Suchergebnisse

Widespread S & L failures during the 1980s required the federal government to spend over 100 billion dollars bailing out the deposit insurance fund. This paper interprets the S & L debacle as a regulatory failure. Review of the S & L debacle suggests that regulators failed to manage the deposit insurance system efficiently. But the regulatory agencies' structure appears to have played a secondary role in contributing to regulatory failure. Faced with the same incentives, objectives, and resources, regulators probably would have behaved similarly regardless of the regulatory structure.

This paper assesses the implications for the banking industry of relaxing interstate branching prohibitions. Theoretical models suggest that the number, size distribution, and specialization of firms in an industry are determined so as to minimize costs of production. Analysis presented here shows that interstate branching prohibitions, or their removal, are likely to affect costs only if the "convenience" of office location is important and if significant economies of scale are associated with office expansion. These conditions apparently do not hold in either retail banking or wholesale banking. The paper concludes that productive efficiency alone will not force a major consolidation of the banking system when branching restrictions are eliminated. To the extent that a consolidation does occur, it likely will reflect factors not considered in our model. These factors include (1) possibilities for increased diversification with greater size, (2) scarce managerial resources, (3) managerial incentives to maximize the organization's size, and (4) demand for multi‐office banking.

On March 12, 1986, Ambassador Vernon A. Walters, the United States representative at the United Nations, said:
[T]he prospect is for the withholding by the United States of a very sizable amount. … This inevitably would raise the question of whether the non-payment of a substantial amount could constitute a material breach of the United States obligation under Article 17 of the U.N. Charter to pay our duly assessed share of the U.N. budget. This is an issue of which we must be aware.

Contents: Multinational force and observers, Sinai Peninsula; Multinational force, Beirut; Comparisons: MFO, MNF and the UN peacekeeping model.