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Correcting the relative lack of attention to the supply side of trade policy, this article addresses how political institutions channel societal demands for protection. I hypothesize that strong presidents with significant legislative powers and strong party leaders—empowered through electoral rules that rein in the personal vote—can help overcome protectionist biases. These arguments compare with two institutional alternatives: first, that protectionism should decrease as electoral district size grows because elections become more proportional; and second, that the collective‐action problems in fragmented party systems thwart trade reform. I evaluate these hypotheses empirically using pooled time‐series–cross‐sectional data involving 18 developing countries from 1971 to 1997. I find that delegation to presidents and party leaders is significantly related to trade liberalization, and some evidence suggests that the effective number of parties and the size of electoral districts may also influence levels of protectionism.

Current international relations theory struggles to explain both the autonomy and transformation of international organizations (IOs). Previous theories either fail to account for any IO behavior that deviates from the interests of member states, or neglect the role of member states in reforming IO institutions and behavior. We propose an agency theory of IOs that can fill these gaps while also addressing two persistent problems in the study of IOs: common agency and long delegation chains. Our model explains slippage between member states' interests and IO behavior, but also suggests institutional mechanisms—staff selection, monitoring, procedural checks, and contracts—through which states can rein in errant IOs. We evaluate this argument by examining multiple institutional reforms and lending patterns at the World Bank from 1980 to 2000.

Die aktuelle Theorie der internationalen Beziehungen hat Schwierigkeiten, sowohl die Autonomie als auch die Transformation internationaler Organisationen (IO)zu erklären. Vorherige Theorien versagen entweder bei der Erklärung von Verhaltensweisen von IO, die von den Interessen der Mitgliedsstaaten abweichen, oder vernachlässigen die Rolle der Mitgliedsstaaten bei der Reform von IO-Institutionen und deren Verhalten. Der Artikel entwirft eine Agency-Theorie der IO, die diese Lücken füllen kann und ausserdem zwei andauernde Probleme des Studiums von IO löst: die sog. "common agency" und die "long delegation chains". Das Modell erklärt Differenzen zwischen den Interessen der Mitgliedsstaaten und dem Verhalten von IO, schlägt aber auch institutionelle Mechanismen wie z.B. die Auswahl der Angestellten, Überwachung, prozedurale Überprüfung und Verträge vor, durch die Staaten die Kontrolle über fehlgeleiteten IOen wiedergewinnen können. Dieses Argument wird durch die Untersuchung mehrerer institutioneller Reformen und Kreditvergabemustern der Weltbank von 1980 bis 2000 überprüft. (SWP-Jns)

By the late 1980s the Colombian constitution had come under severe pressure for reform as the population shifted markedly from a rural to an urban majority. The president had repeatedly tried to provide policy to court the median Colombian voter, who was urban. The congress was strongly tied to rural interests. Congress consistently thwarted presidential efforts at policy reform. Different presidents again and again proposed constitutional reform as a way of achieving eventual policy aims, only to have the proposed reforms soundly rejected in the legislature. The Colombian congress solely possessed the authority to make constitutional revisions. This article tells the story of how this institutional impasse was overcome. In the wake of severe social strife and conflict a national referendum on constitutional reform was passed by popular vote and upheld by judicial action. This article argues that such constitutional conflict might only be overcome through extraconstitutional—although still democratic—means.