Suchergebnisse

This article uses Statoil (Equinor since 2018) as a prism to explore some key features and concerns of Western oil companies' evolving human rights awareness from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. This period saw the first human rights lawsuits brought against oil companies and a gradual change in their human rights awareness. The article uses insights from the business history literature and new archival material from the oil industry to explain why business ethicists and legal scholars are wrong to argue that the relationship between business and social responsibility, on the one hand, and business and human rights, on the other, are inherently problematic and profoundly disparate due to their divergent historical origins. In so doing, the article offers a historical take on the so-called debate between business human rights (BHR) and corporate social responsibility (CSR), and it repudiates the argument that a so-called minimal understanding of human rights has hindered business from undertaking proactive human rights initiatives. Mapping onto both the business history literature and the BHR–CSR debate, the article aims for a richer understanding of the experiences and ideas that incentivized oil companies to "get serious" about human rights.

Denne artikkelen redegjør for og diskuterer freds- og forsoningspolitikkens ambisjoner, hovedlinjer og posisjon innad i utenrikspolitikken under Ine Eriksen Søreides periode som utenriksminister fra 2017 til 2021. Artikkelen argumenterer for at to politiske hovedspor tegnet seg for fredspolitikken i løpet av disse fire årene. Dette er fredspolitikkens rolle som sikkerhetspolitisk verktøy og det multilaterale sporet, ofte omtalt som FN-sporet. Artikkelen tar utgangspunkt i aktuelle stortingsmeldinger og årlige redegjørelser og setter dette i sammenheng med konkret innsats i utvalgte fredsprosesser og utvikling i internasjonal politikk.
Abstract in EnglishThe Primacy of Security Policy: Norwegian Peace and Reconciliation Policy During Ine Eriksen Søreide's TermThis article explains and discusses the ambitions, main features and position of Norway's peace and reconciliation policy during Ine Eriksen Søreide's period as foreign minister from 2017 to 2021. The article identifies two main political tracks for the peace policy during these four years. The first is the role of peace policy as a security policy tool and the second is the multilateral track, often referred to as the UN track. The article uses parliamentary white papers and annual parliamentary accounts as contextual background for the analysis of selected peace efforts, and connects this to general developments in international politics.

This chapter goes back in history to explore the roots of Norway and Sweden's postulated peace traditions and some key features of the two states' mediation efforts during and after the Cold War. With particular attention paid to Norway's attempt to take national ownership of the peace nation narrative in the 1990s and the 2000s, the chapter discusses why Sweden and Norway both found peacemaking an attractive tool for national image building, and demonstrates how the quest for a peace nation identity sparked competition and friction between the two states. The chapter uses examples from Guatemala, the Middle East and Sri Lanka to illustrate the possibilities and limitations of Nordic mediation, and argues that although the mediation successes have been relatively few, the peace nation narrative is hard to challenge since its overarching telos is to be the good, spread the good, and fulfill the good.

This article explores how Norway's quest for moral authority to be recognized as a "champion of ideals" came under strain in the 1990s when the Norwegian state's oil company (Statoil) expanded its operations in- and outside Norwegian borders. While we know a lot about Scandinavia's international activism after the end of the Cold War, we know less about Scandinavian business' responses to this policy. Neither do we know much about business' potential impact on this policy. The aim of this article is therefore to begin address this issue by examining Statoil's response to some of Norway's moral and ethical aspirations in the post-Cold War global arena. Particular attention is paid to the tension between Norway's ambition to be an early mover for sustainable development and a human rights advocate, and Statoil's approach to environmental problems and human rights violations. As such, the article explores the role of state-owned enterprises in profit-making and global expansion during a formative decade when economy became an increasingly important determinant of Norwegian foreign relations, and ethical and moral objectives with roots in earlier decades were revitalized through an unprecedented number of international initiatives.

This article explores the political interplay between Norway's national oil company Statoil and its government during a period when a truly global debate over climate emerged. The article sheds light on how the climate issue concerned the relationship between a Nordic state and its most important state-controlled enterprise, and exposes how Statoil responded to increasing calls for decarbonization while being privileged in climate policy-making processes. Furthermore, the article explores the origin and shortcomings of the puzzling argument about Norway's 'environment-friendly' oil and gas, and discusses how this argument helped enable Statoil and the rest of the industry to continue with business as usual despite growing social demands for the oil industry to step up its climate efforts.

Can weak third parties contribute to ripening conflicts for resolution despite their lack of leverage? According to the core principles of ripeness theory, mediators with leverage have a clear advantage when it comes to ripening. What is often overlooked in the literature, however, is the important ways a weak mediator can contribute to ripening as well. This article explores two noteworthy cases of weak third party ripening – the Norwegian roles in the Oslo channel between Israel and the Palestinians, and between the urng guerrilla and the government in Guatemala. These cases demonstrate how careful interventions by weak third parties can help disputants see negotiations as a way out both in preliminary and later phases of negotiations. However, we also argue that weak third parties should not get involved in ripening unless they can call on a mediator with more leverage once substantial negotiations begin.