EU's Central Asia policy: the adoption of a new strategy paper ; 2007-2013
In: Central Asia and the Caucasus: journal of social and political studies, Heft 3/45, S. 7-15
ISSN: 1404-6091
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In: Central Asia and the Caucasus: journal of social and political studies, Heft 3/45, S. 7-15
ISSN: 1404-6091
World Affairs Online
As Germany took over the rotating presidency of the EU in the first half of 2007 one of its primary tasks was to redirect and reform EU's Central Asia policy before the Council's adoption of a new Strategy Paper for Central Asia in June. As Germany's Presidency Program explicitly states: "The Presidency will pay particular attention to the strategically significant region of Central Asia. The EU plans to adopt a strategy on Central Asia defining its interests and objectives." Moreover, following a meeting with MEPs on 23 January, 2007, Germany's Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier announced that Germany would launch a new "Central Asia Initiative" which would bundle together energy and security, the two overarching interests of the EU in the region, into a single coherent strategy. It is still, as of May 2007, unclear if this initiative will complement the Regional Strategy Paper or be integrated into it. Nevertheless, the urgency of a redirection of policy could scarcely be understated considering that Europe's substantial interests in Central Asia rarely have been more evident while the absence of strategy seldom has been clearer. According to the draft Regional Strategy Paper for Central Asia 2007-2013 the EU's strategic objectives are: 1) To ensure the stability and the security of the countries of the region; 2) To help eradicate poverty and increase living standards in the context of the Millennium Development Goals; 3) To facilitate/promote closer regional cooperation both within Central Asia and between Central Asia and the EU, particularly in the energy, transport, higher education and environmental sectors. Let it be acknowledged that the EU has launched some well-received initiatives among which the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) perhaps is the primary one. Let it also be acknowledged that 366m Euro has been spent since 1991 (although this is only a fraction of the size of U.S. assistance) and that Central Asia has received an upswing in attention since 9/11. Still, there are some major shortcomings in the EU's strategy which Germany will need to correct in order to realize the strategic objectives above. These flaws generally relate to the EU's past policies being reactive in nature rather than proactive. This reactivism is seen in relation to Afghanistan's new role after Operation Enduring Freedom, failure to recognize the potentials in continental trade (including energy), and the tendency to disengage from the Central Asian leadership. In the words of the German FM: "As far as our common European past is concerned I can't see any stage where people were strongly interested in this region." In contrast to Europe's past disengagement, Germany seems to have harbored serious intentions in Central Asia as it took over the presidency. Good news is also that Germany is particularly well-positioned to undertake these reforms. Angela Merkel's Germany is currently the strong power in Europe during a time when both France and the U.K. are changing leaderships. Germany is also the largest European donor to Central Asia. In contrast to the EU's draft strategy for 2007-2013 barely mentioning Afghanistan while downplaying the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, German FM Steinmeier has recently and repeatedly stated that these two issues coupled with energy will be the essential components in Germany's proposed strategy toward Central Asia. Energy security has also profiled big during Germany's presidency, since the adoption of the EU constitution has procrastinated. Finally, Germany has also advocated a lifting of the sanctions imposed on Uzbekistan which so far has done little but strengthened the influence of China and Russia on the Uzbek regime in the vacuum left behind by the EU's and the U.S.' disengagement after the violence in Andijan in 2005. This awkward yet necessary dialog is something which is urgently needed, since a stable and accommodative Uzbekistan is one of the most important factors for a stable and prosperous Central Asia.
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In: China and Eurasia Forum, Band 4, Heft 4, S. 31-38
World Affairs Online
In: Central Asia and the Caucasus: journal of social and political studies, Heft 3-4/51-52, S. 203-211
ISSN: 1404-6091
World Affairs Online
The wider Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions have so far figured as relatively peripheral concerns for the European Union. While the enlargement of the EU has created incentives for a stronger commitment to these regions, the motives for a more strategic European engagement in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and around the Black Sea have always existed. These regions provide access to energy outside the control of OPEC and Russia and provide a transit corridor connecting Europe with the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. Remarkable benefits may also accrue the EU if a proactive rather than reactive approach is taken toward the region. These benefits do not only include energy diversification and transit but also relate to the security and stability of Europe's vicinity and, by extension, Europe itself. So far, the EU has, however, showed little interest in working with regional organizations such as BSEC, GUAM, the Black Sea Forum and others but preferred to engage with the states in the region on a bilateral basis. GUAM belongs to the organizations which Europe has given little or no attention despite the fact that both work, more or less, toward the same goals. These include energy diversification, both in production and transit routes, and a less dominant position of Russia over the energy resources and politics of the region. Conceived as such, it is tempting to conclude that the EU should push for stronger engagement with GUAM (and other similar organizations). However, this article argues that there are few areas in which these two organizations could cooperate fruitfully. This is primarily due to the inefficiency of GUAM, the geopolitics involved, and most importantly, to the fact that EU could favorably pursue its interests in other formats.
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In: Central Asian survey, Band 26, Heft 3, S. 429-444
ISSN: 1465-3354
In: Asian survey, Band 47, Heft 3, S. 351-373
ISSN: 1533-838X
Trade in Eurasia is shifting to growing continental rather than regional ties at the same time as overland transports are becoming a viable option. If trade obstacles could be surmounted, this trend promises to have substantial implications for the landlocked states of Greater Central Asia and their access to world markets.
In: Central Asian survey, Band 26, Heft 3, S. 429-444
ISSN: 0263-4937
World Affairs Online
In: Asian survey: a bimonthly review of contemporary Asian affairs, Band 47, Heft 3, S. 351-373
ISSN: 0004-4687
World Affairs Online