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AbstractSince 1990, the American states have adopted a variety of reforms to regulate lobbying in an attempt to address a host of ethical issues. Such regulation can have important impacts on a variety of aspects of the legislative process because it typically impacts the relationships between legislators and lobbyists. How does such lobbying regulation vary across the states and over time? I have developed a measure of state lobbying regulation from 1990-2003. This measure validly captures the laws that limit relationships between lobbyists and legislators and, as such, can be used to help assess a variety of hypotheses about the legislative process.

Since 1990, the American states have adopted a variety of reforms to regulate lobbying in an attempt to address a host of ethical issues. Such regulation can have important impacts on a variety of aspects of the legislative process because it typically impacts the relationships between legislators & lobbyists. How does such lobbying regulation vary across the states & over time? I have developed a measure of state lobbying regulation from 1990-2003. This measure validly captures the laws that limit relationships between lobbyists & legislators &, as such, can be used to help assess a variety of hypotheses about the legislative process. 1 Table, 13 References. Adapted from the source document.

ABSTRACTThis article reviews the existing literature on policy transfer and diffusion and offers a more integrated theory for examining the spreading of policy. Typical studies have treated each as separate, yet they are similar in many respects. For example, both involve many of the same agents and processes involved in the spreading of policy. This article integrates the two literatures by developing a theoretical continuum upon which varying degrees of policy diffusion occur.

This article reviews the existing literature on policy transfer & diffusion & offers a more integrated theory for examining the spreading of policy. Typical studies have treated each as separate, yet they are similar in many respects. For example, both involve many of the same agents & processes involved in the spreading of policy. This article integrates the two literatures by developing a theoretical continuum on which varying degrees of policy diffusion occur. 3 Tables, 1 Figure, 39 References. Adapted from the source document.

The purpose of the advocacy coalition framework is to explain policy change over time through an examination of the stability of advocacy coalitions within policy subsystems. Recently, scholars have confirmed that advocacy coalitions are held together by shared belief systems, specifically in distributive policy arenas. We contend that federal agencies, in distributive policy arenas, provide both the anchors and support systems for the development and maintenance of belief systems. This anchoring helps provide adequate resources, access to political institutions, ability to control administrative process, and/or the capacity to deliver public goods and services. We conducted an analysis of the policy changes that occurred during the implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act for the construction of the Bureau of Reclamation's Animas‐La Plata project. This is an example where administrators, through the management of information, were able to control the policy process. The analysis provides a needed replication of previous findings regarding policy change and offers new insights into how institutions are critical to subsystem stability over time.

Many scholars have argued that there are strong incentives for states to spend less money on redistributive or consumption programs, such as welfare, and more on developmental or investment programs, such as highways. Yet, over the last few decades, the proportion of state budgets allocated to expenditures intended to develop human and physical capital, specifically education and highways, has declined. In real terms, spending on virtually every government program has increased but expenditure increases to redistributive programs have been much greater than those to investment programs. Why this shift has happened despite theory predicting the contrary has not been adequately examined in a way that considers multiple developmental programs and multiple ways of conceptualizing spending over a substantial time period. We undertake this task in the following article using a large, cross-sectional time series data set of state budgeting toward K-12 education, higher education, and highways from 1965 to 2004. We test competing theories of the determinants of state spending using these data and then discuss the factors that we believe have led to the relative de-emphasis on developmental programs. We find that the most consistent predictors of state developmental spending patterns are federal grants, the state of the economy, and interstate and intrastate competition. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractWhile state environmental and natural resource spending is designed to address actual environmental problems, the budget process is also inherently political. Thus, in the following article we ask a simple question: to what extent does state environmental and natural resource spending respond to the scope of environmental problems in a state, versus the demands of the political process? Unlike the bulk of previous research, we consider both aggregate spending and program‐specific spending. We also consider how the severity of environmental problems and the political environment may interact to determine spending. The findings show that politics, specifically the strength of the environmental movement, is a more important determinant of state environmental spending than pollution severity. However, for some program areas, it appears that strong environmental groups make state budgets more responsive to the severity of environmental problems.

Objective. The goal of this study is to examine how the political mobilization of business interests influences aggregate public policy outputs in the states. We examine the relationship between business mobilization and general state policy liberalism, as well as policy that we term state "business policy climate."Methods. We construct a measure of the "business policy climate" from a number of tax and regulatory indicators in the states and examine whether business influences it and policy liberalism using ordinary least squares regression.Results. The analysis shows that business mobilization does not influence general policy liberalism but is a significant influence on a state's business policy climate. Specifically, the dominance of a state's campaign finance system by business interests makes policy more favorable toward business.Conclusions. The extent of business mobilization in a state is an important influence on public policy outputs but is constrained by the activities of other political actors such as unions.

Objective. The goal of this study is to examine how the political mobilization of business interests influences aggregate public policy outputs in the states. We examine the relationship between business mobilization & general state policy liberalism, as well as policy that we term state "business policy climate." Methods. We construct a measure of the "business policy climate" from a number of tax & regulatory indicators in the states & examine whether business influences it & policy liberalism using ordinary least squares regression. Results. The analysis shows that business mobilization does not influence general policy liberalism but is a significant influence on a state's business policy climate. Specifically, the dominance of a state's campaign finance system by business interests makes policy more favorable toward business. Conclusions. The extent of business mobilization in a state is an important influence on public policy outputs but is constrained by the activities of other political actors such as unions. 3 Tables, 19 References. Adapted from the source document.

Objective. The goal of this study is to examine how the political mobilization of business interests influences aggregate public policy outputs in the states. We examine the relationship between business mobilization and general state policy liberalism, as well as policy that we term state "business policy climate." Methods. We construct a measure of the "business policy climate" from a number of tax and regulatory indicators in the states and examine whether business influences it and policy liberalism using ordinary least squares regression. Results. The analysis shows that business mobilization does not influence general policy liberalism but is a significant influence on a state's business policy climate. Specifically, the dominance of a state's campaign finance system by business interests makes policy more favorable toward business. Conclusions. The extent of business mobilization in a state is an important influence on public policy outputs but is constrained by the activities of other political actors such as unions. (Original abstract)