Suchergebnisse

Este artículo analiza el desempeño del gobierno de Enrique Peña Nieto en materia de combate a la corrupción. Me enfoco en entender los orígenes del Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción (sna), cómo está formado, y en identificar los retos y posibilidades de éxito de cara al futuro. Con base en la revisión de la evidencia reunida, propongo que, en materia de anticorrupción, el desempeño del gobierno de Peña Nieto fue reactivo, incompleto y limitado. Los esfuerzos respondieron principalmente a la necesidad de aplacar el descontento social, mientras que los recursos se mantuvieron precarios y nunca se formuló una política anticorrupción eficaz. Más aún, no hubo voluntad política para consolidar y mejorar la estrategia en ciernes, ni una coalición que asegurara su continuidad. Estos defectos explican por qué el sna no ha podido consolidarse, hasta ahora, como una estrategia anticorrupción de largo plazo.

Sociale en economische veranderingen hebben gezorgd voor een meer dynamische en instabielere vorm van kapitalisme. Organisaties zien zich gedwongen om hun structuren en processen te heroverwegen en zodanig aan te passen dat ze flexibeler en effectiever worden. Dit proefschrift bestudeert dergelijke reorganisaties. Het maakt gebruik van observaties uit een studie onder private ondernemingen en overheidsinstanties in Nederland en Mexico, om recente patronen van organisatieveranderingen in zowel de publieke als private sector te begrijpen. De resultaten laten onder meer zien dat managers niet noodzakelijkerwijs reorganisaties starten omdat ze de controle hebben, zoals doorgaans wordt aangenomen. Het is waarschijnlijker dat ze reorganiseren vanwege een gebrek aan controle. Dit impliceert dat managers die een gebrek aan controle waarnemen een grotere kans hebben om te gaan reorganiseren, terwijl zij die zich wel in controle zien zich waarschijnlijk zullen verzetten tegen veranderingen. De resultaten wijzen er verder op dat de behoefte aan controle belangrijke consequenties kan hebben voor het implementeren van veranderingen in de publieke sector. De studie naar een bestuurlijke hervorming van de Mexicaanse overheid laat zien dat managers soms coördinatie moeten opofferen om naleving van regels (compliance) te verkrijgen. Empirisch bewijs suggereert verder dat het reorganiseren van de overheid niet noodzakelijkerwijs grote hoeveelheden financiële middelen vereist. Tot slot impliceren de resultaten dat publieke en private organisaties sinds de jaren '90 convergeren, althans in Nederland. Dat gezegd hebbende, blijven cruciale verschillen bestaan. We laten bij voorbeeld zien dat meer autonomie voor publieke managers kan zorgen voor "meer verandering", vergeleken met managers in de private sector. Dit suggereert dat de algemeen aanvaarde zienswijze op publieke organisaties als "rigide" deels ongefundeerd is. ; Social and economic changes have brought about a more dynamic and unstable form of capitalism. Organizations have been forced to rethink their structures and processes and adapt them to become more flexible and effective. This dissertation studies these reorganizations. It uses observations drawn from a study of private companies and government agencies in the Netherlands and Mexico to understand some of the recent patterns of organizational change in the public and the private sectors. Results show, among other things, that managers do not necessarily embark on reorganizations, as assumed in many popular management textbooks, because they are "in control", but probably because they are not. This implies that managers who detect lack of control are more likely to reorganize; whereas, those who perceive themselves in control will likely resist change. Further, results also show that the need for control may have important consequences for the implementation of changes in the public sector. The study of a governmental reform in Mexico shows that sometimes managers must sacrifice coordination to achieve compliance. Evidence also suggests that implementing reorganizations in the government does not necessarily imply committing vast financial resources. Finally, results suggest that since the 1990s, public and private organizations, at least in the Netherlands, seem to be converging. Yet, crucial differences persist. For instance, we show that granting more autonomy to public managers fosters "more change" relative to private ones. This suggests that the common view on the "rigidity" of public organizations may be partially unfounded.

This study uses the Neo-Weberian State (NWS) and TODO frameworks to examine Mexico's public sector reforms and current challenges. Analyzing the trajectory of public administration reforms reveals a historical context of mixed logics, weak institutions, and limited capacity, further aggravated by recent democratic backsliding, dismantling, and austerity cuts. Next, based on the TODO framework, emphasizing turbulent environments, oscillating knowledge quality, domino-falling types of interdependence, and opposing solutions, we analyze the case of the migration crisis at the US-Mexico border as a way to exemplify current challenges faced by the Mexican public sector. The analysis exposes shortcomings in crisis management, highlighting political neglect, strained US-Mexico relations, and prolonged uncertainty for asylum seekers. Overall, the study underscores Mexico's need to enhance systemic resilience governance. Findings contribute to the study of discourse on governance models, emphasizing the importance of adaptive frameworks for crisis management and democratic governance in the Global South.

AbstractPrincipal‐agent models of corruption control that emphasize rules, incentives, and sanctions as prime antecedents of corruption often stop short when evaluating how these general principles translate into concrete Human Resource Management (HRM) policies. Following a call to develop research about how day‐to‐day public management operations change incentives to be corrupt, we use data of 5.22 million USD audited to 545 local Mexican governments over 3 years to test the correlation between the misappropriation of public funds and specific HRM functions. Our results suggest that HRM is a critical, underseen factor in understanding the risk of corruption. In line with previous findings, we show that having merit‐based recruitment can prevent corruption. However, we also find that having performance and departmental evaluations and a less unequal structure of remunerations may also help local governments effectively avoid the misappropriation of public money.

D'après les théories sur l'entrepreneuriat des cadres intermédiaires dans les organisations privées, on sait que la position structurelle en réseau des cadres intermédiaires influence leur comportement innovateur au travail. Notre étude vise à déterminer si, dans un contexte gouvernemental, le comportement de réseautage infra-organisationnel des gestionnaires publics a une influence positive similaire sur le comportement innovateur au travail. Comme les mécanismes de réseautage peuvent dépendre du contexte particulier et des normes organisationnelles, nous étudions également l'influence des motivations du réseautage. Selon la recherche sur les réseaux sociaux dans les entreprises privées, les liens des réseaux sociaux peuvent servir à faire progresser les carrières individuelles. Selon les théories de la gestion publique et de la motivation de service public, les gestionnaires publics ont une orientation collective visant à produire des biens publics. Voilà pourquoi nous examinons si, à côté du réseautage infra-organisationnel, la motivation professionnelle individuelle ou la motivation collective pour le réseautage expliquent le comportement de travail innovateur. Dans une étude de cas sur les gestionnaires publics d'une municipalité de Mexico, nous constatons une forte influence du réseautage sur le comportement innovateur au travail. Nous observons aussi d'autres influences de motivations de carrière individuelles, mais aucun élément attestant de motivations collectives. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens Le travail en réseau infra-organisationnel des gestionnaires publics conduit à un comportement innovateur accru dans un cadre gouvernemental. En outre, lorsqu'elles visent à accroître les comportements innovants, les motivations professionnelles individuelles semblent avoir des effets positifs plus forts que les motivations collectives (telles que les motivations liées au travail en équipe).

Abstract
Bribery and other forms of petty corruption typically arise in bureaucratic encounters and are a common element of the everyday experience of the state in many countries, particularly in places with weak institutions. This type of corruption is especially troublesome because it creates direct costs for citizens when accessing services and benefits to which they are formally entitled. However, only a few studies deal with how situational attributes of bureaucratic interactions create incentives for citizens to pay bribes and opportunities for street-level bureaucrats to demand them. We contribute to filling this gap by providing evidence that administrative burdens increase the chance of bribery. We do so by analyzing the prevalence of (attempted) bribery in more than 63,000 interactions across 20 different types of bureaucratic encounters, ranging from paying taxes to accessing essential services, using multilevel logistic regression analysis. Our study contributes to understanding the possible consequences of administrative burdens and the factors conducive to petty corruption in specific citizen–state interactions.

AbstractThis study analyzes how adverse working conditions shape frontline workers' behavioral and cognitive coping mechanisms. It builds on the idea of frontline work as a precarious profession and explores how workers deal with associated challenges. Specifically, evidence is provided for factors associated with alienative commitment among frontline workers. We do so against the background of the 2020–2021 Mexican and Brazilian pandemic response by health workers, social workers, and police officers. Findings from our qualitative analysis show that they feel abandoned, vulnerable, and left to deal with the risks of the pandemic by themselves. In response, they tend to cognitively disconnect from their work and prioritize their own job survival. We contribute to the literature by showing how institutional factors over which street‐level bureaucrats have little control, such as resource scarcity, lack of job security and managerial support, and low trust by citizen‐clients, are fertile conditions for these coping patterns.

A technocratic pathway to public management reform stresses the need for committing sizeable resources to reform implementation. Building on an institutional framework, we argue that there are alternative pathways to compliant implementation for government agencies with limited resources. Our comparative study of 55 Mexican government agencies that were the object of the 2003 Civil Service Reform Act reveals the co‐occurrence of both technocratic and institutional pathways to compliant implementation. The common denominator across pathways in organizations with limited resources was the absence of strong oppositional norms (patronage) and the presence of robust interpersonal trust. We conclude that the role played by available resources in compliant reform implementation is far from straightforward, and depends on different combinations of public organizations' endogenous characteristics.

A technocratic pathway to public management reform stresses the need for committing sizeable resources to reform implementation. Building on an institutional framework, we argue that there are alternative pathways to compliant implementation for government agencies with limited resources. Our comparative study of 55 Mexican government agencies that were the object of the 2003 Civil Service Reform Act reveals the co-occurrence of both technocratic and institutional pathways to compliant implementation. The common denominator across pathways in organizations with limited resources was the absence of strong oppositional norms (patronage) and the presence of robust interpersonal trust. We conclude that the role played by available resources in compliant reform implementation is far from straightforward, and depends on different combinations of public organizations' endogenous characteristics.

Proponents of new public management (NPM) expect public organizations to become more flexible and adaptive after administrative reforms, effectively showing convergence with patterns of organizational change in the private sector. This "convergence argument" is tested with a sample of 61 public and 61 private organizations in the Netherlands. We analyze whether public organizations, after 20 years of NPM reform, have changed their organizational structures and internal policies in relation to competitive, regulatory, and autonomy pressures, similarly to private organizations. Statistical analyses show that competition increases the incidence of change both in public and private organizations. High managerial autonomy and exposure to regulatory pressures relate to increased incidence of change in public organizations, but not in private ones. The results support the idea that NPM reform has made public organizations more similar to private organizations but that some concrete differences persist between private and public management in the Netherlands. Adapted from the source document.