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Regulatory studies have traditionally focused on external political and administrative factors when explaining the behavior of regulatory inspectors. This is, however, only one part of the story about regulatory behavior. To understand the behavior of street‐level bureaucrats such as regulatory inspectors, it is essential to look not only at external political and administrative factors but also at the very interaction between the bureaucrat and the client. By focusing on differential treatment of regulated firms by inspectors and the explanatory power of the interaction between inspector and firm, the article shows that variation in the level of communication between inspector and regulatee helps to explain variation in regulatory leniency. The higher the level of communication, the more lenient is the inspector.

Traditional studies of street‐level bureaucrats see the bureaucrat's behaviour as a kind of self‐defence – a way to minimize negative aspects of the job and thereby job frustration. I argue – and empirically show – that it is equally relevant to consider at least part of street‐level bureaucrat behaviour as positively motivated – as a way of maximizing job satisfaction. Behavioural mechanisms such as coping are not just a way to avoid frustration, but also a way to gain satisfaction. This becomes clear when we attempt to explain differential treatment among regulated companies.

For decades there has been a trend in regulatory studies to advocate a responsive, tit‐for‐tat, regulatory strategy. However, most of the prominent arguments for this strategy are theoretical and few have tested its effectiveness. Even less tested has been whether or not regulatory inspectors manage to react responsively to the "conduct" of regulatees. By distinguishing between five different kinds of responsiveness, the present article tests these different kinds of responsiveness in four different regulatory areas, using data about more than 2,500 legal breaches. The empirical analyses show that regulatory inspectors manage to act responsively, but only to a small degree and not necessarily in the way that the theories of responsive and tit‐for‐tat regulation recommend. Furthermore, the analyses show large differences between the four regulatory areas suggesting that future studies should focus on the role of formal and informal institutional settings in creating responsiveness. If we want to design regulatory agencies that are able to regulate responsively we need to know what kind of institutional settings promote responsiveness.

"Traditional studies of street-level bureaucrats see the bureaucrat's behaviour as a kind of self-defence - a way to minimize negative aspects of the job and thereby job frustration. I argue - and empirically show - that it is equally relevant to consider at least part of street-level bureaucrat behaviour as positively motivated - as a way of maximizing job satisfaction. Behavioural mechanisms such as coping are not just a way to avoid frustration, but also a way to gain satisfaction. This becomes clear when we attempt to explain differential treatment among regulated companies." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Based on data disclosing differential treatment of regulated companies, this article shows that it is important to look at the implementation phase as well as the political decision‐making phase when one talks about distribution of power in Western democracies. Doing so gives a more nuanced picture of the distribution of power. However, explaining differential treatment throughout the implementation phase with variation in the possession of different power resources gives a more or less kaleidoscopic picture and calls for a complex theory of power. Local economic strength, networks, knowledge and organizational similarity do lead to more lenient regulatory inspection, but the effect depends on whether the company is public or private. Therefore, to have power and influence, one must possess the right resources, understand how to use them and be able to handle the fact that people might expect something different from you than they expect from others – not because of what you do, but because of who you are.