COVID-19 is the most invasive global crisis in the postwar era, jeopardizing all dimensions of human activity. By theorizing COVID-19 as a public bad, I shed light on one of the great debates of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries regarding the relationship between the United States and liberal international order (LIO). Conceptualizing the pandemic as a public bad, I analyze its consequences for US hegemony. Unlike other international public bads and many of the most important public goods that make up the LIO, the COVID-19 public bad not only has some degree of rivalry but can be made partially excludable, transforming it into more of a club good. Domestically, I demonstrate how the failure to effectively manage the COVID-19 public bad has compromised America's ability to secure the health of its citizens and the domestic economy, the very foundations for its international leadership. These failures jeopardize US provision of other global public goods. Internationally, I show how the US has already used the crisis strategically to reinforce its opposition to free international movement while abandoning the primary international institution tasked with fighting the public bad, the World Health Organization (WHO). While the only area where the United States has exercised leadership is in the monetary sphere, I argue this feat is more consequential for maintaining hegemony. However, even monetary hegemony could be at risk if the pandemic continues to be mismanaged.
Abstract. Accumulating debt is usually harmful for states, but a cyclical deficit policy and large-scale borrowing have been beneficial for the United States. While structural changes in the international political economy may cap America's future ability to process debt, an empirical analysis of the economic dimensions of hegemony over the last quarter century shows unambiguously that the hegemon reaps disproportionate gains in the area of trade and investment. This finding provides new insight on whether it is advantageous to be a hegemon.Résumé. Les États pâtissent généralement de l'accumulation des dettes, mais une politique de déficit cyclique et le recours à de larges emprunts ont pourtant été bénéfiques aux États-Unis. La capacité future de la puissance américaine à gérer sa dette sera peut-être entamée par les changements structurels subis par l'économie politique mondiale. Toutefois, l'analyse empirique des dimensions économiques de la situation d'hégémonie durant les vingt-cinq dernières années met à jour, et sans ambiguïté aucune, les gains disproportionnés générés par l'hégémon dans les domaines du commerce et de l'investissement. Cette recherche apporte un éclairage nouveau au débat sur les avantages liés à la position d'hégémon.
In: International political science review: the journal of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) = Revue internationale de science politique, Band 20, Heft 4, S. 341-358
This article offers a theory that can explain a relatively open international trade system as corresponding to a non-cooperative (in the game-theoretical sense) outcome of bargaining interactions between states. Such a non-cooperative outcome, as will be shown, can be expressed as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium between several states or trading blocs. This type of Nash equilibrium does not lead countries to complete "free" trade, but to an outcome that is closer to what is usually called "managed" trade. The theory also shows that under certain circumstances, this Nash equilibrium corresponds to a trade war similar to the one that broke out in the 1930s, and has the advantage of explaining the emergence of large trading blocs. Also introduced is the concept of a two-dimensional strategy when actors use two independent instruments as policy tools and establish the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium between three actors optimizing in two instruments.