Suchergebnisse

PurposeThis paper aims to consider the suitability of Anglo‐American new public management (NPM) practices in the context of public sector reform in Japan.Design/methodology/approachThe paper examines the two principal alternative approaches that have been taken to public sector reform in the UK and the USA. These comprise in the case of the UK the setting of targets by politicians and the monitoring by quasi‐autonomous non‐governmental organisations of the extent to which these are delivered upon. This is in contrast to the USA, where reform has been founded upon "market‐oriented populism". Reforms implemented by successive Japanese administrations since the end of the Second World War are considered and the extent to which these manifested a philosophical preference for either approach.FindingsThe research finds that the Anglo‐American (occidental) versions of NPM may not be appropriate in the context of public sector reform in Japan. Attempts to achieve a decentralised and deregulated form of NPM, philosophically rooted in the 1945 Constitution as written by the post‐Second World War Occupying Power, the United States, and mimicked from its Anglo‐American contexts by Japan's political elite may, paradoxically, delay achievement of more culturally accommodating reform of the bureaucracy acceptable to all the country's principal democratic stakeholders.Practical implicationsThe need for Japan's public sector reformers to evolve a unique form of NPM which accommodates the cultural and historical traditions of the country instead of mimicking occidental approaches is identified. Specifically, the paper provides policy proposals as to how this alternative to the UK and US models may be developed.Originality/valueThe paper suggests an alternative approach to public sector reform in Japan, which may be suitable for other countries looking to implement NPM but finding the USA and UK policies unsuitable in the context of their own traditions. Accordingly, the paper should be of value to public sector managers and policy makers generally who are looking to innovate upon traditional models of NPM.

This paper examines and compares, according to the New Public Management approach, the U.S. watchdog, the Government Accountability Office, in its ability to oversee and call to account the executive branch of government, and its U.K. counterpart, the National Audit Office. Results of this examination indicate that the Government Accountability Office is more effective than its U.K. counterpart. Its greater effectiveness is attributable to the fact that it derives its powers and legitimacy from a written constitution; in contrast, in the United Kingdom there is no equivalent document defining the relationship between the state and the citizenry. As a consequence, the powers, duties, and self‐perception of the National Audit Office are significantly weaker and more mutable than those of the Government Accountability Office.

Growing interest in UK corporate governance has engendered research on specific issues of corporate governance reform. However, there seems to be little research on the more general impact of recent reforms in corporate governance. In this paper we employ an extensive postal questionnaire survey to investigate: (i) UK institutional investors' general attitudes towards recent corporate governance reforms; (ii) whether UK institutional investors consider specific corporate governance initiatives to be of equal importance, and; (iii) whether all institutional investors represent a homogeneous group with respect to corporate governance reform. The empirical results indicate that institutional investors: (i) have generally welcomed the recent reforms; (ii) do not consider that specific corporate governance initiatives are equally important but attach more relevance to initiatives aimed at monitoring the principal/agent problem, and; (iii) may be treated as a homogeneous group, except in relation to voting policy, where pension funds appear more pro‐active in their approach than other groups.

In this paper we present empirical evidence on the attitudes of Taiwanese company directors on the role and function of the board of directors in Taiwanese corporate governance. Our findings arise from a questionnaire survey distributed to the directors of a sample of companies listed on the Taiwanese Securities Exchange (TSE). Our findings provide a picture of the current state of corporate governance in Taiwan. The respondents indicate that the board of directors constitutes the most important instrument in Taiwanese corporate governance and our findings endorse the important role played by outside directors in the corporate governance system in Taiwan. Furthermore, the respondents endorsed the agency theory perspective on corporate governance as they considered the presence of outside directors improved corporate accountability to shareholders. There is, however, evidence that few companies have created remuneration and audit committees. We also found that Taiwanese directors are dissatisfied with the influence of families on the corporate governance of listed companies and do not consider that outside directors on boards should be related to founding families. Overall, the directors displayed an awareness of accountability issues and a desire to improve accountability and transparency. They clearly want international harmonisation of corporate governance standards and view corporate governance reform as a means of attracting foreign funds into Taiwan. This is an important finding as it endorses the work of the OECD and other international bodies in harmonising corporate governance at a global level.