Suchergebnisse

ResumenLos objetivos de sostenibilidad, sobre todo medioambientales, han sido reconocidos por la OIT en iniciativas de «transición justa» y «empleos verdes». Sin embargo, los ODS ofrecen más margen para un compromiso de la OIT con la sostenibilidad social, al reconocer el «trabajo decente» (ODS 8) y requerir «la adopción en todos los niveles de decisiones inclusivas, participativas y representativas que respondan a las necesidades» (meta ODS 16.7). En este artículo se examina cómo la OIT podría seguir promoviendo los derechos de representación colectiva, a quién otorgarlos y cómo ejercerlos, en el contexto del debate sobre un futuro del trabajo sostenible.

RésuméL'action de l'OIT pour le développement durable s'est d'abord organisée autour des notions de «transition juste» et d'«emplois verts», en lien avec la protection de l'environnement. Aujourd'hui, les objectifs du développement durable devraient permettre à l'Organisation de se saisir pleinement de la dimension sociale du développement durable, grâce à l'ODD 8, qui mentionne le travail décent, et à la cible 16.7 sur la participation à la prise de décisions. L'auteure examine comment l'OIT pourrait promouvoir l'expression collective des travailleurs dans le contexte du débat sur un «avenir du travail durable» et cherche à déterminer qui doit avoir un droit d'expression et comment celui‐ci doit s'exercer.

AbstractSustainability objectives have been recognized by the ILO primarily in terms of the impact of environmental protection in the form of "just transition" and "green job" initiatives. Arguably, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) now offer richer scope for ILO engagement with social sustainability. This can be attributed to the prominent recognition of "decent work" in SDG 8 and the need for "responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision‐making at all levels" in SDG target 16.7. This article examines how the ILO could further promote collective worker voice in the context of debates over a sustainable "future of work", particularly considering to whom voice is given and how it is exercised.

This article examines disputes regarding the connection between freedom of association and the right to strike, occurring at multiple levels, within international, regional and national legal orders. It focuses on the period from 2007 – 2019, when a challenge was made to norms long-established at the International Labour Organisations (ILO) that was subsequently continued in European and national court proceedings. These events raised the potential for normative fragmentation and conflict between legal systems. This article interrogates the roles played by two key actors in these processes: the International Organization of Employers (IOE) and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). Drawing on sociological insights into collective action offered by Offe and Wiesenthal, transposed to the transnational level, an analysis is offered of the power dynamics that motivated IOE attempts to alter the content and influence of ILO norms, alongside the scope for ITUC resistance, given its resources.

This article explores the consequences of "collective begging", that is the failure to provide meaningful legal protection and support for collective bargaining. The first part identifies the perils we are now facing, including increasing precarious work, growing economic inequality and diminished democratic engagement. The second part considers our journey here, namely how we took our (collective) eye off the ball and enabled "begging" rather than "bargaining". Finally, the third part considers potential legal solutions, including expanding the coverage of those at work legally entitled to trade union representation, facilitating sectoral bargaining and enlarging the scope for lawful industrial action.

The UK Government provided a tardy response to the coronavirus pandemic, whichwould seem to have led to widespread community transmission and a high death toll.The measures taken in relation to the labour market were disappointing, being predominantly concerned with protecting business, while limited assistance was provided to the most vulnerable, precarious workers. Jobs have been preserved by such measures, but it is unclear what will happen as the Government schemes are phased out. Crucial issues relating to health and safety at work have been downplayed during the crisis, racial concerns have emerged and gender-related inequalities are being given little attention by the Government. The Trades Union Congress (TUC) has engaged with the Government on policy matters, resulting in some significant alterations to measures taken. Unions have also been prominent in discussions regarding the terms of return to work. This report was originally submitted on 10 April and has now been updated, being accurate up to 7 June 2020.

Bob Simpson has documented the evolution of collective labour laws in the United Kingdom (UK) over several decades and his scholarship reminds us of their intended and unintended consequences. In the highly politically charged context of the 2016 Brexit vote, this article considers how UK and EU laws have shaped the nature and scope of collective bargaining in the UK and, thereby, income differentials and equal treatment in the workplace. While it would be possible to provide for equality of treatment between local British and migrant labour in ways that reduce social tensions, instead we have witnessed the imposition of legal frameworks that place workers in a position of competition rather than solidarity. The mistrust of current forms of migration from the EU seems to have been one key part of the journey towards the Brexit vote. An important question is what comes afterwards. If Brexit does not proceed, we should be contemplating reform at both UK and EU levels; but the problems identified here seem unlikely to evaporate in the event of either 'soft' or 'hard' Brexit. The article concludes that the UK situation offers a salutary reminder to other European Union (EU) States of the dangers of dismantling systems of sectoral bargaining and mechanisms for extension of collective agreements.

Since the financial crisis and the attempts made subsequently to alleviate sovereign debt, European Union (EU) Member States have pursued policies that limit access to legally recognised forms of 'employment'. Such policies have well-documented effects on individual employment rights, such as access to protection from dismissal, but also have the capacity to undermine scope for freedom of association. That effect may arise by virtue of domestic labour laws, but also EU law relating to employment status in the context of collective representation. There is the possibility that EU institutions could redefine employment status to encompass non-standard forms of employment and there are tentative moves in this direction. Recourse to Council of Europe institutions to promote protection of freedom of association as a universal human right may also prove an effective means of addressing the legacy of austerity policies.

From the 1980s onwards, the rhetoric of 'democracy' was used to justify industrial relations reform in the United Kingdom (UK), including the incremental addition of balloting and notice requirements for industrial action. The most recent Trade Union Act 2016 (UK) ('TUA') is remarkable, not only for more extensive balloting and notice requirements that aim substantially to reduce industrial action, but also a shift to a more obviously economic justificatory orientation. This blatant shift from principle to pragmatism can be linked to various financial concerns. One example is the Government's appreciation of the potential economic shocks that could follow the 'Brexit' referendum as to whether Britain should remain in or leave the European Union (EU), which led to some concessions made to the UK trade union movement so as not to alienate an ally for the remainder of the campaign. Another, examined more fully below, is the determination to reduce the budget deficit following the financial crisis. Additionally, and more worryingly, there is evidence that the TUA reforms follow a narrow economic neo-liberal agenda, planned some time before election of the Conservative Government, which aims to silence trade union protest in the UK. This article begins by explaining the current UK legal regime regarding strike ballots and notices, noting the ways in which the TUA has modified the relevant rules. The democratic justifications given for introduction of this statutory matrix of balloting requirements in the 1980s and subsequent amendments in the 1990s are then considered. Finally, the eclipse of 'democratic' by 'economic' reasons for the TUA reforms is examined, alongside the future trajectory of legislative regulation of balloting and notice for industrial action in the UK.

The formal exclusion of the right to strike from the legislative competence of the European Union (EU) under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union stems from an understanding that such industrial relations matters were to remain the prerogative of the Member States in compliance with standards set by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). It is argued here that such an approach is manifestly inadequate, for at least two reasons. The first is the significance of the capacity to take industrial action for European social dialogue, which needs to be protected at EU level if the ILO is unable to do so. The second is that the legitimacy of the EU has been bolstered by reference to social rights, and we might therefore expect the right to strike to be protected within this framework (as understood under the jurisprudence of ILO supervisory bodies). These are reasons for the positive protection of a right to strike, but this article also examines how the right to strike has, in fact, been compromised and arguably even negated by the pursuit of economic objectives by the EU. Extensive restrictions have been placed by judicial means on collective action which has potential cross-border effects, but also EU political and economic institutions have sought to prevent purely domestic action taken by trade unions which has the capacity to undermine certain EU macro-economic objectives regarding public expenditure and wage-setting. In this way, the notional exclusion of EU competence over freedom of association and the right to strike can be seen as a bind from which EU institutions have long escaped. What we have instead is extensive EU back door regulation of industrial action which significantly departs from what were widely accepted ILO standards. What is needed is more transparent debate over the activities of the EU in this sphere and their implications for social dialogue.