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Cover -- Half Title -- Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Approaching (Legal) Argumentation: A Historical Background -- The Book's Content -- 1 Gilbert's Multi-Modal Argumentation, Jung's Psychological Typology, and the Extension of Multi-Modality to Law -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Gilbert's Multi-Modal Argumentation -- 1.3 Multi-Modality and Jungian Psychological Typology -- 1.4 The Four Modes and Law -- 1.4.1 Introduction -- 1.4.2 The Logical Mode -- 1.4.3 Facing Legal Institutional Constraints -- 1.4.4 The Kisceral Mode -- 1.4.5 The Visceral Mode -- 1.4.6 The Emotional Mode -- 1.5 Conclusion -- 2 Multi-Modal Arguments in Judicial Decisions -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Three Models of Legal Argument -- 2.2.1 The Dialectical Model -- 2.2.2 The Rhetorical Models -- 2.2.2.1 The Legal-Systemic Level -- 2.2.2.2 The Meta-Legal Level -- 2.3 The Dialectical and Rhetorical Dimensions of Multi-Modality in Law -- 2.4 Models and Types of Legal Argumentation and Multi-Modality -- 2.5 The Four Modes and Traces of Multi-Modality in Court Cases -- 2.5.1 The Dialectical and Rhetorical Dimensions of the Legal Logical Mode (Legal Logos) -- 2.5.2 The Dialectical and Rhetorical Dimensions of the Kisceral Mode (Values and Legal Ethos) -- 2.5.3 The Dialectic and Rhetoric of Emotions in Law (Legal Pathos) -- 2.5.4 The Power of Visceral Argumentation (Legal "Physis") -- 2.5.4.1 The Dialectical Dimension -- 2.5.4.2 The Rhetorical Dimension -- 2.5.4.3 Visual Arguments -- 2.5.4.4 Arguments of Sounds -- 2.5.4.5 Arguments of Scents and Tastes -- 2.6 Multi-Modal Arguments and Arguments About Multi-Modality -- 2.7 Conclusion -- 3 Visual as Multi-Modal Argumentation in Law -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Visual Arguments in Legal Argumentation -- 3.2.1 Visual Arguments as Legal Evidence -- 3.2.2 Semiotic "Translation".

"Multi-modal argumentation with its logical, emotional, visceral and kisceral arguments is an important addition to logical argumentation, especially when real-life situations are considered. It does not discard logic but adds other modes of argumentation to complement it, to emphasize the realistic environments of communication.. In this sense, the multi-modal theory is important for the area of legal argumentation, where even in the reasoning of judicial decisions traces of a flesh-and-blood personality, who decided the case and wrote the reasons, can be found. This book presents a comprehensive analysis of this informal logic in legal argumentation and its practicality within the law. It argues that by building on the dialectical and rhetorical models of legal argument, the former being important for clear cases while the latter for unclear ones, the multi-modal theory of legal argumentation brings together logic and psychology in a holistic or integral perspective. The approach is not only descriptive, identifying the traces of alternate arguments in judicial decisions, but is also normative, presenting the criteria for evaluation that multi-modal arguments need to face to attain validity in the legal context. The work will be of interest to academics and researchers in the areas of Legal Theory, Legal Linguistics, Philosophy of Law, and Communication Studies"--

This volume presents a Type Theory of Law (TTL), claiming that this is a unique theory of law that stems from the philosophical understanding of Jung's psychological types applied to the phenomenon of law. Furthermore, the TTL claims to be a universal, general and descriptive account of law. To prove that, the book first presents the fundamentals of Jungian psychological types, as they had been invented by Jung and consequently developed further by his followers. The next part of the book describes how the typological structure of an individual determines their understanding of law. It then addresses the way in which inclusive legal theory can be understood based on this typology. Finally, the book describes the TTL in general and descriptive terms and puts it into context. All in all, the book shows how the integral or inclusive approach to understanding the nature of law is not only in tune with our time, but also relevant for presenting a more persuasive picture of law than the older exclusivist or dualist approaches of strict natural law and rigid legal positivism did

U suvremenim društvima zapadnoga svijeta svjedočimo masovnom povećanju broja zakona i drugih pravnih akata. To je rezultat činjenice da je suvremeni život sve složeniji i ubrzano se razvija, što se odražava na češćim promjenama zakona nego što je to bilo prije. Ali čini se da u nekim situacijama i pretjerano naglašavanje dinamičkog karaktera prava može rezultirati nerazumno učestalim izmjenama zakona. Takva je (trenutačno) situacija i u Sloveniji, kao tranzicijskoj zemlji, u kojoj su pravna sigurnost i pravna predvidljivost kao dvije važne sastavnice načela vladavine prava do izvjesne mjere ugroženi. Zato smo sada više nego ikada svjesni potrebe da se više pozornosti posveti statičnim komponentama prava. One su uvijek bile dijelom prava i moja je teza u ovome radu da ih je potrebno ponovno naglašavati u dovoljnoj mjeri kako bi se stvorila protuteža nerazumno čestim promjenama u našemu pravu. Ilustrativan primjer iznimno nestabilne pravne discipline u Sloveniji jest pravo društava. Stoga primjena načela stabilitas legis u rješavanju ovog problema od strane Ustavnog suda i na područje prava društava, moglo bi potencijalno biti jedno od primjerenih pravnih sredstava. ; Modern Western societies have witnessed a massive growth of legislation and other legal acts. This stems from the fact that modern life in general is increasingly complex and develops very fast, which is reasonably reflected in more frequent legal changes than were common before. But in certain situations it seems that the dynamic content of law might be exaggerated resulting in unreasonably frequent changes. This is typical of the (present) situation in Slovenia as a transitional country, in which legal certainty including legal predictability as two important components of the rule-of-law principle are to a certain extent jeopardised. Consequently, now more than even we have become aware of the need to put more attention to static components in law. These have ever been part of law, so my claim in this article is that it should be re-emphasized to a necessary extent in order to counterbalance unreasonably frequent changes in our law. A particular example of a very instable legal discipline in Slovenia is corporate law. Thus, the application of the stabilitis-legis principle to this problem by the Constitutional Court, also in the area of corporate law, could potentially be one of the remedies to deal with it.

Part I -- Chapter 1. Problem Definition, Structure and Methodology -- Chapter 2. Cyber Security -- Chapter 3. Artificial Intelligence and Law -- Chapter 4. Data Protection -- Part II: Data Protection Law – Selected Countries of Asia -- Chapter 5. South Korea -- Chapter 6. Hong Kong -- Chapter 7. Macau -- Chapter 8. The Philippines -- Chapter 9. Taiwan -- Chapter 10. Lao -- Chapter 11. Vietnam -- Chapter 12. China -- Part III: North America -- Chapter 13. Canada -- Chapter 14. The United States -- Chapter 15. Comparison, Challenges and A Way Forward.

Legalism or legal formalism usually depicts judges as resolving cases by allegedly merely applying pre-existing legal rules. They do not seem to legislate, exercise discretion, balance or pursue policies, and they definitely do not look outside of conventional legal texts for guidance in deciding new cases. For them, the law is an autonomous domain of knowledge and technique. What they follow are the maxims of clarity, determinacy, and coherence of law. This perception of law and adjudication is sometimes designated as "an orthodox lawyering". However, at least in certain cases, it is very difficult to say that legalism is not an inappropriate theory or a method of legal interpretation. Different theories have attested that legal interpretation is much more than just legalism, which appears to be far too naïve. In the framework of modern legal interpretation, the following questions can be raised. Is it possible to integrate legalism in a coherent theory of legal interpretation? Is legalism as a distinctive theory of legal interpretation still a feasible theory of interpretation? How can such a formalist approach withstand a critique from Dworkinian moral interpretivism or accusations of being a myth, masking political preferences from legal realists? These and many other issues about legal interpretation are discussed in this book by prominent legal philosophers and legal theorists.