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SummaryThe recent downfall of autocracies worldwide, most notably in the Middle East, raises the question: Do the new, more democratic regimes hold a promise of creating a better economic and business environment? To answer this question, I analyze a new large‐scale firm‐level dataset for the post‐regime‐change time horizon of up to 20 years. The main finding is that during the post‐revolution time period the business environment is likely to worsen under the new politically unstable regimes that replace stable autocracies.

openAccessArticle: False ; Page Range: 51-51 ; doi:10.1016/S0313-5926(12)50004-4 ; Harvest Date: 2016-01-12 15:10:43 ; issueName: ; cover date: 2012-03-01 ; pubType:

Abstract
This paper provides empirical evaluation of a number of determinants of tax evasion by firms. The analysis includes both standard determinants, such as tax rates and probability of detection, and non-traditional factors, such as trust in government, compliance costs, and corruption. Firm-level survey data from 4,538 firms in 23 transition economies are analyzed. One of the main findings is that fighting corruption is more important in deterring tax evasion than conventional measures.

Do faculty who teach more produce less research? We revisit this question with a better measure of research productivity, eschewing simple publication counts in favor of the impact of research measured by Google citations. Using original data, we pose this question in the broader context of other determinants of scholarly productivity. We find that heavier teaching crowds out research. Furthermore, faculty with more teaching duties tend to protect the quantity of their research more than the quality. We also find that faculty rank, promotion, experience, gender, the ability to win grants, and the ranking of the resident school are significant predictors of faculty research output. JEL Classifications: I23, J24

This paper develops a model for a particular type of grand corruption often encountered in developing countries, namely, the sale of government positions by autocratic rulers. A two-stage game is considered, where the autocrat moves first to maximize his revenue from the sale of positions in the cabinet by choosing a price that must be paid by interested politicians. The latter become bureaucrats who maximize their utility from bribe revenues for the given price set by the president. Backward induction yields subgame-perfect equilibrium levels of corruption of the president and bureaucrats. A key insight from this analysis is that conventional tools of fighting corruption become ineffective when corruption at the very top is ignored. The model is distinctive in its treatment of individual moral costs of being corrupt and in its consideration of a revolutionary constraint on the autocrat's choices.