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The common narrative about Jean-Baptiste Say's treatment of money holdings is that he denied the possibility of hoarding. I show that this interpretation of Say's thinking is erroneous. Drawing upon the various editions of Traité and Cours and other lesser-known texts, I provide substantial evidence to refute the widespread but mistaken view that, for Say, money was only a medium of exchange. In reality, not only did Say analyze long-term and short-term hoarding, but more generally, Say did envisage that money could serve as a store of value. In particular, three motives could lead individuals to keep idle balances in times of uncertainty: a precautionary motive, the lack of good investment opportunities, and the lack of information. For Say, the demand for money for precautionary motive rose during depressions, indicating that hoarding was a symptom rather than a cause of disturbance. Hoarding was an integral part of Say's economic system that did not invalidate his law of outlets.

Jean-Baptiste Say is generally portrayed as an unrelenting champion of laissez faire who believed commercial activity promoted economic well-being. However, I develop a more nuanced portrait of Say's thinking by showing that he did not believe that free trade was an unmitigated good. He thus identified several exceptions to free international trade that justified government intervention in the form of restrictions on imports and public subsidies to domestic industries. Going beyond Adam Smith's arguments for protective tariffs, Say maintained that government could play a role to protect infant industries, insisting on the fact that protectionism could only be gradually and carefully removed. Drawing upon Say's published writings and archival sources, I show that Say developed original views on domestic and international trade, several of which were distinct from those of Smith. Overall, Say's analysis of free trade sheds greater light on his conception of the role of government in a market economy. It illustrates under what conditions the government should intervene in order to achieve both economic efficiency and social justice.

Charles Coquelin and Jules Dupuit both advocated free banking, but they articulated different views on credit, the note-issuing mechanism, and the role of banking in economic crises. For Coquelin, credit allowed producers to enhance their productive capacities. There was no need to restrict the issuing of banknotes to the quantity of metallic reserves. Coquelin emphasized the role that privileged banks played in the emergence of economic crises. For his part, Dupuit did not believe that credit could create more capital, and warned against the excessive issuing of banknotes. Dupuit considered economic crises to be caused by real factors. I argue that Coquelin's ideas reflected a credit theory of money while Dupuit's views were characteristic of a monetary theory of credit.

In this article, I analyze and compare the contributions of Dupuit and Walras on the natural monopoly of railroads. Both theorists argued that railroads—as opposed to inland waterways—could not be vertically unbundled, a point that previous authors who compared their views failed to point out. Moreover, until now, Dupuit's analysis of the railroad monopolies before the Société d'économie politique had been overlooked. This article fills this gap in the literature by showing that Dupuit and Walras both concluded that railroads were better managed under the monopoly regime; however, they drew upon different perspectives. I argue that Dupuit was more pragmatic, using the concept of a "de facto monopoly," while Walras was more ideological, arguing that the railroad industry was a public utility. In so doing, I underline that Dupuit did not oppose government intervention, counter to a few misrepresentations and fallacies in the literature.

Résumé J.S. Mill est généralement considéré comme le père du concept de monopole naturel au sens moderne du terme. Mais aucun analyste n'a souligné que si Mill distingue deux types de monopole, le « monopole naturel » et le « monopole pratique », c'est à travers ce qu'il entend par « monopole pratique » qu'apparaît la notion moderne de monopole naturel. Les deux notions ont toutefois un point commun : elles désignent des avantages procurés par le fait d'occuper une situation privilégiée ou stratégique.

Abstract
Cournot's views on the effects of international trade on social income have received little attention. Drawing upon a comprehensive analysis of Cournot's writings, this article shows that Cournot distinguished between variations in nominal income and variations in real income. He introduced the principle of compensation of demands: if the price of a commodity changes, the value of the total demand for other commodities remains unchanged. He relied on this principle to demonstrate that a unilateral removal of trade restrictions can cause real income to fall. Under specific circumstances, protective tariffs may be warranted. Cournot thus endorsed the infant-industry argument without being a die-hard protectionist. The article discusses the arguments of his critics and concludes that many commentators have misrepresented his thinking.