Suchergebnisse

Acknowledgments -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Markets, Governments, and Smart Growth -- Catallactics, Knowledge, and Entrepreneurs -- Urban Political Economy -- Green Building Studies -- Smart Growth Entrepreneurs -- Research Design -- The Plan of the Book -- Bibliography -- Chapter 2: Sprawl and Smart Growth -- Real Estate and the State -- Sprawling into the Future -- Smart Growth and the New Urbanism -- Smart Growth Versus Sprawl -- Smart Regulations and Ecological Modernization -- Promoting New Urbanist Development and Identifying the Obstacles to Smart Growth -- Parking and Urban Form -- Sustainable Construction Costs -- Mixed-Use and Financing -- Community Participation and the Permit Review Process -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Chapter 3: Managing Urban Growth in Oregon and California -- Managing Urban Growth in the El Dorado State -- Megapolitan SoCal -- Growth Management in the Golden State -- California Zoning -- The General Plan -- Tax Revolt and Fiscal Crises -- California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) -- Exactions and Impact Fees -- Development Caps -- California Cities and Growth Controls -- San Luis Obispo -- Santa Maria -- Santa Barbara -- Ventura -- Oxnard -- Camarillo -- Thousand Oaks -- Oregon Urban Growth and Management -- History -- Senate Bill 10 -- Senate Bill 100 -- Urban Growth Boundaries (UGBs) -- Portland -- Portland Development Commission (PDC) -- The Portland Metro -- The Portland Metro TOD (Transit-Oriented Development) Program -- Oregon Cities and Growth Controls -- Beaverton -- Lake Oswego -- Milwaukie -- Gresham -- Conclusion -- Note -- Bibliography -- Chapter 4: The Smart Growth Machine: Coalitions of Entrepreneurs -- The Entrepreneurial State, Innovators, and Market Formation -- The Entrepreneurial State in Santa Barbara and Ventura

Sovereign credit ratings guide over USD 50 trillion in outstanding sovereign debt and set the ceiling for most corporate credit ratings. The credit rating agencies assign ratings based on a combination of objective fundamentals and the subjective judgment of their in‐house rating committees. In this paper we decompose the sovereign ratings of the 'Big Three' rating agencies into an 'objective' component (the fitted value from an OLS regression of ratings on 10 explanatory variables) and a 'subjective' component (the corresponding residuals) using data for advanced and emerging economies over the period 1996–2013. We then examine the explanatory power of the two components for predicting sovereign default. Our main finding is that, while the 'objective' component has explanatory power to predict defaults both in the short and long‐term, the 'subjective' component does not help to predict defaults of a horizon of 1 year or more. In particular, analysing the probability of default within 3 years, we find the 'subjective' component is biasing default predictions in the wrong direction with—at times—dramatic consequences. This is the 'damaging bias' of sovereign ratings. The biggest casualty of this was the Eurozone periphery, which was downgraded far too heavily during the 2009–2011 sovereign debt crisis as the rating committees repeatedly overruled the signal coming from fundamentals. In light of our findings, we suggest that credit rating agencies should be stripped of their regulatory powers and these transferred to an international body. Failing that, the ratings agencies should be forced to substantially increase transparency, including publishing a separate breakdown of the 'objective' and 'subjective' components of ratings, the minutes of the rating committees, and the voting records.