Suchergebnisse

Ajatuspajojen valtapotentiaali perustuu tiedon tuottamiseen. Tätä valtapotentiaalia käyttämällä osa niistä on ollut avainasemassa uusliberalismin levittämisessä 1970-luvulta alkaen. Tämä artikkeli tarkastelee, pyrkivätkö ajatuspajat edelleen uusliberalismin levittämiseen analysoimalla Brysselin vaikutusvaltaisimpien talouspolitiikasta kirjoittavien ajatuspajojen, Chatham Housen, Center for European Policy Studiesin ja Bruegelin, näkemyksiä finanssi- ja eurokriisin ratkaisuista. Nämä kriisit olisivat olleet mahdollisuus kyseenalaistaa uusliberalismin paradigma. Ajatuspajojen määritelmän ja vallan käsittelyn jälkeen artikkeli analysoi diskurssianalyysin avulla vuosien 2008 ja 2012 ajatuspajojen tekstien uusliberalismin kiinnekohtia, jotka osoittavat, että ajatuspajat eivät haastaneet vaan uusinsivat uusliberalismia – mutta eivät yksioikoisesti. Ajatuspajojen ristiriita suhteessa teoriaan on talouden valvonnan, koordinaation ja sääntelyn korostamisessa. Ajatuspajat kuitenkin pitävät uusliberalismin ydinasioista kiinni, ja aiemminkin uusliberalismin täytäntöönpano on kasvattanut valtiovaltaa. Vaikka ajatuspajat ovat olettamuksia kriittisempiä, osallistuvat ne uusliberalismin lujittamiseen, esimerkiksi tavoittelemalla sääntelyn lisäämistä uuskonstitutionalismisin keinoin. Artikkeli kuitenkin osoittaa, että Brysselin vaikutusvaltaisimmat ajatuspajat pyrkivät edelleen levittämään uusliberalistisia, ainakin ordoliberalismiin sopivia, oppeja.

Quinn Slobodian, Globalists. The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018, 381 s. ; Non peer reviewed

The eurozone crisis presented the opportunity to reform European economic policies. In spring 2010, a new technocratic knowledge regime developed in the form of the Troika that consisted of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This article provides new, previously understudied, knowledge on the internal dynamics of the Troika. As the prevailing austerity paradigm had been questioned during the preceding years also within the IMF, this study analyses the role of IMF's expertise during the negotiations that led to the first Greek loan package and created a path-dependent crisis management scheme. It traces how the IMF acted as a source of expertise and its role in the persistence of the austerity paradigm. The analysis is based on a unique set of interviews with decision-makers. The IMF's role in the negotiations was very important, but unexpectedly the Commission ruled on most of the content. In contrast to some earlier research, this analysis argues that even if the IMF had become more open to new economic-policy ideas, it did not truly challenge the European austerity policy. Reasons for this include the perceived lack of fiscal space, constraints from the EU, pessimism towards Greek growth, and the gap between research and policy departments of the IMF. This partly explains why the crisis did not lead to a change in eurozone policies. The analysis contributes also to identifying intra-institutional autonomy and fragmentation as reasons for the stability of economic paradigms despite apparent challenges even within hegemonic institutions such as the IMF.

AbstractThe IMF's 2010 Troika lending programme with Greece was unprecedented due to the IMF's controversial internal rule changes, the programme's pivotal effects on eurozone crisis policies and the effect of austerity concepts on Greece. We aim to explain conclusively why the IMF lent to Greece without restructuring, as previous explanations have crucial gaps. We operationalise Ben Clift's theory of IMF behaviour in process-tracing, analysing programme-related text sources. Our exercise is novel as Clift does not aim to explain individual programmes, while the theory warrants further testing. According to our causal mechanism, the IMF used two key analytical lenses formed via bricolage, fiscal space and nonlinear multiple equilibria processes (NLMEP), to analyse the programme context and formulate the programme design. While we find our mechanism too narrow to explain the programme design, our results regarding the role of NLMEP and fiscal space within IMF programme-time economic analysis support the importance of financial contagion as a motivator for monetarily significant IMF participation and why the IMF adhered to austerity despite risking debt stabilisation. However, it seems limitedly useful to assume coherent ideational drivers behind the precise programme design: instead, accepting the key role of ad hoc judgement depicts IMF behaviour accurately.