LEGISLATIVE CHOICE OF REGULATORY FORMS: A COMMENT ON FIORINA
In: Public choice, Volume 39, p. 67-71
ISSN: 0048-5829
FIORINA'S PAPER COMBINES HISTORY, TRADITIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE, AND FORMAL MODELS WITH MIXED SUCCESS. HE PRESENTS AN ARRAY OF EXPLANATIONS OF WHY CONGRESS OFTEN CHOOSES TO REGULATE THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES WITH VAGUE MANDATES RATHER THAN BY ENACTING MORE PRECISE LEGISLATION TO BE ENFORCED IN THE COURTS. MANY OF THE INDIVIDUAL MODELS AND EXPLANATIONS ARE INTERESTING AND OFFER USEFUL INSIGHTS, BUT THE PAPER WOULD BENEFIT FROM A GREATER EFFORT TO INTEGRATE AND EVALUATE THE ALTERNATIVES PRESENTED. IN PART, FIORINA HAS SHIFTED THE RESPONSIBILITY" TO THE READER, POSSIBLY IN THE HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE LESS SLIPPAGE FOR THE PROPOSITIONS WITH WHICH THE READER AGREES THAN FOR THOSE HE FINDS LESS COMPELLING. MY COMMENTS FOCUS FIRST ON THE SPECIFIC MODELS PRESENTED BY FIORINA AND THEN ON WAYS IN WHICH PORTIONS OF HIS ANALYSIS MIGHT APPLY TO OTHER REGULATORY ISSUES, IN PARTICULAR THE CHOICE BETWEEN "COMMAND AND CONTROL" AND INCENTIVES.