Since the original publication of The Death of Expertise, the assault on experts has only ratcheted up. Numerous forces have driven the increase, including a deepening of populist anti-intellectualism, a notable rise in conspiratorial thinking, and the hostile reaction to the medical establishment during the Covid pandemic. Trump and Trumpism, of course, have also played an outsized role, and social media continues to fan the flames. In this new edition, Tom Nichols covers the latest developments in the past half dozen years. Along with updating all the chapters, he has added a chapter on the Covid pandemic. Arguably the most influential book written on the attack on expertise in our era, this new edition is sure to remain the standard book on the subject.
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In Our Own Worst Enemy, Tom Nichols challenges the current depictions of the rise of illiberal and anti-democratic movements in the United States and elsewhere as the result of the deprivations of globalization or the malign decisions of an undifferentiated "elite." Rather, he argues that too many of us have succumbed to a toxic cocktail of growing narcissism and increasing expectations fueled by affluence, peace, and a connected global culture, which in turn are exploited by political entrepreneurs who encourage reinforcing cycles of perceived relative deprivation, political alienation, unvirtuous political (and social) behavior, and who provide targets for subsequent bouts of unfocused rage.
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"NATO has been a "nuclear" alliance since its inception. Nuclear weapons have served the dual purpose of being part of NATO military planning as well as being central to the Alliance's deterrence strategy. For over 4 decades, NATO allies sought to find conventional and nuclear forces, doctrines, and agreed strategies that linked the defense of Europe to that of the United States. Still, in light of the evolving security situation, the Alliance must now consider the role and future of tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). Two clear conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, in the more than 2 decades since the end of the Cold War, the problem itself -- that is, the question of what to do with weapons designed in a previous century for the possibility of a World War III against a military alliance that no longer exists -- is understudied, both inside and outside of government. Tactical weapons, although less awesome than their strategic siblings, carry significant security and political risks, and they have not received the attention that is commensurate to their importance. Second, it is clear that whatever the future of these arms, the status quo is unacceptable. It is past the time for NATO to make more resolute decisions, find a coherent strategy, and formulate more definite plans about its nuclear status. Consequently, decisions about the role of nuclear weapons within the Alliance and the associated supporting analysis are fundamental to the future identity of NATO. At the Lisbon Summit in Portugal in November 2010, the Alliance agreed to conduct the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR). This effort is designed to answer these difficult questions prior to the upcoming NATO Summit in May 2012. The United States and its closest allies must define future threats and, in doing so, clarify NATO's identity, purpose, and corresponding force requirements. So far, NATO remains a "nuclear alliance," but it is increasingly hard to define what that means."--Publisher's website
Mountain rescue (MR) teams in Britain are run entirely by volunteers. The number of MR callouts has increased, partly because teams are increasingly being used by the police in searches for missing people in non-mountainous areas. Most MR teams feel they are coping with the increased demand although some are becoming selective about which call-outs they respond to. A survey of MR team members and potential recruits reveals a mismatch between potential members' expectation of being engaged in MR and the reality of the increased work supporting non-mountain incidents. This illustrates a potential strain in the motivations of volunteers being used to deliver public services. This article explores how this is particular to the type of volunteering involved in MR, how teams have coped with the increased demand and how the increased use of MR teams is partly a response to changed police management practices.