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The paper explores the ideas of feminist epistemologies in the 21st century: skepticism about objectivity, intersectional approach, epistemic injustice, etc. The author investigates the concepts of a hermeneutic gap, gaslighting and meta-ignorance, and gives the implications of these terms in higher education. The term «feminist epistemologies» is used in the paper in the plural since the attempts of oppressed groups to return the value of their own experience cannot be manifested in the existence of the only one universal epistemology. Rethinking the concepts of «knowledge», «knowing» with regard to women, disabled people, representatives of different races, sexual minorities becomes the core for the development of trans-epistemology, queer-epistemology, creep-epistemology, epistemology of resistance, epistemology of ignorance, etc. A particular contribution of feminist epistemologies is the attention to values and vested interests of privileged and oppressed groups in the sphere of knowledge production, which allows expanding the use of the concepts of epistemic injustice, epistemic advantage, and epistemic ignorance. The author raises a question: if power can lead to epistemic ignorance, while oppression, in turn — to epistemological advantage, does it mean that knowers from marginalized groups have the most complete knowledge? While there are many different research positions, none of the feminist epistemologies puts forward such a simplistic understanding of the connection between power and knowledge. The author argues that the relationship between knowledge and power cannot be described in such a way that the value of one's knowledge will increase while the power of oppressed groups will decrease. The study shows that feminist epistemologies are a «kaleidoscope» of alternative or «marginal» epistemologies.

The article explores the arguments in favor of feminist epistemology used in the works of L. Code, S. Harding, D. Haraway, J. Lloyd and other gender (radical) feminists. The sources of feminist epistemology are the naturalized epistemology and the thesis of underdetermination by W. Quine, the views of W. Sellars, Marxism, the strong program of sociology of knowledge, logical positivism. The features of feminist epistemology include many signature schemes, the tendency to use different schemes from suitable disciplines, rethinking of the concepts «knowledge» and «knower» for previously excluded or non-included groups of women, people with disabilities, representatives of different races, sexual minorities. Another feature is that «Feminine» experience and voice, viewed from an essentialist or non-essentialist approach, are considered the grounds for the position of «knower». The article examines the critical remarks made by feminists against the assumptions of traditional epistemology: universal human nature, «a view from nowhere», pureimpersonal reason, the assumption of «Robinsonade». Attention to subjectivity, values and selfish interests in the production of knowledge should be considered a merit of feminist epistemology. However, L. Laudan has already shown that no one, including representatives of feminist epistemology, have demonstrated the plausibility, let alone the veracity of judgements that justify any number of possible interpretations of the knowledge gained. The paper shows that feminist epistemology cannot avoid the well-known vicissitudes of epistemological relativism. However, feminist epistemology deserves the attention of philosophers because it is part of a broader relativist turn in social sciences and the humanities that seeks to extend its criticism to scientific knowledge.