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In September 2015, the international community agreed on 17 new sustainable development goals (SDG) as part of the new sustainable development agenda. This current perspective article discusses development cooperation under the new SDG agenda with a special focus on Norway's efforts. It provides background on the governance system for development cooperation and discusses particular issues and topics present policy focuses on, and strategies and policies for achieving the SDG agenda for Norway, both at home and abroad. The role of education as a core part of development cooperation is highlighted and discussed throughout. A recurring theme is the role of conflict, stability and fragility for Norwegian development cooperation in particular. As discussed, Norway has a long-standing tradition of involvement in peacebuilding across the globe. Both the explicit link made by the new SDG agenda between peace and justice, through SDG 16, and its other goals bring the UN's priorities in line with what has been a guiding principle for Norwegian development cooperation for several decades already.

The level of violence seen during transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule varies substantially. Recently, Tunisia experienced an almost bloodless transition, while in Libya the attempt to oust the Gadhafi regime ended in a civil war. This paper looks at the dynamics of democratic transitions, and attempts to explain why some become extremely violent while others progress peacefully. Specifically, the paper looks at the potential role of international governmental organizations (IGOs) for constraining or altering the behavior of non-democratic regimes, thereby influencing regime transitions. It argues that, by alleviating commitment problems between the outgoing regime and the new elites, and by imposing sanctions that reduce an incumbent regime's ability to reap the benefits of office, IGOs increase the likelihood of seeing a peaceful transition to democracy. However, the paper also argues that non-democratic leaders should anticipate this, and therefore that regimes that are members of highly interventionist IGOs should be less likely to liberalize at all. The paper finds evidence in favor of the proposition that IGOs increase the likelihood of a peaceful regime transition, and that non-democratic regimes that are members of highly interventionist IGOs anticipate being constrained by these organizations, and therefore are more reluctant to liberalize in the first place.

The level of violence seen during transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule varies substantially. Recently, Tunisia experienced an almost bloodless transition, while in Libya the attempt to oust the Gadhafi regime ended in a civil war. This paper looks at the dynamics of democratic transitions, and attempts to explain why some become extremely violent while others progress peacefully. Specifically, the paper looks at the potential role of international governmental organizations (IGOs) for constraining or altering the behavior of non-democratic regimes, thereby influencing regime transitions. It argues that, by alleviating commitment problems between the outgoing regime and the new elites, and by imposing sanctions that reduce an incumbent regime's ability to reap the benefits of office, IGOs increase the likelihood of seeing a peaceful transition to democracy. However, the paper also argues that non-democratic leaders should anticipate this, and therefore that regimes that are members of highly interventionist IGOs should be less likely to liberalize at all. The paper finds evidence in favor of the proposition that IGOs increase the likelihood of a peaceful regime transition, and that non-democratic regimes that are members of highly interventionist IGOs anticipate being constrained by these organizations, and therefore are more reluctant to liberalize in the first place.

Oktober 2000 kidnappet Hezbollah tre israelske soldater, operasjonen fikk ingen konsekvenser. Da Hezbollah gjennomførte en nærmest identisk operasjon sommeren 2006, endte konfrontasjonen med krig. Hvorfor fikk to så like hendelser så ulike konsekvenser? Svaret ligger i trekantforholdet mellom Israel, Iran og Hezbollah.

Many conflict studies regard formal democratic institutions as states' most important vehicle to reduce deprivation-motivated armed conflict against their governments. We argue that the wider concept of good governance—the extent to which policy making and implementation benefit the population at large—is better suited to analyze deprivation-based conflict. The article shows that the risk of conflict in countries characterized by good governance drops rapidly after a conflict has ended or after independence. In countries with poor governance, this process takes much longer. Hence, improving governance is important to reduce the incidence of conflict. We also decompose the effect of good governance into what can be explained by formal democratic institutions and less formal aspects of governance, and into what comes from economic development and what is due to how well countries are governed. We find that informal aspects of good governance to be at least as important as formal institutions in preventing conflict and that good governance has a clear effect over and beyond economic development.

Soft power is the power to persuade whereby one actor in a non-coercive manner convinces another to want the same things he/she wants. Sport can be used as tool of soft power both internationally and domestically. Peace-building and nation-building can be achieved through four mechanisms of sport diplomacy and politics: image-building; building a platform for dialogue; trust-building; and reconciliation, integration and anti-racism. These mechanisms are not deterministically controllable and can have unintended consequences. On the one hand, sporting events can be used as a means of building trust between adversaries. On the other, the hostilities between peoples can be mirrored on playing fields. This article examines the intended and unintended consequences of each mechanism. It also examines the role of confounding economic factors. Each article comprising this Special Issue explores a different mechanism of sport politics and public diplomacy.

Can we predict civil war? This article sheds light on this question by evaluating 9 years of, at the time, future predictions made by Hegre et al. (2013) in 2011. We evaluate the ability of this study to predict observed conflicts in the 2010–2018 period, using multiple metrics. We also evaluate the original performance evaluation, i.e., whether the performance measures presented by Hegre et al. hold in this new 9-year window. Overall, we conclude that Hegre et al. were able to produce meaningful and reasonably accurate predictions of armed conflict. Of course, they did not always hit the mark. We find that the model has performed worse in predicting low level incidence of conflict than in predicting major armed conflict. The model also failed to predict some important broader regional shifts. These, however, represent important insights for future research and illustrate the utility in predictive models for both testing and developing theory.