Suchergebnisse

Patenting Nanomedicine in Europe: Applying the 'medical methods exception' to emerging technologies is based on the authors PhD dissertation, defended in March 2014, at the University of Copenhagen. The book debates restrictions on the patentability of medical methods in European Patent Law. The main question addressed is whether it is viable and advisable the reinterpretation, reformulation or replacement of Article 53 (c) EPC - a provision restricting the patenting of medical methods. The subject is approached by reference to emerging technologies, and using nanomedicine innovation as example and point of departure. Nanotechnology inventions blur the lines between patentable subject matter and what may fall under the exception from patentability. It is a good example of how in recent years, emerging technologies have been challenging the patent system and exposing the need for re-thinking the adopted solutions

In this article we analyse the legal approach and measures implemented as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic implemented by Sweden's public authorities and their legal background. Further, we discuss general legal and ethical questions related to measures to contain public health threats such as the current COVID-19 pandemic. It is outside of the scope of this paper to compare and critically analyse the effectiveness of Sweden's public health strategy.

In Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation (ISCC) v. Comptroller General of Patents (December 18th, 2014), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) distinguished its' earlier ruling in Brüstle v. Greenpeace (Brüstle) with regard to non-fertilized human ova stimulated by parthenogenesis. The Court found that in order to be considered a 'human embryo'- and thus to be unpatentable under the EU Biotechnology Directive - the stimulated ovum must have the "inherent capacity to develop into a human being". This permits the patentability of innovative pluripotent parthenotes and their applications. Yet, ISCC also leaves considerable discretion to national courts and the full impact of the decision still depends on national implementations. Moreover, ISCC only applies to very specific human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) and lacks further clarifications concerning other non-totipotent hESCs, such as stem cells created through somatic cell nuclear transfer. Considering the significance of Brüstle and ISCC for regenerative medicine and cellular therapy, the persisting legal uncertainty is unfortunate. Irrespective of these flaws, however, ISCC opened at least doors that were thought to be closed and thereby reinvigorated crucial debates. Thus, it might have the "inherent capacity" of developing into a reasonable doctrine on stem cell patenting. Paradoxically, the patentability of isolated embryonic stem cells is now less certain in the US.