Suchergebnisse

Introduction : towards an aversive account of democracy -- Democracy, universalization and (dis)agreement -- Democratic argumentation : rhetoric and imagination -- Democratic identification and aspect change -- Democratic subjectivity : the promise of democratic community -- Conclusion : aversive democracy : exemplarity, imagination and passion.

This article investigates the theoretical arguments concerning political frontiers as they arise in the work of Laclau and Mouffe. The question of political frontiers emerges in the context of their anti-essentialist, post-Marxist theorisation of the division of political space, the constitution of political antagonism and the individuation of identity. The aricle traces the genealogy of the concept of frontiers through an investigation of its Marxist and non-Marxist intellectual roots. It argues that Laclau and Mouffe conflate two separate questions concerning political identity in their arguments on political frontiers, namely, the individuation of identity and the constitution of antagonistic relations. Through a deconstructive reading, it proposes an alternative conceptualisation which would allow one to retain the important insights offered in their theorisation, while seperating those distinctive questions. ; This article investigates the theoretical arguments concerning political frontiers as they arise in the work of Laclau and Mouffe. The question of political frontiers emerges in the context of their anti-essentialist, post-Marxist theorisation of the division of political space, the constitution of political antagonism and the individuation of identity. The aricle traces the genealogy of the concept of frontiers through an investigation of its Marxist and non-Marxist intellectual roots. It argues that Laclau and Mouffe conflate two separate questions concerning political identity in their arguments on political frontiers, namely, the individuation of identity and the constitution of antagonistic relations. Through a deconstructive reading, it proposes an alternative conceptualisation which would allow one to retain the important insights offered in their theorisation, while seperating those distinctive questions.

Democratic theory is often portrayed as torn between two moments: that of disruption of rule, and the ordinary, ongoing institutionalization of politics. This dualism also marks contemporary democratic theory. In Jacques Rancière's theory of politics it takes the form of an emphasis on the ruptural qualities of the staging of novel democratic demands and the reconfiguration of the space of political argument. The reconfiguration of existing political imaginaries depends upon a moment of inscription, which remains underdeveloped in Rancière's work. Arguing that the possibility of inscription is indeed thematized in Rancière's more historical writings, but is often ignored by commentators, this article seeks to draw out the implications of a focus on inscription for democratic theory and practice. To flesh out this account, the article draws on Cavell's writings on exemplarity and the role of exemplars in fostering both critical reflection and the imagination of alternatives. The focus on such exemplars and an aversive, nonconformist ethos together facilitate a better understanding of what is required for such novel demands to be acknowledged and inscribed into democratic life.

This article explores the formation of democratic subjectivity and its connection to change. Drawing on Wittgenstein's account of aspect seeing, it seeks to elucidate the processes through which political grammars change. More specifically, it illuminates two dimensions of the formation of democratic political subjectivity: the initial "identification as" a democratic subject and its repeated renewal, necessary to the maintenance of a democratic ethos. I argue that by drawing a distinction between "aspect dawning" and "aspect change," it is possible to capture the key characteristics of these two dimensions. This account is developed in contrast to existing democratic theory, which either does not deal sufficiently with the formation of subjectivity or does not give full attention to the specific requirements of the formation of democratic forms of identification.