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"Hating Congress but loving Democracy is a national passion. For those who apply law, whether lawyers or judges, it is an oxymoronic luxury neither can afford. One of the dirty secrets of the legal academy is that it teaches almost nothing to lawyers about how law is made in Congress. The results of this ignorance can be perverse and anti-democratic. No lawyer would confuse a dissenting judicial opinion with a majority opinion, but somehow lawyers and judges in famous cases have unwittingly confused the meanings of legislative losers and winners. For those lawyers and judges who have declared that reverting to Congress's records is shameful and unconstitutional, this book provides a powerful antidote. Lawyers may hate Congress but Congress by another name is democracy, and without understanding how it works, lawyers will unwittingly find themselves participating in an interpretive endeavor that celebrates those who have lost over those who have won the legislative debate"--

This Article argues that theorists and practitioners of statutory interpretation should rethink two very basic concepts—legislative intent and legislative history. Textualists urge that to look to legislative history is to seek an intent that does not exist. This Article argues we should put this objection to bed because, even if groups do not have minds, they have the functional equivalent of intent: they plan by using internal sequential procedures allowing them to project their collective actions forward in time. What we should mean by legislative "intent" is legislative "context." For a group, context includes how groups act—their procedures. Once one accepts this position, we must rethink the very concept of legislative history. Legislative history is not a search for a mental state, behind the words, but a search for decisional context. We should give up talking about legislative history, replacing it with the far more helpful notion of legislative decision and statutory context.

In this writing, I apply a "decision theory" of statutory interpretation, elaborated recently in the Yale Law Journal, to Professor William Eskridge's illustrative case, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon.[1] In the course of this application, I take issue with the conventional wisdom that purposivism, as a method of statutory interpretation, is inevitably a more virtuous model of statutory interpretation. First, I question whether we have a clear enough jurisprudential picture both of judicial discretion and legal as opposed to political normativity. Second, I argue that, under decision theory, Sweet Homeis a far easier case than either Justice Stevens's or Justice Scalia's opinions reveal. Finally, I critique both opinions for failing to rely on norms borrowed from Congress's actual decisions in the 1982 Endangered Species Act Amendments. The question then, is not "norms or not," but whose norms, Congress's or the courts', should apply. [1]. 515 U.S. 687, 688, 708, 714 (1995). Justice Stevens wrote for the Court, with Justice Scalia in vigorous dissent. Justice O'Connor concurred.