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The tobacco industry has been active in Texas politics for over 25 years. It spends money on lobbying, campaign contributions, legislative events and gifts in order to gain favor with the legislature and attempt to control the agenda set for tobacco control efforts. Political campaign contributions–reported only by Philip Morris–have remained high throughout the 1990s. Philip Morris reported contributing $556,250 to legislative, judicial and statewide candidates between 1988 and 2001. In recent years, their contributions to statewide officeholders and judicial candidates have decreased as their legislative contributions have increased. In each election cycle, 1998-1999 and 2000- 2001, Philip Morris contributed $51,000 to legislative candidates. The 3 largest lifetime recipients of campaign contributions in the legislature were all Senators: David Cain ($8,250, D-Mesquite), Ken Armbrister ($5,500, D-Victoria), and Chris Harris ($5,500, R-Arlington). The largest recipient of tobacco money from the statewide offices was former Lt. Governor Bob Bullock who received $36,500 from the tobacco industry from 1988-1996. The tobacco industry has also spent heavily on lobbying, although it is impossible to calculate the exact amounts. When lobbyists' report their fees to the Texas Ethics Commission, they are only required to report a fee range for each of their clients, not the exact amount that they were paid by each client. For example, a lobbyist would select between the ranges of $0-$10,000, $10-$25,000, $25-$50,000, etc. However, given these estimates, we can determine that from 1993-2001, the tobacco industry spent between $4,660,000-$9,640,000 on lobbyists' fees to influence the legislature. Texas' only statewide tobacco control laws are Senate Bill 55 (by Senator Zaffarini, DLaredo) and House Bill 119 (by Rep. Hirschi, D-Wichita Falls), both passed during the 1997 legislative session. SB 55 is the "Texas Tobacco Law" which establishes strict penalties for retailers who sell tobacco to minors and for minors in possession of tobacco products. The tobacco industry fought heavily against the legislation. The provisions in SB 55 which impose penalties upon minors are controversial among public health advocates because they distract attention from retailers and clerks who sell tobacco to minors. HB 119 is an ingredient disclosure bill, requiring manufacturers who sell tobacco products in Texas to report their ingredients to the Texas Department of Health. The tobacco industry uses allies like the Texas Restaurant Association, the Texas Retailers Association and the Texas Association of Business and Chambers of Commerce (TABCC) in order to shield its involvement in tobacco control issues. Restaurant owners are mobilized to oppose smoking restrictions and retailers testify against youth access and advertising restrictions. The TABCC opposed the state's lawsuit against the tobacco industry, with coaching on the issue from tobacco industry lobbyists. The tobacco industry has partnered with and heavily sponsored the activities of the Texas Civil Justice League (TCJL) in order to enact tort reform legislation which protects the industry from prosecution. In the tort reform and products liability legislation during the 1993 and 1995 sessions, the tobacco industry and TCJL limited punitive damage awards and the rights of plaintiffs to sue the tobacco industry for smoking-related illnesses. In 1996, then- Attorney General Dan Morales was the third Attorney General to sue the tobacco industry. He settled the case in 1998, prior to the 46 state settlement known as the Master Settlement Agreement. Texas' suit against the industry resulted in a $17.3 billion dollar settlement. From the money that the state has received as of 2001 ($1.8 billion), only $30 million has been spent on tobacco control programs from 1999-2001. In 1999, the state legislature deposited $200 million into a tobacco trust fund to be used for statewide tobacco control programs. However, the legislature only allowed for the interest on that money to be spent for tobacco control (about $9 million annually). The Texas Department of Health, charged with developing a tobacco control program with that small amount of money, was required to focus their efforts in East Texas. The Texas Department of Health comprehensive tobacco control program has been very successful, however, their attempts to secure more funding and expand the program statewide have failed. In 2001, the Legislature only increased funding for the program to $12 million annually. The Centers for Disease Control's Best Practices recommends that a state with the size and population of Texas should spend between $103 million - $180 million annually for an effective tobacco control program. Texas' only statewide smoking regulations, the 1975 Clean Indoor Air Act, sets up minimum standards for smoke-free public places. All of the state's effective smoking regulations have been passed by local governments. Most of the regulations simply establish smoking and nonsmoking sections in workplaces and restaurants. In recent years, several communities, including some surrounding the state capitol in Austin and the West Texas town of El Paso, establish 100% smoke-free public places, including workplaces and restaurants. El Paso's smoking ordinance, passed in 2001, also establishes smoke-free bars, the first ordinance of its kind in Texas. Beginning with the initiative of a sixth grade student, Lubbock enacted a strong clean indoor air ordinance. The tobacco industry, working with the Restaurant Association and Libertarians, opposed the ordinance. After the city council enacted the ordinance, the Libertarians forced a referendum. Tobacco control advocates mounted a vigorous defense and the ordinance was ratified by voters in May, 2002, with 64% voting for it. While tobacco control advocates, generally working through the voluntary health agencies, are showing increasing aggressiveness and effectiveness in working at the local level, they are still unwilling to confront the tobacco industry's allies in the state legislature, which explains their failure to force Texas to mount a strong state tobacco control program despite the millions of dollars made available by the state's tobacco settlement.

• After making substantial progress on tobacco control in the mid-1990s, the tobacco industry has stifled tobacco control activities in Washington through a mixture of campaign contributions and legal challenges. • Political campaign contributions have remained steadily high throughout the 1990s. Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, the Tobacco Institute, Lorillard, Brown & Williamson, and the Smokeless Tobacco Council contributed $362,298 to campaigns in 1996 through 2000 election cycles: $114,123 in the 1996 election cycle, $109,975 in 1998, and $138,200 in 2000. • From 1996-2000, 92% of these campaign contributions by the tobacco industry were to Republican candidates, party contributions, and soft money. • The largest lifetime recipients of campaign contributions were Clyde Ballard ($16,830, R-East Wenatchee), William Grant ($7,400, D-Franklin), Dan McDonald ($7,246, R-King), and Pat Scott ($5,490, D-Snohomish). Ballard and Grant are both powerful in the House leadership; Ballard is the Co-Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Grant is the House Democratic Caucus Chair. McDonald was the Majority Leader of the Senate from 1996-1999, and prior to that, he chaired the powerful Ways and Means Committee. • The tobacco industry has also spent heavily on lobbying; from 1996-2000, the industry spent $1,864,086 to lobby members of the legislature and the state administrative offices. This includes lobbyists' salaries and perks given to legislators such as holiday gifts, entertainment and meals. • Washington and its Attorney General, Christine Gregoire, played an active role in the state tobacco trials and subsequent 46 state settlement (known as the Master Settlement Agreement) in 1998. The legislature reserved $100 million of the settlement money for a new Department of Health tobacco control program. • Department of Health officials and health advocates had requested $26 million to begin the tobacco control program, but, because of pressure from the Republican members, the legislature only allocated $15 million for the first year, about half of what the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommends for Washington State. • Attempts to pass local smoking regulations, with provisions stricter than the 1985 Clean Indoor Air Act, have been hampered by an ambiguous legal question about whether the Clean Indoor Air Act preempts local legislation. Puyallup, the only city attempting to pass a smokefree restaurant ordinance, rescinded it after being challenged with an industry-funded lawsuit without seeking a court ruling on the issue of preemption. The fact that the Attorney General's office has not issued a formal decision on this issue has contributed to the reluctance from local governments. This circumstance has allowed the tobacco industry to stop local clean indoor air regulations. • Spokane has adopted a voluntary approach to controlling secondhand smoke in restaurants with their Big Air Program. Many restaurants in the City and County of Spokane have become voluntarily smokefree since the program was initiated in 1996. Although city officials initiated their program independently, it is very similar to the tobacco industry's voluntary smoking regulations through their "accommodation" and "red light/green light" programs. • The industry has also orchestrated legal pressure to attack the federally-funded ASSIST tobacco control project with allegations of "illegal lobbying" and filed a complaint to the Public Disclosure Commission. While the ASSIST project has ended, the tobacco industry successfully used this experience to discourage health departments and advocates from using the policy process to promote tobacco control. • Several counties, including King, Snohomish, Pierce and Spokane passed outdoor and color advertising restrictions between 1996 and 1999. These measures abolished all outdoor billboards and restricted advertising in stores to small, black and white posters. The industry supported challenges that overturned these restrictions on the grounds that they were preempted by federal law and a violation of the First Amendment. The industry prevailed in the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the defendants agreed not to appeal in exchange for the industry not demanding that its legal fees be paid. This situation has stopped similar legislation in Washington. Similar laws were upheld elsewhere in the United States and as of early 2001 the issue was under review at the US Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court upholds such laws, Washington authorities may seek to reinstate them. • Health advocates, who could play a decisive role in anti-tobacco campaigns, have been hindered by the lack of a continuously functioning statewide coalition in Washington. The former group, Tobacco Free Washington Coalition, was funded in large part by a grant from ASSIST. Without ASSIST funding, the statewide coalition could not procure the resources to continue operations. Many advocates limited their efforts to smaller, local coalitions which dilutes their strength as a statewide lobbying force. A new group, Washington Alliance for Tobacco Control and Children's Health (WATCH), was created in 1998 to replace Tobacco Free Washington. They are a broad-based coalition funded by their member organizations. They lobbied in 1999 to ensure that money from the tobacco settlement went to fund health services and that the Department of Health's tobacco programs received adequate funding. • WATCH, together with the Washington Restaurant Association, sponsored Senate Bill 5993 which passed the Senate in March 2001. The bill would ensure more smokefree restaurants, but it has several flaws including exceptions for restaurants where minors are prohibited and the creation of a task force to study ventilation systems. The tobacco industry often advocates ventilation systems to dilute smokefree restaurant legislation and perpetuate controversy around the fact that no ventilation system can completely remove secondhand smoke from an enclosed environment. • In general, the tobacco industry has succeeded in stalling tobacco control efforts in Washington State. Although advocates, local public health officials, the Department of Health, the Attorney General, and some influential members of the legislature are all in favor of broad-based, fully funded, tobacco control education programs and increased Clean Indoor Air legislation, these advocates have not mobilized the resources necessary to overcome the legal and political impediments the industry has created.