Public-private partnerships: a comparative study of new public management and stakeholder participation in the UK and Spain
In: International journal of public policy: IJPP, Band 4, Heft 3/4, S. 214
ISSN: 1740-0619
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In: International journal of public policy: IJPP, Band 4, Heft 3/4, S. 214
ISSN: 1740-0619
In: Public administration review: PAR, Band 68, Heft 5, S. 921-931
ISSN: 1540-6210
This paper examines and compares, according to the New Public Management approach, the U.S. watchdog, the Government Accountability Office, in its ability to oversee and call to account the executive branch of government, and its U.K. counterpart, the National Audit Office. Results of this examination indicate that the Government Accountability Office is more effective than its U.K. counterpart. Its greater effectiveness is attributable to the fact that it derives its powers and legitimacy from a written constitution; in contrast, in the United Kingdom there is no equivalent document defining the relationship between the state and the citizenry. As a consequence, the powers, duties, and self‐perception of the National Audit Office are significantly weaker and more mutable than those of the Government Accountability Office.
In: Corporate governance: an international review, Band 11, Heft 3, S. 235-248
ISSN: 1467-8683
In this paper we present empirical evidence on the attitudes of Taiwanese company directors on the role and function of the board of directors in Taiwanese corporate governance. Our findings arise from a questionnaire survey distributed to the directors of a sample of companies listed on the Taiwanese Securities Exchange (TSE). Our findings provide a picture of the current state of corporate governance in Taiwan. The respondents indicate that the board of directors constitutes the most important instrument in Taiwanese corporate governance and our findings endorse the important role played by outside directors in the corporate governance system in Taiwan. Furthermore, the respondents endorsed the agency theory perspective on corporate governance as they considered the presence of outside directors improved corporate accountability to shareholders. There is, however, evidence that few companies have created remuneration and audit committees. We also found that Taiwanese directors are dissatisfied with the influence of families on the corporate governance of listed companies and do not consider that outside directors on boards should be related to founding families. Overall, the directors displayed an awareness of accountability issues and a desire to improve accountability and transparency. They clearly want international harmonisation of corporate governance standards and view corporate governance reform as a means of attracting foreign funds into Taiwan. This is an important finding as it endorses the work of the OECD and other international bodies in harmonising corporate governance at a global level.