depend on elite rhetoric and interpersonal conversations. Yet, we continue to have little idea about how these two forces interact with one another. In this article, we address this issue by experimentally examining how interpersonal conversations affect (prior) elite framing effects. We find that conversations that include only common perspectives have no effect on elite framing, but conversations that include conflicting perspectives eliminate elite framing effects. We also introduce a new individual level moderator of framing effects—called "need to evaluate"—and we show that framing effects, in general, tend to be short‐lived phenomena. In the end, we clarify when elites can and cannot use framing to influence public opinion and how interpersonal conversations affect this process.
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 47, Heft 4, S. 729-745
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: American politics research, Band 42, Heft 5, S. 784-814
ISSN: 1552-3373
Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings offer senators a public opportunity to exercise their 'advice and consent' privilege and scrutinize presidential nominees. In this article, we examine the purpose and functioning of confirmation hearings for federal district court nominees, which make up the majority of presidential selections to federal courts. Using transcripts from all hearings between 1993 and 2008, we find the characteristics of individual nominees have little effect on the types of questions senators pose. Instead, larger institutional and political factors-such as Senate composition, party of the president, and proximity to a presidential election-are much better predictors of how senators use their opportunity to scrutinize nominees. The results indicate senators use hearings to engage in partisan and ideological position taking rather than to ascertain the qualifications of district court nominees. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]
In: American politics research, Band 42, Heft 5, S. 784-814
ISSN: 1532-673X
In: American politics research, Band 42, Heft 5, S. 784-814
ISSN: 1552-3373
Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings offer senators a public opportunity to exercise their "advice and consent" privilege and scrutinize presidential nominees. In this article, we examine the purpose and functioning of confirmation hearings for federal district court nominees, which make up the majority of presidential selections to federal courts. Using transcripts from all hearings between 1993 and 2008, we find the characteristics of individual nominees have little effect on the types of questions senators pose. Instead, larger institutional and political factors—such as Senate composition, party of the president, and proximity to a presidential election—are much better predictors of how senators use their opportunity to scrutinize nominees. The results indicate senators use hearings to engage in partisan and ideological position taking rather than to ascertain the qualifications of district court nominees.
In: American political science review, Band 106, Heft 2, S. 430-455
ISSN: 0003-0554