Suchergebnisse

Antidumping actions in the United States and EU are knownto be linked to macroeconomic conditions. In part, this is becausepositive injury findings may be easier to make in a downturn. Weexplore the evidence for Mexico, one of the main new antidumpingusing countries. Injury determination is also critica! in Mexico'santidumping policy, as a majority of unsuccessful complaints have beenrejected because of negative injury findings rather than negative findingsof dumping. Working with data from 1987 through 2000, we provideevidence for a relationship between macro-economic factors andantidumping complaints, including current account and exchange ratemovements, and both local and global general macroeconomicconditions.

We examine the role of political factors in Mexico's antidumping regime, considering both the characteristics of target countries subject to antidumping duties and industry-specific factors for sectors receiving protection. Our results are broadly consistent with the recent theoretical literature on endogenous protection, in terms of both the political costs and the political benefits of providing protection. They are also in line with the existing empirical literature on antidumping, which is focused primarily on the experience of the U.S. and the EU. Our results also suggest that WTO Membership of trading partners increases the political costs of supplying administered protection.