Suchergebnisse

The focus of the forthcoming Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty besides the problem of a lack of conference for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East are the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament are, while the US and Russia to modernize their arsenals vigorously. The arms control must not be questioned. With its recommendations, the American, German and Russian experts from the Deep Cuts Commission to contribute to overcoming the standstill. Adapted from the source document.

Outer Space is increasingly being used by leading states for various civilian & commercial purposes, but also for military means. As a result of the Cold War, the USA & Russia have refrained from deploying operational weapons in space due to the provocative & expensive nature of space-based weapons (SW). Already, the United States is focusing its research effort on achieving possible means of controlling the earth's orbit & outer space. Russia & China could very easily develop "asymmetrical means" to counter US dominance in space. This article examines the international debate around this set of problems as well as the political & technical consequences of a possible weaponization of space. The goal should be the establishment of an arms control regime centered upon a binding & verifiable ban on all kinds of space weapons. Viable steps towards this could include confidence-building measures as well as institutional & technical steps. The EU should become the vanguard of arms control in space. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

The EU describes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as potentially greatest threat to its security. In 2003, to prevent this threat, the EU compiled a catalogue of measures strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction focusing primarily on political & preventive means such as diplomatic pressure or export & armament controls. Sanctions according to chapter 7 of the UN-Charta are proposed as last resort. The author is surprised that NATO accepted the Bush administrations immature & questionable antimissile defense plans. Research & development of antimissile defense systems will continue but a premature location decision on European soil could create more problems than it will solve. E. Sanchez

With the announced withdrawal from the ABM-treaty, the Bush administration has underlined its intention to develop & to deploy a global missile defense. The termination of the treaty not only allows the development of sea- & air-based elements, but also of space-based weapons. The danger of a renewed arms race with considerable risks, including a devaluation of arms control & nonproliferation norms & mechanisms, is real. Additionally, the attacks of September 11 (2001) show that nonstate actors do not need missiles to wreak havoc in highly industrialized societies. Even a global missile defense shield, which is not yet technologically ripe, & which would only be applicable to limited real target sets, can only cover a small area of conceivable security risks. Other diplomatic or arms control measures designed to decrease or cancel the missile threat of emerging threshold states are more reliable & far-reaching. 2 Tables. Adapted from the source document.

The "revolution in military affairs" is a focal point of security policy making & arms dynamics today. The basis of this (r)evolution is formed by the ever-intensifying integration of information technology in strategies, weapon systems, & armed forces' structures. This debate is overlapped by a discourse on the role of information as a central factor in future warfare, both in terms of capabilities & threats. As this article shows, different concepts get mixed up under the generic term information warfare. However, the two main lines of argument, information-based warfare & cyberwarfare, show multiple differences. This becomes most visible if one takes a look at the different goals & means as well as the respective status of realization, but also with regard to the problems & risks as well as possible reactions. Adapted from the source document.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) not only furthered the common European security & defence policy, but also named for the first time a set of concrete threats for the security of the EU. The ESS furthermore formulated the objective to combine the efforts of the Union, thus enabling a common approach to counter these threats. One of the results is the European Security Research Program (ESRP) put forward by the European Commission. As we will show, the ESRP remains plagued by several inconsistencies which impair its effectiveness: while potentially providing viable solutions the program might also generate undesirable consequences due to these inherent problems. These potential risks & their management also mark the point of reference for a proposed interdisciplinary research program concerned with the impact of new security technologies on European societies & individuals. Adapted from the source document.