Suchergebnisse

Este artículo estudia la evolución del asociacionismo empresarial en España. Empleamos el enfoque desarrollado por Franz Traxler para considerar que el mapa de asociaciones empresariales es el resultado de un acomodo gradual de ciertos mecanismos de compensación para superar tensiones organizativas y retos de representación. Se discuten una serie de indicadores con los que analizar el carácter adaptativo del asociacionismo empresarial. A modo de conclusión, el análisis indica que los cambios internos de la CEOE son el resultado de una prolongada erosión de un modelo asociativo estructurado jerárquicamente en torno a una confederación corporatista y monopolística, que la impulsan a ser más transparente

The authors' principal purpose is to study why the government in Spain has maintained price regulations on medicines during the last thirty-five years. The hypothesis is that price regulations were related to the regulatory style of the Spanish government in the 1960s and, since the last 1970s, have become a key instrument for preventing the pharmaceutical costs of the National Health System from rising. In order to test this hypothesis, two questions are considered. The first relates to how business interests and their main representative bodies have managed to influence the implementation of price regulations during the last thirty-five years. The second question concerns the extent to which changes in the prices of medicines have been effective in preventing increased costs of the Spanish National Health System drug bill between 1964 ad 1994. After analyzing the political economy of the price regulation of medicines and pharmaceutical cost-limiting policies during the last thirty-five years in Spain, and after estimating a function of the public demand for medicines between 1964 and 1994 in Spain, the authors extract the following two conclusions. First, price regulation has become a very useful instrument for preventing public pharmaceutical costs from rising since the late 1970s in Spain. Second, business interests have found it increasingly useful over the last thirty-five years to establish a stable framework in the market for medicines based on price regulation and the public provision of medicines.

Résumé Dans le cadre du « Nouveau régionalisme » cet article expose un modèle d'« incentive potentiels » en direction des entreprises ayant vocation à soutenir le processus de régionalisation. Nous présentons ici un nouveau modèle analytique qui développe quatre « incentives » essentiels au niveau régional à deux niveaux. Au niveau politique d'abord, les entreprises cherchent à intervenir dans l'agenda politique et les alliances régionales. Au niveau structurel ensuite, elles essayent d'accéder aux services publics décentralisés, aux financements publics, voire même d'obtenir un certain niveau de représentation institutionnelle. On applique ce modèle à quatre organisations catalanes : trois entreprises (Foment del Treball Nacional, la Chambre de Commerce de Barcelone et PIMEC) et un think tank (Cercle d'Economie) et nous essayons de démontrer comment ces « incentives » constituent un déclic pour leur ancrage dans ce processus de régionalisation. Le cas observé concerne les réclamations en faveur d'un aéroport de Barcelone décentralisé et en partie privatisé. La méthodologie mise en œuvre se veut qualitative.

The aim of this article is to analyse the concept of governability of collective bargaining proposed by Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel (2001) and to demonstrate its explanatory capacity and limitations in the Spanish case. Governability is an important subject that should be taken into account in the reform of industrial relations systems and in the debate with regard to centralisation and decentralisation of collective bargaining in Europe. The authors' main hypothesis is drawn up in line with the institutionalist approach. Their argument, based on the results of collective bargaining, is that the Spanish system of collective bargaining, in spite of the organisational weakness of the unions and of the employers' associations, is governable thanks to the role of the state, the institutions, the legal ordering, as well as tradition and custom.