Suchergebnisse

The peculiar trajectory followed by Ne'eman in his post-1977 political films reveals the characteristics of the political consciousness of a large group of Israeli artists, academics, and left-oriented activists. Their passive political resentment at the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip that followed the 1967 War took a radical shift following the political overturn in the 1977 elections, which brought to power the right-wing Likud party, leading the group to politicize Israeli culture and to denounce the Israeli occupation and the repression of the Palestinian people. However, this altruistic stand was based upon a dead-end, pessimistic, and ultimately ethnocentric viewpoint. We find in the films of Ne'eman and other Israeli filmmakers after 1977 a contradiction between an explicit moral critique of Israeli politics and the aesthetic grounding of this critique within a cinematic reality of persecution and hopelessness. Ne'eman, however, in his last film, Streets of Yesterday, brings to light the conflict submerged in his prior films and in all the films produced by the group. Having revealed the futility of the group's political consciousness Ne'eman abandoned his cinematic political activism in favor of research and teaching.

THE PRIMARY OBJECT OF THIS PAPER IS TO EXAMINE THE ROLE OF DIFFERENTIAL SHARING RULES WITHIN A COLLECTIVE RENT-SEEKING SETTING ON THE POSSIBLE NON-EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM. FOCUSING ON GROUPS THAT DISTRIBUTE PART OF THE RENT EQUALLY AMONG THEIR MEMBERS AND THE RESIDUAL ACCORDING TO RELATIVE EFFORT, THE AUTHORS SHOW THAT IN RENT-SEEKING SOCIETIES APPLYING THE TWO POLAR SHARING RULES EQUILIBRIUM NEVER EXISTS. IN THE GENERAL CASE WHERE GROUPS APPLY DIFFERENT BUT NOT NECESSARILY THE POLAR SHARING RULES, THEY STUDY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GROUP VARIABILITY IN DISTRIBUTING RENTS AND THE PROBELM OF NON-EXISTENCE OF EQUALIBRIUM IN THE RENT-SEEKING GAME.

In this study we explore the endogenous determination of moral objections to free riding. We first derive the individually rational behavior for given preferences. The motivational structure is allowed to evolve evolutionarily based on the comparison of the relative reproductive success of all possible preference types. The tastes that emerge are not necessarily those assumed in models resorting to altruism or moral obligations. In general, an effective social conscience preventing free riding need not be evolutionarily stable. In the first model that we explore, moral objections to free riding and, in turn, voluntary contributions to the provision of public goods are not to be expected with one notable exception, namely unanimity games. In the second model that we explore, the evolutionarily stable probability that an individual develops social conscience is positive.