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Cover -- CONTENTS -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. STYLIZED FACTS -- A. Global Trends in PPPs -- B. Country-level Determinants of Contractual Disputes -- C. Contract Design and Fiscal Institutions -- III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK -- A. Procurement -- B. Investment Decision -- C. Conditions for Outbreak of Disputes -- IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY -- A. Data and Sample -- B. Hazard Estimation -- C. Bias Adjustment using the Propensity Score Matching -- V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS -- A. Determinants of Contract Selection -- B. Hazard Regression -- C. Robustness Checks in Alternative Specifications -- D. Role of Public Financial Management -- VI. CONCLUSIONS -- FIGURES -- 1. Overall Trend of PPP Investments -- 2. Evolution of Dispute Risk -- 3. Change in Government Financial Commitment -- 4. Sectoral Distribution of Each Instruments -- 5. Change in Hazard Ratio by Contract Types -- 6. Distribution of the Quality Scores on Fiscal Institutions -- TABLES -- 1. Determinants of Government's Financial Commitment -- 2. Parametric Hazard Regressions -- 3. Effect of the Quality of Fiscal Institutions -- References -- TECHNICAL ANNEX -- A. Country Groupings -- B. Map -- C. Summary Statistics -- D. Balancing Test of PSM -- E. Derivation of the Shadow Price -- F. Role of PPP Investment Management in case of Concessions.

Cover -- Contents -- Abstract -- I. Introduction -- II. Background -- A. Decomposition of Changes in Public Education Spending -- B. Decomposition of Changes in Per-Pupil Education Spending -- III. A Model -- IV. Data and Descriptive Analysis -- A. Wage Premium in Education -- B. Summary Statistics -- V. Testing the Baumol's Hypothesis -- VI. Robustness Checks -- A. Intertemporal Parameter Stability -- B. Asymmetry by Country Groups -- C. A Comparison between Basic and Higher Education Expenditure -- VII. Conclusion -- Tables -- 1. Summary Statistics -- 2. Estimates of First-Differenced Model