Suchergebnisse

Abstract
The article focuses on the fact that climate change is a global phenomenon. Based on the latest IPCC Assessment Report and the climate policies of the major emitters, the earth's temperature is expected to rise by 2.5 to 3°C by 2100. As a scenario analysis commissioned by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action shows, this will cause considerable damage, although it can be significantly reduced through increased adaptation measures. The article concludes that Germany (and the EU) should refrain from playing a pioneering role and work more towards further developing the Paris Agreement in accordance with the principle of reciprocity. Additionally, Germany should significantly strengthen its adaptation measures.

Der weltweite Klimawandel lässt sich nicht durch die Anstrengungen einzelner Länder oder Ländergruppen aufhalten; dazu bedarf es internationaler Kooperationen und Abkommen. Daher wird in diesem Beitrag analysiert, wie sich der CO2-Ausstoß der zehn größten Emittenten bisher entwickelt hat und wie er sich bis 2030 entwickeln wird, wenn die Teilnehmenden des Pariser Abkommens die von ihnen eingereichten 'nationally determined contributions' auch einhalten werden. Welche Anteile der CO2-Budgets zur Einhaltung des 1,5-Grad- bzw. 2-Grad-Ziels werden dann bereits 2030 ausgeschöpft sein? ; The article analyses how the CO2 emissions of the world's ten largest polluters have evolved in the past and will evolve by 2030 if the member countries of the Paris Agreement comply with the NDCs. By 2030, the CO2-budgets for reaching the 1.5- or 2-degree target will be exhausted to a significant extent. Industrialized countries cannot stop climate change by reducing their own emissions alone. Therefore, they should change their strategy and cooperate more closely with developing and emerging countries and support them in reducing their CO2 emissions. Additionally, they should take more measures to adapt to climate change.

Renate Neubäumer, Universität Koblenz-Landau, analysiert die Nachfrageentwicklung in Griechenland zwischen 2000 und 2013 und kommt zu den Ansicht, dass für den Einbruch der Wirtschaftsleistung Griechenlands die Fiskalpolitik zweitrangig war. Entscheidender war der Rückgang anderer Nachfragekomponenten, vor allem des Wohnungsbaus, aber auch des privaten Konsums und weiterer Anlageinvestitionen, der sich bereits vor dem Beginn der Sparpolitik vollzogen hatte.

This paper analyzes the prologue to the Greek tragedy-in particular, the long period of slow growth after Greece joined the European Union and the short period of very strong growth following its adoption of the euro-and deduces reform proposals. Ultimately, a growth strategy should contain three interrelated bundles of measures: First, an improvement of the institutional environment, which currently makes it difficult to do business in Greece and thus leads to too little investment. Second, a reorganization of public finances and the creation of a leaner, more efficient administration, as well as a reform of the pensions system. Third, an expansion of the industrial basis and the modern sector in order to build a strong export basis. All of these measures entail comprehensive changes to Greece's economy and Greek society, and the majority of Greeks must therefore be in favor of them. The alternative is to opt for moderate reforms and to return to the old path of low growth and a lower living standard.

Der Beitrag analysiert die Vorgeschichte der griechischen Tragödie - insbesondere die lange Phase niedrigen Wachstums nach dem EU-Beitritt und die kurze Phase sehr hohen Wachstums nach dem Euro-Beitritt - und leitet daraus Reformvorschläge ab. Eine Wachstumsstrategie müsste drei Maßnahmenbündel umfassen: erstens eine Verbesserung der institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen, die eine Geschäftstätigkeit in Griechenland erschweren und zu niedrigen Investitionen führen, zweitens eine Sanierung der Staatsfinanzen, die mit einer kleineren und effizienteren öffentlichen Verwaltung sowie mit umfassenden Reformen des Rentensystems einhergeht, und drittens den Ausbau der industriellen Basis und die Förderung moderner Dienstleistungen, um so die Exportbasis zu stärken. Solch umfassende Reformen würden zu einem grundlegenden Wandel der griechischen Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft führen und müssten deshalb von der Mehrheit der Griechen angestrebt werden. Die Alternative wäre, nur moderate Reformen vorzunehmen, auf den Pfad niedrigen Wachstums zurückzukehren und einen niedrigeren Lebensstandard in Kauf zu nehmen. ; This paper analyzes the prologue to the Greek tragedy-in particular, the long period of slow growth after Greece joined the European Union and the short period of very strong growth following its adoption of the euro-and deduces reform proposals. Ultimately, a growth strategy should contain three interrelated bundles of measures: First, an improvement of the institutional environment, which currently makes it difficult to do business in Greece and thus leads to too little investment. Second, a reorganization of public finances and the creation of a leaner, more efficient administration, as well as a reform of the pensions system. Third, an expansion of the industrial basis and the modern sector in order to build a strong export basis. All of these measures entail comprehensive changes to Greece's economy and Greek society, and the majority of Greeks must therefore be in favor of them. The alternative is to opt for moderate reforms and to return to the old path of low growth and a lower living standard.

The aim of this discussion paper is not only to activate a debate over the interrelation between rising income inequality and economic policy measures but also to initiate comparative research in several European countries and North America. It discusses the consequences of a rising income inequality and its implications for state activities and economic policy. Using a simple model it becomes evident that an increasing income inequality leads to higher government spending, as a share of Gross Domestic Product, though the state does not take over more responsibilities. It also leads to a higher tax share though rates of taxation are not increased. This forces economic politicians to act. If they want to prevent an increase of these shares in order not to fall behind in the international competition, they must accept a rising public debt and/or must move away from socially accepted value judgments about social standards, the degree of redistribution by taxes and/or an adequate supply of public goods. This might result in disenchantment with politics.

Bei der Diskussion um die Staatsschuldenkrise wird häufig vergessen, dass die Finanzkrise die eigentliche Ursache für den Anstieg der Staatsverschuldung in den einzelnen Staaten war. Eine unsolide Haushaltspolitik lässt sich bei den finanzschwachen Ländern - mit Ausnahme von Griechenland - nicht nachweisen. Daher sollte von dem zu einseitigen Blick auf die Fiskalkriterien abgerückt und den Fehlentwicklungen, die zur Finanzkrise geführt haben, wieder mehr Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt werden.

Our paper investigates the relative effects of wage subsidies and further vocational training on the subsequent employment prospects of previously unemployed program participants. First, we outline a theoretical approach based on a firm's hiring decision. For the relative effectiveness of both labor market programs the assumption concerning the formation of human capital is crucial and leads to competing hypotheses for the medium and long term. On the assumption that wage subsidies have no effect on human capital they improve individuals' employment prospects less than training programs. Contrariwise, on the assumption that the formation of human capital on subsidized jobs equals that by formal training subsidization has the same employment effect as a training program. Second, we test the two hypotheses empirically, using a large administrative data set from Germany and statistical matching techniques. Our treatment groups consist of unemployed persons taking up subsidized employment or entering a further vocational training program, respectively, during March 2003. To exclude unemployment after program end we estimate the effect of keeping a subsidized job versus participating in training and taking up a job immediately afterwards. The results strongly support the latter of our competing hypotheses: Previously subsidized individuals and trained individuals who found a job immediately afterwards have the same employment rates. This leads to the conclusion that firms value training on a subsidized job as much as formal training programs.