Suchergebnisse

Little more than a decade ago the basic structure of the Canadian public service was radically reformed. In accordance with recommendations of the Glassco Royal Commission on Government Organisation the central agencies were restructured and their relations with departments reconstructed to shift as much as possible the location of responsibility for financial and personnel management to the departments. The Treasury Board, a statutory committee of Ministers, separated from the Department of Finance which handles economic and revenue policy, became the Government's management agency responsible for budgeting as well as financial and personnel administration. It was also cast in the role of "employer" for purposes of collective bargaining, which was introduced into the Service at the same time and thereby aligned labour relations in the Service with the system which had prevailed in the private sector since the Second World War. Responsibility for recruitment and promotion of staff according to "merit" was vested in the Public Service Commission, an independent agency reporting directly to Parliament, which also has some advisory functions in respect of training. These legislatively‐based changes were accompanied, especially after Mr. Trudeau became Prime Minister in 1968, by construction of an elaborate Cabinet committee system and more policy coordination at the administrative level by an expanded Privy Council Office. Structural change was reinforced by changes in methods of operation. Over the next few years new techniques in budgeting, which was placed on a program basis, policy evaluation and performance measurement were introduced. Under the guiding hand of the Planning Branch in the Treasury Board Secretariat, increasing emphasis was given to planning and research in central agencies and departments.

Abstract: The 1977 report on the Civil Service by the Expenditure Committee of the U.K. House of Commons contains much to interest Australian readers. It recommends abolition of the Administration Trainee Scheme and an extension of the "Open Structure" to Assistant Secretary level; the establishment of a higher management course; the re‐activation of the Pay Research Unit; and the appointment of part‐time "outsiders" to the Civil Service Commission. Although luke‐warm to the Fulton doctrine of "hiving‐off", the Committee favours the creation of more "accountable units" in departments. The centrepiece of the Report is the recommended return of key Civil Service Department functions—manpower control; management services; and internal responsibility for monitoring efficiency—to Treasury. The role of Parliament in improving efficiency is not neglected; it is proposed that the Exchequer and Audit Department conduct audits of management efficiency and effectiveness and that the use of select committees to review Executive activity be extended. The Committee was divided on the issue of whether officials serve ministers as well as they should, but the Report does contain proposals which are seen as "strengthening the minister's arm". Overall the Report reflects the Committee's limited resources; analysis is often inconclusive, or at best, partial (particularly in areas such as the central organization of government and relations between the centre and departments), and the document seems to lack a clear strategy and sense of direction. However, the Committee's work does compare favourably with that of many other inquiries into the Civil Service.