Humanitarian disintervention
In: Journal of global ethics, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 33-46
ISSN: 1744-9634
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In: Journal of global ethics, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 33-46
ISSN: 1744-9634
In: Journal of Strategic Security: JSS, Band 4, Heft 1, S. 37-56
ISSN: 1944-0472
In: International theory: IT ; a journal of international politics, law and philosophy, Band 3, Heft 3, S. 355-389
ISSN: 1752-9719
World Affairs Online
In: Ethics & global politics, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 103-124
ISSN: 1654-6369
In: International theory: a journal of international politics, law and philosophy, Band 3, Heft 3, S. 355-389
ISSN: 1752-9727
What are the moral costs of democratic trade with dictatorships, and what action these costs demand of our elected governments? This article develops as a Rousseauian answer the idea that democracies ought to boycott corrupt dictatorships and establish themselves collectively as an autarkic bloc, in order to reform not others but themselves. I articulate the basis for this democratic disengagement, first through a reconstruction of Rousseau's social contract, as seeking to replace corrupt dependence with egalitarian interdependence between citizens. I then examine the potential for egalitarian interdependence between democracies that treat their citizens equally as collectively sovereign, contrasted with corrupting cooperation between democracies and dictatorships, which distorts democracies' values, specifically by making them complicit in despots' theft of their peoples' resources. Ending this corruption requires disengagement, elaborated here first against liberal objections and then against skeptic criticism.
In: Ethics & global politics, Band 3, Heft 4, S. 277-301
ISSN: 1654-6369
In: Ethics & Global Politics, Band 3, Heft 4, S. 277-301
Thomas Pogge has been challenging liberal thinking on global politics, often through critical engagement with John Rawls' work. Pogge presents both normative and empirical arguments against Rawls: normatively, Rawls' domestic Theory of Justice (TJ) and global Law of Peoples (LP) are incompatible ideal theories; empirically, LP is too removed from the actual world to guide the foreign policy of liberal societies. My main purpose here is to contest the first, ideal theory criticism in order to direct more attention to the second, non-ideal objection. I argue against Pogge that TJ and LP can be read as coherent, once one employs a Rousseauian rather than Pogge's economic Kantian reading of TJ. The first two sections present Pogge's view of TJ and contrast it with a Rousseauian alternative that is less cosmopolitan and economic and much more focused on the democratic and sovereign context of justice as fairness. The third section seeks to refute Pogge's incoherence arguments, which encompass the identity of the parties to the international original position, their motivations and their decisions. Instead of a conclusion, the last section emphasizes LP's non-ideal problems, and suggests that insofar as LP is the most robust liberal ideal theory of global politics, its empirical failure indicates the need to shift global justice theorizing even more to the non-ideal realm. Adapted from the source document.
In: Global society: journal of interdisciplinary international relations, Band 23, Heft 3, S. 245-268
ISSN: 1469-798X
In: Social theory and practice: an international and interdisciplinary journal of social philosophy, Band 37, Heft 4, S. 629-653
ISSN: 2154-123X