Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Contents -- Series Editors' Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- A Political Theory of Fiscal Federalism in the States -- The Strategic Pursuit of Federal Grants -- The Strategic Expenditure of Federal Grants -- Grants and the Electoral Connection -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- V -- W.

In the 25 years following the Second World War, state governments doubled the amount of inflation adjusted revenue that they collected in taxes. That represented a growth rate more than double that of the federal government (see Maxwell 1972). On average, the increase in state tax effort flattened out markedly by the 1980s, but there has been tremendous variation in the degree to which individual states have raised or lowered the tax burden on citizens over the last four decades. This study argues that federalism, and particularly the grant-in-aid system, influenced state budgetary decision-making and ultimately tax levels within recipient jurisdictions over the past 40 years. ; Includes bibliographical references

Scholars have challenged the notion of "political safeguards of federalism" in a large and well-developed body of work on the use of coercive policy tools by the federal government. This study suggests, however, that there may be some utility in re-examining the political factors that help to constrain the growth of national power. Specifically, it argues that the need to win votes from subnational constituencies makes national lawmakers less supportive of mandates, preemptions, and tax sanctions during election cycles and, thus, provides an intermittent safeguard of state authority. It tests and finds evidence for hypotheses related to that general argument in analyses of the passage of coercive federalist policies over the last thirty years. Adapted from the source document.

Scholars have long been interested in the politics of taxation in the U.S. states. Research in this area has not, however, sufficiently explored the impact of fiscal federalism on state-level taxing decisions. Drawing on theoretical models of fiscal choice, this study develops the expectation that, under certain conditions, federal grants-in-aid exert significant downward pressure on state-level tax effort. I test that assertion in an analysis of tax effort in the U.S. states between 1971 and 1996. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractScholars have long been interested in the politics of taxation in the U.S. states. Research in this area has not, however, sufficiently explored the impact of fiscal federalism on state-level taxing decisions. Drawing on theoretical models of fiscal choice, this study develops the expectation that, under certain conditions, federal grants-in-aid exert significant downward pressure on state-level tax effort. I test that assertion in an analysis of tax effort in the U.S. states between 1971 and 1996.

The success of State Children's Health Insurance Programs (SCHIP) in expanding insurance coverage among low‐income children varies considerably across states. Scholars have looked to different program characteristics to explain this variation, but have arrived at disparate conclusions regarding the impact of one of the most significant design choices—the decision to create a new program or to pursue increased child health insurance rates through an expansion of the existing Medicaid program. This study suggests that understanding the impact of programmatic choices requires a more careful consideration of the mechanisms through which these different program designs might influence enrollment than has been offered in previous research. Employing a multilevel governance framework, it suggests that there is a hitherto unexplored indirect impact, where design choices influence administrative behavior, which in turn influences enrollment success in SCHIP programs. It is important to understand the effect of administrative design choices because this is one of the key areas in which states exercise discretion in the implementation of many federal programs.