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Based on the premise that climate responsibility had emerged as an international norm in the pre-coronavirus era, this paper studies to what extent the coronavirus is challenging the policies and strategies of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its offspring the Polar Silk Road. We begin with a critical overview of the BRI and illustrate the practical implications of the fact that the BRI lacks an official strategy, a definition and a governing institution. We elaborate what kind of discourses and standards are attached to the BRI in general, and its latest addition, the Polar Silk Road, in particular. On the one hand, we analyze how China's pre-COVID-19 era Arctic policy and BRI documents (and norms) manifested and set the standards of climate responsibility, and, on the other hand, based on original Chinese policy documents, we debunk how these lofty political goals were rapidly and completely set aside as the new coronavirus epidemic was spreading around. Instead, the Party hastily made stipulations and policies and refocused the BRI to save Chinese overseas investments and the reputation of China in the post-coronavirus era.

China's long insistence on non-interference in sovereign states' domestic affairs has contributed to a widely held impression that China also lends abroad without attaching policy conditions. In this article, we debunk the notion that China's bilateral lending is entirely devoid of conditionality, by showing that it involves elements of political conditionality, embedded conditionality and cross-conditionality, stemming from the varying concerns of Chinese foreign policy-makers and state-linked lenders. We then draw on the pathdependence literature to explore the possibility that there may also be more indirect forms of conditionality associated with Chinese lending practices. By 'emergent conditionality', we refer to structural lock-in effects that may cumulatively restrict or redirect recipient countries' policy-making choices similarly as more direct conditionality would do, even if thePRC government officially shuns conditionality. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

China.s long insistence on non-interference and sovereignty and frequent criticism of Western in-terventionism has contributed to a widely held impression that China lends and invests abroad without attaching policy conditions. This discussion paper surveys the general policy debate on conditionality in lending, as well as China.s own debate on conditionality. We then examine bila-teral loans provided by Chinese state-owned policy banks, notably China Exim Bank, arguing that the assumption of China.s shunning conditionality is valid only if the term is taken narrowly to imply the specific set of policy conditions (e.g. privatisation and financial liberalisation) routinely called for by World Bank Group lenders. Based on a literature review and analysis of loan features along with tentative evidence from empirical cases of Chinese bilateral lending, we identify four hypothetical types of conditionality: political conditionality, embedded conditionality, cross-conditionality and emergent conditionality. In all likelihood the last three types of conditionality are not imposed by a unitary state actor, but emerge as an indirect consequence of the voluminous busi-ness activities of Chinese state-linked lenders and enterprises in developing countries.

As China's cross-regional diplomacy is not separated from the party-state's overall foreign policy goals and doctrines, this chapter offers a review of China's foreign policy and economic interests. Without doubt, these dynamics also shape China's policy in the Arctic. The chapter concludes that Beijing is no longer content to be a norm-taker in international politics but it is more comfortable with becoming a norm-maker. However, there are noteworthy differences between China's Arctic engagement and its diplomacy in other parts of the world.

The chapter focuses on economic relations between China and Finland in the Arctic context. This is done from two perspectives. First, the chapter considers Chinese investments and presence in northern Finland and particularly Lapland. Relevant sectors include bioeconomy and tourism, the Arctic railway project, as well as – in terms of future prospects – mining, renewable energy, data centres and testing facilities. Second, the chapter looks at the instances of economic cooperation – Finnish investments in China, Chinese in Finland and joint ventures – in areas of Finnish Arctic expertise.

This chapter elaborates on China's evolving strategy in the Arctic. For China, the Arctic is no longer about simply being an observer in the Arctic Council, but much more. The chapter will analyze mainly the specifics of China's Arctic white paper and examine a pair of specific cases, namely China's role in negotiating the Polar Code and the Arctic fisheries agreement. Special attention will be paid to the ways in which China's national policy towards the Arctic has emerged and how it has been viewed by other actors and commentators following China's role in the Arctic. As a sub-section, China's policy towards the Arctic's indigenous peoples will also be studied.

The chapter focuses on economic presence of China in the Arctic regions. First, it considers the economic relations between China and the Nordic states, North American Arctic and Russia. China and Chinese actors are active in different ways in different parts of the Arctic. Second, it looks at the key Arctic industries, where China's role is or may become relevant: shipping, oil and gas, minerals extraction, and tourism. Finally, the chapter considers the two dimensions of concerns related to Chinese economic activities: the problem of economic and political influence gained through investments and the environment and social performance as well as reliability of Chinese companies.

The Arctic region is rapidly transforming from a peripheral region to a global theatre with an increasing number of non-Arctic stakeholders. One illustration of this transformation process is the growing presence of China in the Arctic. This report first discusses China's changing role in global affairs (Chapter 1). This provides background for exploring China's interests, role and presence in the Arctic. The study of China's presence in the region is carried out through the lens of the Chinese government's four priority areas towards the region as expressed in the country's first official Arctic statement – the White Paper – from January 2018 (Chapter 2). Further, Chinese interests and actions in the Arctic are studied from the viewpoint of one particular Arctic State, Finland. The authors provide an overview of a broad spectrum of Chinese-Finnish interactions in different contexts, including investments in Northern Finland and co-operation within the areas of Finnish Arctic expertise and research. In addition, concerns and risks related to interaction with Chinese actors are discussed (Chapter 3). Over the past decade, China has undertaken an effort to demonstrate its growing knowledge of, and commitment to, the Arctic region. Some actors and experts are concerned about China's aims and actions in the region, while others express hope for Chinese institutions, investors and companies to contribute to regional development and knowledge-building. The report presents a balanced and multifaceted, although necessarily not fully comprehensive, picture of China's rise as an actor in the Arctic.